

PAKISTAN  
AT THE POLLS  
1997

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Part I

Analysis of  
Elections 1997

## Election Results and the New Calculus of Pakistani Politics

The 1997 Elections are a new watershed not only in Pakistani Politics, but more importantly in Pakistan's political culture. According to the definitions developed in the science of Electoral Politics, the 1997 elections can be categorised as a "Critical Election". Critical Elections are defined as elections which represent not just a shift in popularity of one party over another, but those which also cause a complete change of paradigm. They indicate a shift in the loyalties of various social classes, a new agenda of political discourse and a change in the prevailing political culture. It can safely be said that so far in Pakistan's political history there have been only two critical elections. The first one was in 1970 which shaped the loyalties of various social classes, defined the agenda of political debate and set the pace for a specific political culture. For nearly one quarter of a century politics in Pakistan remained largely in the mould created by the 1970 elections. As would be true of any dynamic situation, a change remained in the process of creation throughout this period; the pace of that change was accelerated in the nineties, but the final shift occurred in 1997, when a new Critical Election brought about the qualitative transformation.

It is important to analyze as to what were the core elements of the 1970 elections and to see whether there is a change brought about by the 1997 elections. In nutshell, the 1970 elections marked the birth of Bhuttoism: and, the 1997 elections signify the end of Bhuttoism. The 1970 elections were much more than just the electoral victory of a political party and the defeat of certain others. Similarly, the 1997 elections are much more than just the defeat of People Party and the victory of the Pakistan Muslim League. That kind of change had also occurred in 1990, but the 1990 elections were not a critical election. They did not mark a definitive change in the loyalties of various social groups (although the election results then showed the beginnings of it) nor did they set a new agenda or show signs of a new political culture.

The 1990 elections were a stand off between two major parties, PPP and PML/IJI, each of which receive nearly 37% of the popular vote. The PML/IJI won because it had better alliances, and as would be explained later, it managed to gain the critical 10% edge in popular vote in the province of Punjab which opened the door to victory. But up until 1993 elections PPP still enjoyed a marked edge among the lower classes in the country, and it was recognized as the part of the poor. The PML/IJI campaign worked hard to confront the socio-economic appeal of PPP by focusing on nationalist appeal of the integrity and independence of Pakistan. It tried to make electoral issue out of the fall of Dhaka, the Nuclear Issue, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Islamization of society. But in the end, PPP retained its traditional 37% of the vote and there was little switch over to PML/IJI. The Gallup Exit Poll Surveys show that even in the 1993 elections Peoples Party had an edge of 9% points over PML among the very poor, and a 5% point edge among the illiterate, even though it was 2% behind PML in the aggregated national vote. The very poor and the illiterate did not vote in their true proportions; if they had done so PPP would have been significantly ahead of PML in the 1993 elections.

In 1990, PPP lost an election to PML/IJI in a decisive fashion. It won only 44 seats in the National Assembly compared to 106 won by PML/IJI. But it lost hardly any space in the popular vote where it declined by only 1% (down from 38% in 1988 to 37% in 1990). The situation was quite different in the 1997 election, wherein it not only lost the election but its vote was nearly halved from 38% to 22%. This has led to a qualitative change, a paradigmatic shift, in Pakistani politics. The People Party is now significantly behind PML among all social classes. This is unlike the past when it was ahead in some and behind in others.

The loss of vote by PPP has raised an interesting issue of whether PPP voters have switched loyalties or simply stayed at home and not voted. The prevailing view so far has been that the majority of PPP deserters simply stayed home. The implication is that they did not switch loyalties. While this conclusion appears quite appealing at first sight, it is not borne out under close scrutiny. I have tried to investigate this matter.

## TURN OUT LOSS

On February 3, nearly 2.1 million voters, who should have turned out the turn out rates would have been identical to 1993, stayed home and did not vote.

## PPP's LOSS

If PPP's performance was identical to its 1993 performance, it should have received 7.9 million votes. It received only 4.1 million. This means the loss of its vote was around 3.8 million.

