



PAKISTAN
AT THE POLLS
1993



Political Weather Report
Special Issues

1993



P A K I S T A N
A T T H E P O L L S
1993

Gallup
Political Weather Report
Special Issue
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**Special Issue on
1993 National Elections**

P A K I S T A N

**AT THE POLLS
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This report is based on the research carried out by Gallup Pakistan with the collaboration of Election Study Group.

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PART I

1993 GENERAL ELECTIONS

PART I

1993 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The Rise and fall of Nawaz Sharif Government

IN SEARCH OF THE EIGHTH PRIME MINISTER SINCE 1985

In 1993 Pakistan held a national election, fourth of its kind in eight years since 1985. The average tenure of a government was thus less than two years. In between there were another four interim governments. All of the eight governments were sworn-in under the 1985 constitution, which demonstrated a certain degree of robustness. All the untimely dissolution's of government were attributed to corruption and incompetence. The President (Zia and later Ishaq) exercised their prerogative to make these charges. In two of the three dissolutions (Junejo and Sharif) the Supreme Court disagreed with the Presidential decision and gave its judgment against the dissolution. In the third case (Bhutto government) the Presidential decision was not challenged in the higher courts. In one case (Sharif) the Supreme Court decision caused to restore the Sharif government for a brief period, at the end of which he was compelled to resign and sought fresh elections. Pakistan is still on a bumpy course towards achieving a civilian democratic government. Four elections and eight successive governments in eight years leave much to be desired.



CONTROVERSIAL ELECTIONS

It is ironic that all four elections, including the latest, were held under controversial circumstances. The 1985 elections were controversial because they were being held by the Chief of the Army Staff and the Martial Law Administrator, General Mohammad Zia Ul Haq; he had prohibited any role for political parties and the elections were conducted on a non-party basis. This was a means to limit the power of political leaders and the Peoples Party in particular. The second elections were necessitated in 1988, firstly because the Junejo government was dismissed by General Zia in May 1988 and secondly because General Zia expired in an air crash in August the same year. The third elections were held in 1990 because Benazir Bhutto's government was dismissed by the President on charges of corruption, and the fourth election were held in 1993 because the Nawaz Sharif government felt compelled to resign under mounting pressure from the President and the military leader.



BENAZIR BHUTTO

In 1988, the electoral outcome gave a plurality of seats to Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party in the National Assembly, allowing her to form a weak coalition government. From its very beginning, her government was under pressure from the opposition political parties and a section of the military and civilian administration. It came as no surprise when her government was dismissed in less than two years under serious charges of corruption and malpractice. The ensuing elections were held under a clearly partisan interim government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who had earlier led the parliamentary opposition against Benazir Bhutto, she refused to accept the elections as fair and leveled serious charges of electoral fraud. International election monitoring teams did not agree with this charge, but the blemish continued to fuel political discontent. Benazir Bhutto persisted in her claims that elections were stolen, and some months later her party produced a White Paper on election fraud. The evidence on electoral malpractices was unconvincing but Ms Bhutto's persistence in periodically pursuing her charges sustained political impasse, which crippled the smooth functioning of competitive democracy. The National Assembly and the legislators failed to emerge as a serious body of lawmakers and policy leaders; the feuding among its leaders kept the legislature an under developed and fragile body.

NAWAZ SHARIF

Despite its clear majority in the Assembly, the Nawaz Sharif's premiership remained shaky during the following thirty months while he remained in government. The series of episodes which kept the Sharif government under clouds of uncertainty included the Gulf War (.....), during which the popular mood ran counter to government policy, his estrangement with the Army Chief General Beg on the question of his retirement, public outburst on murder cases in Lahore which led the Prime Minister to cancel a pre-scheduled foreign visit (to Japan), the Veena Hayat rape case, massive uproar against fraud in cooperative finance companies, the break-up of the ruling political alliance (IJI), unprecedented devastation by floods in almost entire country and a well orchestrated "Long March" by the opposition aimed at forcing the government out of Islamabad.

The Nawaz Sharif government showed impressive alertness and alacrity in the face of many challenges, and was generally seen as an action-oriented team of young and business-minded people. In fact Nawaz Sharif was accused of being a man in-haste, who took upon himself many new ideas and mistook "indecent haste" for "speed". He was accused of lacking a strategic vision and tied down to what appeared most pressing at a given moment.