Thus the number of votes which PPP lost was nearly twice the total loss of turn out in the country. Supposing that nearly 40% of all turn-out loss came from PPP, it would mean that 0.8 million of PPPs potential voters stayed home. It still leaves us 3 million of PPPs potential voters who came to the polling stations and voted for some other party. My analysis based on a survey conducted on the Election Day suggests that half of these, or 1.5 million votes, were gained by PML (N), which other parties and independents were gainers of 1.5 million votes. It raised another interesting issue of whether PML (N) votes were beefed up to the extent of 1.5 million votes of PPP. On first impression the answer is No, but on closer analysis the following picture emerges.

If PML (N) had performed exactly the same way as it did in 1993 it should have gained 8.4 million votes. In effect it obtained almost 8.7 million votes. Thus a net gain of 0.3 million votes was made by PML (N).

But, this net gain conceals the fact that PML (N) is estimated to have lost 0.5 million votes due to turn out loss (estimating that disinclination to vote among PML (N) voters was nearly half that of PPP) and 1.3 million of its 1993 voters were lost to other parties and independents (totalling to a loss of 1.8 million). But, since PML (N) gained approximately 1.5 million PPP and another of 0.6 million voters of other parties (totalling to a gain of 2.1 million), the net gain (2.1—1.8) was 0.3 million.

The important conclusion which emerges out of this is the following. The Pakistan People Party had obtained nearly 7.5 million votes in 1993. Nearly half of these voters became restive with PPP during its tenure in government. Thus nearly 4 million voters were floating around in 1996. This created considerable uncertainty and an opportunity for other political forces. At different times before the elections, these floating voters were attracted to Imran Khan and Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who saw noticeable increase in their popularity. In this background came the 1997 elections. A small section of the dissatisfied PP voters returned to the party fold, but a large group deserted it. Approximately 3.8 million potential PPP voters deserted. From among them 0.8 million are estimated to have abstained from voting, 1.5 million were gained by PML and 1.5 million were gained by other parties and independents. It should be noted that the share of smaller parties and independents increased from 22% of the total vote in 1993 to 32% in 1997.

The PML (N) lost some votes due to turn out loss and some to other parties and independents. But, this loss was offset by the substantial gain from PPP, resulting in a net gain of 0.3 million votes.

While the 1997 elections mark the end of Bhuttoism, the Peoples Party has not disappeared from the scene. It has obtained 22% of the popular vote which keeps it as a strong party. Although all of its National Assembly seats are located in Sindh, yet numerically majority of its polled votes are from the province of Punjab. It secured 22% of the votes in Punjab, the same as its national average. But, as I have explained in another paper, without the charismatic appeal of Bhuttoism, PPP will have to introduce greater institutionalization within the party.

There is another qualitative change in national politics caused by the 1997 elections. While the 1970 elections led to a polarisation among social classes, the 1970 elections show a remarkable sense of national unity. Elections are being seen as an arena for competition and not a battle ground between different social groups. Thus the social profile of PPP and PML voters is quite similar in terms of income, education and age. One interesting feature of the 1997 election is that while in the past the PPP attracted a large majority of voters of the Shia maslak, the situation is quite different in 1997. The voters belonging to the Shia maslak were found to be equally divided among PML (N) and PPP with a slight edge enjoyed by PML (N).

The 1997 elections have caused two major changes. Firstly, Bhuttoism appears to have ended although PPP is well and alive as the second largest mainstream political party in the country. Secondly, polarisation of various social classes has given way to a sense of competition within a broad social consensus. There is an opportunity for greater national unity.

### **A SHIFT OF 5% VOTE IN PUNJAB HAS MADE OR BROKEN GOVERNMENTS**

	Edge in votes	Edge in seats
PPPs edge over PML/IJI in 1988	1% PPP: 40%, PML/IJI: 39%	8 PML/IJI 45, PPP: 53
PML/IJI edge over PPP in 1990	10% PML/IJI: 49%, PPP: 39%	78 PL/IJI: 92, PPP: 14
PML(N) edge over PPP in 1993	6% PML(N): 45%, PPP: 39%	5 PML(N): 52, PPP: 47
PML(N) edge over PPP in 1997	37% PML(N): 59%, PPP: 22%	107 PML(N): 107, PPP: 0

By losing 4% vote in Punjab in 1993 (down from 49% to 45%) PML (N) lost 40 seats (down from 92 to 52)

Earlier in 1990 an edge of 10% in the popular vote had given PML/IJI an edge of 78 seats in Punjab along.