In respect, the Nawaz period is seen to be a period when the economy began to move out of stagnation and signs of hope were aroused: the government began by resolving the perennial disputes on the National Finance Commission which allocates sources to provinces and the distribution of water between provinces; it unfolded and implemented the long pending programme of large scale privatization; international transaction were liberalized; new infrastructure projects in the field of roads, telecommunication and energy were pursued with personal enthusiasm by the Prime Minister. Despite reigning political distractions, the Prime Minister's economic programme gained momentum. Traditional financial managers termed him as reckless, but short-term results went in his favor. Through his much-publicized public contact in launching rehabilitation of flood victims and doling out Yellow Taxis, Nawaz Sharif was able to project economic development as the government's concern number one. This had not happened since the government of Field Marshal Ayub Khan in the 1960s. The new image resonated with popular aspirations. During his short tenure in government, Nawaz Sharif appropriated a vast constituency of voters as his own, under a platform which became personally identified with his name, even to the exclusion of his erstwhile allies among politicians and more importantly in the establishment. It was a classic case of a man once propped up by the establishment who turned to the people to sustain his power base. Two decades earlier, the father of his opposing People Party had done exactly the opposite: Having risen to power on a populist surge, he had turned to the establishment for staying in power. In the end, both Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif failed. A happy marriage between the popular will and the establishment remains to be Pakistani's key problem.

Pakistan lacks the institutions which intermediate between popular will and the wielders of state power: Her political parties are underdeveloped, the parliamentary

practices are rudimentary, professional and interest groups are un-organized and tooth-less and there is no support base for a mature and independent class of intellectuals and social leaders. The fragility of the nation's political infrastructure is considerably more serious than the tenuousness of her economic infrastructure. Nawaz Sharif government could not address these issues and was driven out of power.

This is the background in which Pakistan entered its fourth election in eight years, in search for the eight Prime Minister since 1985.

The seeds of dissolution were sown from the very outset of Nawaz Sharif government. Apparently the favorite of the establishment was caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. But Nawaz Sharif was able to use his greater popular appeal to leapfrog and claim premiership. This created mistrust within the group, which had so far remained, united in removing Benazir Bhutto from power. Nawaz Sharif fell constrained from three sources within his own coalition. His legitimacy could be threatened by the Islamist appeal of religious political parties in the IJI coalition; his authority could be undermined by the military; and he could be removed from his position by the President. In retrospect of it seems that the urge to become independent and autonomous of all three constraints led to the downfall of Nawaz Sharif. He was unable to sustain or build upon his common interests with the IJI partners, the military and the President. At the very outset Nawaz Sharif made a bid to undermine the Presidential authority by proposing a constitutional amendment on the Islamic Sharia. Until then, the religious parties had always talked of Sharia bill, in the form of an ordinary law; they had never proposed a constitutional amendment.

On the face of it the constitutional amendment on Sharia did not address the issue of Presidential powers. But, the connection was not lost to the President and his men: there was a possibility that the eighth amendment which was the source of President's enhanced powers would be dovetailed to the Sharia amendment once the necessary support had been mobilized. During this period Nawaz Sharif also toyed with the idea of holding a referendum to amend the constitution. He had hoped to overcome the President's encroachment on the powers of the Prime Minister's, without engaging in frontal confrontation with him. When the president's blessings failed to come, he decided to wait. The Sharia clauses were introduced in the National Assembly in the form of a Bill, and the question of a constitutional amendment was pended. The entire exercise of the Sharia Bill enabled Nawaz Sharif to temporarily placate the religious constituency. But, since the Bill had very little practical content, it enhanced the underlying tensions between Nawaz Sharif and the religious parties. It also provided them a new demand of a constitutional amendment on the Sharia.

Later that year Nawaz Sharif made another bid to amend the constitution. This time the attempt was made through the "law and order" route. The poor law and order condition in the country had been dramatized during the middle of the year by ruthless group murders of innocent families in Lahore and its adjoining areas. The criminals could not be traced. Nawaz Sharif attributed the ineffectiveness of the

administration to defective laws and slow legal procedures. Thus, he began to work on a constitutional amendment which provided massive powers to the Prime Minister, besides instituting what were called as especial and speedy courts. This time, the President's annoyance was more transparent. Eventually Nawaz Sharif backed off and a watered down version of the amendment was tabled and approved. This was the Twelfth amendment to the constitution. The amendment was of minor significance and did not touch either the controversial Eight amendment or the issue of Presidential powers.

There is indication that by then Nawaz Sharif had already lost the confidence of the military leadership. In the weeks which followed, the IJI coalition broke up. In a stormy meeting held in September 1991, two token parties in the alliance were expelled, while the Jamaat-i-Islami decided to disassociate itself from the alliance. Even through no formal decision was taken to disband the alliance, it become dysfunctional from that time. Within his first year in government, Nawaz Sharif was no more a favorite of the establishment, or of the religious parties.

In the meantime, privatization of public sector industries was on its way. Nawaz Sharif ignored criticism on the issue of transparency of the process and charges of favoritism and went ahead in selling off a major portion of the industry and two of the five key banks. Other economic policies also progressed at rapid pace. Nawaz began to appear as a man of action.

Several crises emerged during that period. The cooperatives scandal unraveled. It implicated a large section of the political leadership including the families of Nawaz Sharif and his close political associates. There was an exchange of accusations between the government leaders and the People Party opposition leaders. Each laid the blame on the other. Through his clever tactical moves, Nawaz Sharif wriggled himself out of this crisis.

Each time a crisis appeared political pundits predicted the downfall of Nawaz government. But by the time the crisis was over, a new wave of uncertainty around another theme would quickly replace the earlier one. Public opinion polls during this period showed an impressive support for Nawaz Sharif; moreover, his majority in the Parliament showed no signs of erosion. But, yet the press and the pundits regarded the Nawaz government as fragile. The source of the strength or the fragility, as the more shrewd ones clearly understood, lay elsewhere outside the parliament and outside popular opinion. On the surface, Nawaz Sharif projected a timid image when he faced the establishment. But, this did not work to win their confidence. A combination of personal and systemic distrust was at work. In his heart Nawaz Sharif had hoped to defeat his establishment adversaries on the battlefield of popular appeal.

The floods towards the end of summer 1992 provided an unusual occasion for Nawaz Sharif to establish rapport with the public. The floods were described to be the worst in a century. Some commentators believed the flood devastation has pushed back Pakistan a decade in terms of development. There was misery, devastation and death in the Punjab, NWFP and Kashmir. The Sindh province was also partly affected.

Nawaz Sharif decided to be with the flood victims for weeks. In a highly visible tour programme he toured the entire flood affected area. Where he issued administrative instructions on flood relief, but more importantly he was successful in convincing the flood victims that the Prime Minister cared for them. It was then that Nawaz Sharif discovered his abilities to establish rapport with the common man. And he seemed to like it. He was known to be shy in public. This remained somewhat correct for his interaction with colleagues; but as for the man in the street, he began to cherish the occasions which he spent with them. When the flood rehabilitation activity slowed down, Nawaz Sharif clasped the opportunity to hold widely publicized meetings with victims of local injustices. This was quickly followed by a land distribution scheme in the Sindh province. One Boeing Jet 737 and a number of helicopters were at the Prime Minister's disposal. For several months, he followed a daily schedule of leaving Islamabad for touring up and down the country until the early evening, when he returned to the capital for attending to a few ceremonial meetings. Much of the official business began to be transacted either on the flight, or by people other than the Prime Minister himself. The establishment generally felt uncomfortable with this highly unusual way of being a chief executive. But, for Nawaz Sharif it brought an invaluable public touch. His detractors accused him of taking a leaf out of Bhutto's book, and imitating his populism. Nawaz Sharif became distant from his political colleagues, as he spent more time in the public. It is quite remarkable that despite their constant grumbling, only a few of his colleagues deserted him when the Government was finally dismissed in April 1993. The establishment generally felt a sense of relief. The popular sentiment in favor of Nawaz Sharif, however took most observers by surprise. Over the next couple of months Nawaz Sharif was at the climax of his popularity. While the Supreme Court debated the lawfulness of his dismissal, public opinion surged in his favor. It was unusual noteworthy that the support for the restoration of Nawaz Sharif government cut across party lines. Opinion polls during that period showed 58 % support for Nawaz Sharif government. The political pundits and intellectuals were also very vocal against the dismissal. They were critical of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and many among them took a leap from criticizing the dismissal of the Nawaz government to actually supporting him. The English language press, which had so far been skeptical about Nawaz Sharif was extremely vocal in his favor. The man once advised to rise from the (local) Model Town mindset to the Margala mindset (Cosmopolitan Islamabad) became the favorite of many of the urban cities. The Supreme Court proceedings became a national drama until the day of the courts decisions in the favor of restoring the Nawaz government. The courts decision did not alter the attitudes of Nawaz Sharif's detractors in the military leadership and the civilian establishment. They were critical of his impulsive behavior, impatience and arbitrariness. Besides, they found that privatization had clipped the wings of the bureaucracy. They had lost some of their prized job and control over resources. Nawaz Sharif's fiscal irresponsibility in going after large projects without securing proper sources of financing was another reason for their concern.

The establishment's intransigence combined with an impatient Nawaz Sharif, slightly intoxicated with his popular appeal, led him to make a few critical mistakes. He focused on regaining the government in the Punjab province on the same lines as the federal level. He called a joint session of the Parliament, and tried to use its



powers. His abrupt steps, which were not quite legal, failed and humiliated him before the establishment. The stage was now set to put pressure on him to leave government. Partly frustrated in his ability to exercise authority, party hopeful of a positive electoral outcome, Nawaz Sharif succumbed to the pressure to resign and seek fresh elections. As part of the deal, President Ghulam Ishaq tendered a simultaneous resignation. For the next three months Pakistan was governed by an acting President and a caretaker Prime Minister.

BENAZIR'S ROLE (Foreign Interference)

In the final hours of the downfall of Nawaz Sharif government in April 1993, Benazir Bhutto had played a behind the scene role. Contrary to much of her history, she did not actively resort to street politics, but mostly played on the threat to use it. Six months earlier in 1992, her 'long march' protest rallies culminating in a march on Islamabad had failed to bring about the government's downfall. Thereafter she led Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif believe that she was amenable to political reconciliation. A pregnancy leave in London, where she gave birth to a baby girl, made her temporary disinterest in politics and a retreat from confrontation quite credible. Surrounded by an unusual air of rapprochement, Benazir Bhutto's spouse Asif Zardari was released from prison, where he was incarcerated on corruption charges, and allowed to join the family in a London hospital. Benazir Bhutto was had been appointed to a prestigious position of chairperson of the National Assembly Committee on Foreign affairs. The government offered to pay for her maternity expenses, as an entitled perquisite to her membership in the parliament, which she gladly accepted. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto spoke in a telecasted speech from the parliament on the merits of rapprochement; their tone was touching and emotional.

This apparent rapprochement had another side to it. Newspapers reported that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was uncomfortable with this new mood of reconciliation between the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition.

GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN

Reports about the President's parting of ways with the Prime Minister had been popular for a long time. But, they had died down after his annual address to the joint session of the Parliament. In that address, the President had endorsed the Prime Minister's performance in clear and loud terms.

During their period a sense of disaffection began to emerge in the Muslim League ranks. Despite their denials, some of the Muslim League MNAs (Member National Assembly) visited the President in a manner which was seen as a conspiracy against the Prime Minister. The death of Muslim League President Mohammad Khan Junejo gave a special twist to the emerging crisis. Nawaz Sharif hastened to install himself as the President of Muslim League. This characteristic haste triggered off a dispute in the party and a separate faction was created under the leadership Hamid Nasir Chatta.

In the background which was building up to a head-on collision between the President and the Prime Minister were two other important jobs: The President's own and the Chief of the Army. The Army Chief's position had fallen vacant after the sudden death of the Army Chief General Asif Nawaz Janjua. The President exercised his constitutional authority to appoint a man of his own choice, ignoring the views of the Prime Minister. Seven senior Generals were bypassed in the process. This was a clear signal that the President meant to exercise his authority. Secondly, the President's term in office was to expire in October 1993. To be re-elected he would have required the support of Nawaz Sharif, whose Muslim League commanded a majority in the electoral college which votes for the Presidents office: a combined electoral college of the National Assembly, Senate and four provincial assemblies. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was vague on extending his support. Whenever the subject was raised, Nawaz Sharif and his cabinet colleagues would say something short of a clear answer. This annoyed the President. His office had started a low level campaigning for re-election. When Nawaz Sharif finally extended his commitment in March, it was too late. The old man was by then infuriated. But, more importantly, an entire coalition of forces under the umbrella of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had already been formed. It brought together a variety of interests from the civilian and the military establishment, PPP, Muslim League defections at the centre and the provinces and perhaps some blessings from the diplomatic circles. Ghulam Ishaq Khan could not step back simply because his Presidential re-election had been cancelled. Thus the momentum to demolish the Nawaz Sharif's government continued. It was only a matter of a few weeks before the President would make his final announcement to dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister.



PART II

ELECTION DATA

ELECTION DATA

TWO PARTY HOUSE

The 1993 elections again revealed gravitation towards a two-party system with the two top parties polling 80 percent of the votes.

The evolution towards a two party house had started from the 1988 elections, when PPP won 93 seats, IJI won 55 seats and the remaining 50 seats were claimed by smaller parties and the independents.

In 1993 elections, PML-N emerged as a powerful Populist Party with nation wide support, in opposition to the PPP. This marked a significant change in the political game in the country as the politics changed from pro-PPP and anti-PPP forces to PPP and PML.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM VERSUS DATA ANALYSIS

While People's Party maintained its traditional vote bank of 38 percent, PML-N won majority of the votes with an impressive vote bank of 40 per cent, marking an increase of 2 percent from the 1990 elections. However, PPP was asked to form the Government because after making an electoral arrangement with PML-J and IJM the combined vote bank of PPP increased to 45 percent as opposed to 43 percent of PML-N which was allied with ANP and PIF.

Remarkable performance of PML-N in rural is a notable feature of the 1993 elections. The party was successful in getting 26 percent of votes in rural Sindh. This further strengthened the two-party system as a consolidated anti-PPP vote bank emerged for the first time.

PPP lost its strong hold in Lahore and other urban centers of the Punjab where it had maintained a dominant position in the 1970 and 1988 elections. However, it was successful in making inroads into Southern Punjab.

One of the most remarkable features of the 1993 elections is the decline of religious parties. The three big religious parties- the Pakistan Islamic Front, the Islami Jamhoori Mahaz and the Muttahida Deeni Mahaz together managed a meager 6.7 percent of the nationwide voting figure. The disappointing performance of the religious parties can be explained by a few reasons: Firstly, in absence of a radical left, an undecided voter does not view the religious parties as the only other alternative. Secondly, after Zia's intense Islamization and Nawaz's appropriation of the Islamic image, religious parties no longer had a significantly different agenda.



ROLE OF SINDH

Sindh remains a stronghold of People's Party although PML-N performed remarkably well in this province in the 1993 elections. PPP was successful in getting 32 seats out of a total of 47 seats in the province. The emergence of PML-N and boycott by MQM affected the results of elections this time round.

The performance of the PML-N in Sindh is notable although its victories were exaggerated as close analysis of PPP's performance shows that PML-N did not cut into PPP vote bank but consolidated on the anti-PPP vote bank.

The PML- N managed to get about 27.6 percent of votes in Sindh. The People's Party share in rural Sindh was 56.3 percent.



'VOTE BANKS' OF PPP AND IJI

PPP 'VOTE BANK'

The PPP, founded in 1968, has maintained an extremely resilient 'vote bank'. It polled 38 percent of the votes in 1970 elections, 38 percent in 1988, 37 percent in 1990 and 38 percent in 1993 elections.

The PML-N and alliances managed a significant vote bank of 44% but were successful only in getting 78 seats in National Assembly as opposed to 86 of PPP and alliance parties. The vote bank of PML-N has registered a notable improvement since the 1970 elections.

As expected, PML-N fared much better in the Punjab, where it secured 45% of votes, while PPP managed to poll 39% of votes. PPP did better in rural areas of southern and central Punjab, whereas PML-N was more successful in urban centers particularly in the northern part of the province.

Sindh remained PPP's stronghold where it managed to get 51 percent of votes as opposed to 30 percent polled in favor of PML-N. In 1993, the PPP managed to win over half the popular vote in every district of the province except Sanghar and Karachi.

In NWFP, PPP managed 16 percent of votes with PML-N doing twice as well with 32 percent of votes.

In Balochistan, PPP managed to win 18 percent of vote while PML-N managed only 7 percent.



ELECTION DATA BASE

Seats and Votes Scored by Various Parties in the NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS: 1993

All Pakistan Figures

PARTY POSITION
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 1993

Party	Votes	% of Polled Votes	No. of Seats
PML(NAWAZ)	7980229	39.9	72
PPP	7578635	37.9	86
PML(JUNEJO)	781652	3.9	6
PIF	645278	3.2	3
IJM	480099	2.4	4
ANP	335094	1.7	3
MDM	216937	1.1	2
PKMAP	97541	0.5	3
NDA	64713	0.3	1
JWP	54607	0.3	2
PKQP	54144	0.3	-
NPP	48721	0.2	1
BNM (Hyee)	47648	0.2	1
BNM (Mengal)	45228	0.2	1
Independents	1482033	7.4	15
Others	107979	0.5	2
===Total===	21045996	100	202*

* Excluding 5 constituencies where proceedings were terminated due to death of contesting candidates during the General Elections, 1993



TURN OUT RATES

Summary Data

COMPARATIVE DATA ON TURN OUT RATES

Country	Means Turnout (%)
Australia	95
Netherlands	95/84
Austria	94
Italy	93
Belgium	93
New-Zealand	90
West Germany	87
Sweden	85
Israel	82
Norway	81
France	79
Finland	79
United Kingdom	77
Canada	76
Ireland	75
Japan	73
Switzerland	65
India	59
USA	59



PART III

VOTERS

ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

Findings from the Exit-Poll Data conducted with approximately 4500 voters covering all provinces and regions of the country. The Survey was conducted outside the polling stations on October 6, 1993.

October 6, 1993



DETERMINANTS OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR



SOCIO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS

ROLE OF AGE

Findings from the Exit-poll data show that PPP is slightly ahead of PML-N among voters of age 30 and above. But it is behind PML-N among the under thirty.

Comparison with the 1990 election study shows that PPP gained additional votes from the over thirty age group of voters. PML-N with 37% votes among younger voters was successful in cutting a slight edge over PPP (36%), While PPP is ahead PML-N in older voters by a margin of 3%.

Table

Age Group	<i>Percent who Voted for</i>			
	1993		1990	
	PML-N	PPP	IJI	PDA
21 - 30	37	36	28	36
30 and above	35	38	37	31

Source: Gallup Exit Poll Surveys



ROLE OF LITERACY

The Gallup exit poll data show that PPP was ahead of PML-N among the illiterate voters. In the previous elections, PDA was ahead of IJI by a margin of 5 percent amongst the illiterate voters which increased to 8 percent this year.

In the previous elections, IJI was more successful amongst the literate voters as compared to PDA, but this year both the parties (now PML-N and PPP respectively) were equally successful among the literate voters securing 36 percent each of total literate voters.

Table

Education-wise	<i>Percent who Voted for</i>			
	1993		1990	
	PML-N	PPP	IJI	PDA
Illiterate	33	41	29	34
Literate	36	36	35	33

Source: Gallup Exit Poll Surveys



ROLE OF INCOME

The Gallup exit poll survey data shows that PPP maintained its position amongst the low income voters. In fact the level of support from voters having an income level of less than 2000 registered an increase as compared to 1990 elections. However, support from voters earning more than 3000 decreased significantly by about 5 percent.

PML-N had almost the same level of support among the voters belonging to the income groups of below 2000 as the previous elections. However, its support increased in the high income groups of voters.

Table

Income level	<i>Percent who Voted for</i>			
	1993		1990	
	PML-N	PPP	IJI	PDA
1-500	31	46	31	32
500-1000	39	40	34	33
1001-2000	34	38	33	36
2001-3000	40	33	35	33
3000+	36	25	35	30



ROLE OF FOREIGN REMITTANCES

The Gallup exit poll shows that PML-N lost its edge over PPP in this election among recipients of overseas remittances. Compared to previous elections where IJI had an edge of 10 percent over PDA, this year both the parties received equal support (36 percent each) from overseas remittances.

ROLE OF FOREIGN REMITTANCES

Table

	<i>Percent who Voted for</i>					
	1993			1990		
	PML-N	PPP	Others	IJI	PDA	Others
Remittance Receiving Household						
Personal recipient	36	36	28	41	31	28
Family recipient	44	31	25	39	30	31

Source: Gallup Exit Poll Survey, October 6, 1993



ATTITUDINAL DETERMINANTS

ATTITUDES AMONG PPP VOTERS

Why did they decide to choose PPP AND REJECT PML-N?

CAUSE FOR CHOICE

Around 31 percent of those voted in favor of PPP cited ‘party of poor people’ as the determining factor behind their decision to vote for PPP. This reason was particularly important for the voters earning below Rs. 3000. As the income level increases other factors become more pertinent to the decision making process of the voters.

Compared to the 1990 election data, this year the factors such as ‘under dog’ and ‘good leadership’ did not surface as significant factors behind voters choice of the party. However, the view of the party as the ‘Pro-poor’ party increased from 26 percent in 1990 to 31 percent this year. Moreover, this view became increasingly more important in the low income voters whereas its importance decreased as the income level improved.

CAUSE FOR REJECTION

Only 5 percent of PPP voters said that they rejected PML-N because it did not work for the poor and the same percentage cited ‘patronage of the rich’ as the most disliked aspect of PML-N. Another 5 percent rejected PML-N for not fulfilling their promises. For the PPP voters the strongest charge against PML-N was inflation: 6 percent said that they held it responsible for inflation.

Table

Campaign Themes

POSITIVE THEMES WHICH APPEALED TO THE PPP VOTERS

Question: [Ask from only those who voted for PPP. (Arrow election symbol)]

"What is the most important factor that made you vote in favor of PPP?"

Percent among respondents who answered this question

	Part of poor people	Good Manifesto	Leadership qualities	Party of Z.A. Bhutto	Development of country	others
All Pakistan	31%	4%	5%	4%	3%	30%
Language-wise						
Urdu	36%	5%	6%	3%	6%	32%
Punjabi	33%	3%	3%	4%	1%	29%
Sindhi	17%	2%	13%	7%	3%	28%
Pashto	49%	12%	1%	0%	6%	17%
Balochi	18%	6%	2%	3%	0%	59%
Income-wise						
Up to 2000	32%	2%	6%	4%	3%	29%
Rs. 2001-3000	35%	4%	4%	2%	3%	36%
Rs. 3001-5000	27%	8%	5%	4%	4%	33%
More than 5000	29%	10%	5%	8%	3%	33%
No response	27%	3%	4%	5%	3%	25%

Source: Gallup Exit Poll Survey, October 6, 1993

Table
Campaign Themes
NEGATIVE THEMES WHICH CAUSED
PPP VOTERS TO REJECT PML-N

Question: [Ask form only those who voted for Peoples' Party. (Arrow election symbol)]

“PML-N is the principal opponent of the PPP. What did you most dislike about the PML-N which led you not to vote for PML-N? (Give only one answer.)”

Percent among respondents who answered this question

	False Promises	Did not work for poor	Patronage of rich	Responsible for inflation	Others	No Opinion
All Pakistan	5%	5%	5%	6%	35%	44%
Language-wise						
Urdu	7%	4%	2%	11%	40%	36%
Punjabi	5%	6%	4%	7%	41%	37%
Sindhi	4%	4%	3%	6%	27%	56%
Pashto	3%	16%	8%	2%	22%	49%
Balochi	0%	2%	1%	0%	19%	79%
Income-wise						
Up to 2000	5%	6%	5%	7%	32%	45%
Rs. 2001-3000	6%	6%	5%	7%	39%	38%
Rs. 3001-5000	3%	5%	6%	5%	46%	36%
More than 5000	6%	1%	2%	6%	54%	30%
No response	3%	6%	4%	3%	30%	54%

Source: Gallup Exit Poll Survey, October 6 1993



ATTITUDE AMONG IJI VOTERS

Why did they decide to chose IJI and reject PPP?

CAUSE FOR CHOICE

PML-N appealed to its voter by establishing its image as a pro poor amongst its voters. The exit-poll data show that about 16 percent of PML-N voters said that they voted in favor of the party because of its pro poor stance. Others factors that determined voters' behavior were: Loyal to country (7 %), providing employment (7%), party of Quaid-e-Azam and development of country (7%).

CAUSE FOR REJECTION

Around 20 percent of PML-N voters said that they rejected PPP because it has woman leadership. Another 10 percent described disloyal to country as the reason for not voting in favor of PPP. Party of criminals, did not work for poor and anti Islam were other reasons behind PPP's rejection by PML-N voters. Party of criminal was mentioned by 8 percent, did not work for poor by 4 percent and anti-Islam by 2 percent of PML-N voters.

Woman leadership was cited as the major reason for rejecting PPP by relatively low income voters amongst the PML-N voters. This factor was of highest significance for voters in income group Rs. 3001-5000. Disloyal to country was a factor bothering relatively high income voters from PML-N vote bank with about 13 percent of voters with income above 5000 describing not loyal to country as the reason for not voting for PPP.

Table
Campaign Themes

NEGATIVE THEMES WHICH CAUSED IJI VOTERS TO REJECT PPP

Question: [Ask from only those who voted for IJI. (Bicycle election symbol)]

“PPP is the principal opponent of the IJI. What did you most dislike about the PPP which led you to not vote for PPP? (Give only one answer.)”

Percent among respondents who answered this question

	Woman Leadership	Party of criminals	Not loyal to country	Did not work for poor	Anti-Islam	False Promises
All Pakistan	20%	8%	10%	4%	2%	4%
Language-wise						
Urdu	11%	9%	6%	4%	2%	2%
Punjabi	21%	8%	11%	3%	2%	5%
Sindhi	9%	12%	3%	3%	1%	11%
Pashto	38%	11%	0%	2%	7%	3%
Income-wise						
Up to Rs. 2000	18%	9%	8%	5%	3%	6%
Rs.2001-3000	27%	7%	7%	3%	3%	6%
Rs.3001-5000	17%	11%	11%	2%	2%	2%
More than 5000	16%	10%	13%	2%	3%	2%
No response	19%	5%	13%	3%	1%	2%

Source: Gallup Exit Poll Survey 1993



TYPE OF VOTERS

The Seven Types



SEVEN TYPES OF VOTERS

Analysis of Gallup exit-poll data suggests that voters can be classified into seven major types. **The Party Loyals, The Value seeking Voters, The Patron Seeking Voters, The Legislation-minded, The Development Searchers, The Biradari Bound, and the Skeptic Voters.**

Analysis of data suggests that about twenty three percent of the voters like to be seen as **Party Loyals**. The most important reason in their choice was the nomination of their candidate by the party. They chose this reason from seven different reasons provided to them on a circular card.

Seventeen percent of voters would like to be seen as **value-seeking/ Morality-Seeking voters**. They describe legislator's religiosity, honesty and integrity as the principal motive behind their choice.

Sixteen percent of voters are the **Patronage-seeking type**. They viewed the legislator's ability to help in dealing with Government Officials as the most important attribute of the legislator.

Thirteen percent of voters are **Legislation-Minded**. They chose their legislator because of his competence in the comprehension of national affairs.

Thirteen percent of voters would pass as **Development Searchers**. They mentioned their legislator's ability to execute development projects, such as, bringing roads and electricity to their community as the critical reason behind their choice.

Six percent admitted to be **Biradari-bound**. They said they voted with their Biradari.

Only two percent placed themselves in the category of Skeptic Voters that is those who chose a certain legislator because he was in their view, at least better than his competitor.

Table
Motivation to Vote
MOST LIKED ATTRIBUTE IN THE CANDIDATE

Attribute	All	PPP	PML-N
Party Loyal	23%	12%	25%
Value/Morality seeking	17%	26%	14%
Patronage seeking	17%	16%	18%
Legislation Minded	13%	14%	15%
Development Seekers	13%	12%	13%
Biradari Bound	6%	7%	5%
Skeptics	2%	1%	2%

Source: Gallup Exit Poll Survey 1993



Motivation to Vote

MOST LIKED ATTRIBUTE IN THE CANDIDATE

The percentage of voters who described themselves as party loyal has decreased by 2 percent, from 25 percent in 1990 elections to 23 percent this year.

The percentage of voters describing value/morality, patronage and legislation comprehension has most important attributes has remained approximately same as the previous elections.

An interesting feature of 1993 elections is the increase in number of development seeking voters. This percentage has increased from 9 percent in 1990 to 13 percent this year. This indicates increasing importance of completion of development projects amongst voters.

Only 2 percent of voters described themselves as skeptics in contrast to 4 percent in the previous elections.



SENSE OF EFFICACY AMONG VOTERS

A large majority (75%) of the voters in Pakistan's 1993 elections believed their vote would make a difference in steering the course of national affairs. In other words they believed in the efficacy of voting. The Political science literature describes such attitudes as a positive sign for democratic development.

The percentage of voters believing in the efficacy of voting increased from the previous election where 73 percent believed that their vote would make a difference in the national affairs. The more significant feature as illustrated by the data is the decrease in the percentage of voters who believed their vote would be ineffective in changing the course of national affairs. The percentage of voters who viewed their vote as ineffective has decreased to 4 percent from a significant 10 percent.

Table

VOTERS' SENSE OF EFFICACY

Voter's Sense of Efficacy	1993	1990
Effective	75%	73%
Ineffective	4%	10%
No Response	21%	17%

Source: Gallup Exit Poll Survey 1993



Exit Poll 1993 Questionnaire

- Q 1) In your opinion, what is the first thing that the Government formed after the elections should do?
- Q 2) In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing the country today?
- Q 3) Which newspaper do you usually read?
- Q 4) How often do you watch television?
- Daily
 - Sometimes
 - Don't watch television
- Q 5) Some people enthusiastically participate in politics/election campaigns by taking part in rallies or helping candidates while others are not interested in politics/elections. What is your level of participation in politics?
- Participate a lot
 - Moderate level of participation
 - Do not participate at all
- Q 6) In the present elections campaigns:
- | | Yes | No |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Did you get the chance to campaign for any candidate | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. Did you get the chance to participate in election rallies or listen to speeches? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. Did you put some party's flag on your car, shop or house? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. Did you help in arrangement of any election rally? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. Did you get the chance to address an election rally? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
- Q 7) Who did you vote for in today's national assembly election?
- Candidate Name:
 - Election Symbol:
 - Party:
 - PPP
 - Muslim League Nawaz Sharif
 - Tehrik-e-Insaf (Imran Khan)
 - Others
- Q 8) If for some reason, representative from this party could not participate in the elections then who would have you voted for?
- PPP
 - Muslim League Nawaz Sharif

- c. Tehrik-e-Insaf (Imran Khan)
- d. Others

Q 9) Why did you vote for this particular candidate in the National Assembly Elections? I will put forward seven reasons, choose the most relevant: Please tell us what is the most important reason? What is the second most reason? What is the third most important reason?

- a. Helps people (Police Stations, Courts etc)
- b. Helps in provision of utility services like gas, electricity etc
- c. Has the capability to comprehend matters of national significance.
- d. Is a pious and religious individual
- e. Is a candidate of our most favourite party
- f. Our biradari decided in his favor
- g. To ensure that the other candidate loses
- h. Other
- i. Don't Know

Q 10) Did you cast your vote in 1990 elections?

- a. Yes
- b. No

Q 11) (if yes then) who did you vote for?

- a. PPP
- b. Islami Jamhoori Itthead (IJI)
- c. MQM
- d. Jamiat-e-Ulamae Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman Group)
- e. Awami National Party
- f. Other (Party)
- g. Independent Candidate
- h. Don't Know/ don't remember

Q 12) (*This question is for those individuals who voted in favor of Islami Jamhoori Itthead (IJI)*) Suppose that IJI did not take part in previous elections, then who would have you voted for?

- a. Benazir Bhutto
- b. Jamat-e-Islami
- c. Other
- d. Don't Know

Q 13) In your opinion, which party would form the Government as a result of this election?

- a. Benazir Bhutto
- b. Nawaz Sharif
- c. Qazi Hussain Ahmed
- d. Other
- e. Don't Know

- Q 14) Suppose that in this election none of the party is successful in getting the majority vote and government has to be formed by through party coalitions. In such an event, which of the following coalitions would you be in favor of?
- a. PPP and PML coalition?
 - i) In favor
 - ii) Oppose
 - iii) Don't Know
 - b. PML and Islami Front coalition?
 - i) In favor
 - ii) Oppose
 - iii) Don't Know
 - c. PPP and Islami Front coalition?
 - i) In favor
 - ii) Oppose
 - iii) Don't Know
- Q 15) In your opinion, is single party government better than government formed by party coalitions?
- a. One party government
 - b. Coalition Government
 - c. Don't Know
- Q 16) What is one thing your really like about People's Party (in case you are voting for it) or what is one thing you really dislike about this party (in case you are NOT voting for it)?
- Q 17) What is one thing your really like about Muslim League Nawaz (in case you are voting for it) or what is one thing you really dislike about this party (in case you are NOT voting for it)?
- Q 18) What is one thing your really like about Islamic Front Qazi Hussain Ahmed (in case you are voting for it) or what is one thing you really dislike about this party (in case you are NOT voting for it)?
- Q 19) After the National Assembly Elections, elections for choosing President would also be conducted. If Wasim Sajjad, Moeen Qureshi, Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan and Qazi Hussain Ahmed are the four candidates for the post of President, who would you vote for?
- a. Wasim Sajjad
 - b. Moeen Qureshi
 - c. Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan
 - d. Qazi Hussain Ahmed



- e. Other
- f. Don't Know

Q 20) Who is your favorite leader amongst the following leaders of the country?

- a. Benazir Bhutto
- b. Nawaz Sharif
- c. Qazi Hussain Ahmed
- d. Altaf Hussain
- e. Maulana Fazal-ur- Rehman
- f. Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani
- g. Don't Know

Q 21) In your opinion, will your vote help in improving country's situation?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Don't Know

Q 22) In your opinion, if elections are held regularly would that improve the country's situation, worsen it or make no difference?

- a. Improve
- b. Will make no difference
- c. Worsen
- d. Don't Know