Thus an edge of 6% did not get the winner much advantage. But an additional 4% taking the margin to 10% brought about a massive swing.

A party with an advantage of 10% points gets a landslide in Punjab and achieves supremacy in the National Assembly. However, an advantage of around 5% simply results in a stalemate of roughly equal seats in the province. Thus it is the additional 5% vote which causes the massive swing and tilts the position of the winner in the entire National Assembly in its favour.

### NINETIES MARK THE DECLINE OF PPP AND THE RISE OF PML (N) 1990-1997

Electoral data show a marked decline in the position of PPP and the rise of PML (N) during the nineteen nineties.

All percentage change are the changes of 1997 over 1990.

#### ALL PAKISTAN

	1990	1993	1997
PPP	37%	38%	22%
PML	37%	40%	46%

Over its 1990 PPP declined by 41%  
PML rose by 25%

#### PUNJAB

	1990	1993	1997
PPP	39%	39%	22%
PML	49%	45%	59%

PPP declined by 45%  
PML rose by 20%

#### SINDH (All Sindh)

	1990	1993	1997
PPP	42%	52%	32%
PML	9%	30%	19%

PPP declined by 42%  
PML rose by 53%

#### SINDH Rural

	1990	1993	1997
PPP	58%	57%	42%
PML	9%	28%	17%

PPP declined by 28%  
PML rose by 89%

#### NWFP

	1990	1993	1997
PPP	23%	11%	10%
PML	28%	24%	38%

PPP declined by 57%  
PML rose by 26%

#### BALUCHISTAN


	1990	1993	1997
PPP	15%	18%	15%
PML	12%	7%	8%

PPP has no change  
PML declined by 33%

### VOTERS TURNOUT


### PAKISTAN

Percent of Registered voters who voted



### USA

Percent of Registered voters who voted in the US Presidential Elections



## IS THERE A GENDER DIFFERENT IN TURN OUT

While there is no evidence yet from the 1997 election, Gallup Pakistan has done an extensive exercise of the 1990 elections regarding gender difference turn out. On that basis it is estimated that women voters vote less than men voters by a ratio of 100: 69, meaning that if 100 men vote only 69 women are expected to vote on the average.

This estimate has been calculated by analyzing the electoral results of more than six thousand (6444) polling stations, spread over all provinces, whose election results were available separately for Men and Women.

## AGE PROFILE OF PAKISTANI VOTERS

All citizens of Pakistan Age 21 and above are eligible to vote. On this basis the age structure of the population, the eligible voters would have the following Age Profile:

Age	Percent of voters
21-29	28
30-39	24
40-49	19
51+	29

Compiled by Gallup Pakistan on the basis of data of 1981 census provided by the Population Census Organisation.

Part II

Election Data:  
Analytical  
Tables

### NOTE FOR THE READER OF THESE TABLES

1. Percentages are rounded off to the nearest whole numbers for ease of communication.
2. These data of 1997 are based on the unofficial results released by the Election Commission on February 4, 1997. There may be a difference of 1% from the actual data in some cases. However, the difference is unlikely to be large enough to affect the direction of analysis.
3. **Source of the data:**

Report on General Elections 1993 (With Comparative Results of General Elections 1985, 1988 and 1990), Volume - II, Election Commission of Pakistan.

### PARTY SHARE OF VOTES

#### ALL PAKISTAN

##### *National Assembly Elections*

	1988		1990		1993		1997	
	% of Voters	No. of Seats						
PML(N) / IJI	30.16	54	37.37	106	39.86	72	45.88	133
PPP / PDA	38.52	93	36.83	44	37.85	86	21.80	18
MQM	5.37	13	5.54	15	-	-	3.55	11
JUI(F)	1.84	7	2.94	6	-	-	1.61	2
ANP	2.09	2	1.68	6	1.67	3	2.31	10
JWP / BNA	0.36	2	0.61	2	0.27	2	0.29	2
BNP							0.66	3
PKMAP / PMAI	0.24	0	0.35	1	0.49	3	0.33	0
Others	1.92	6	4.38	5	12.46	21	9.2	2
IND	19.50	27	10.30	22	7.40	15	14.37	22
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>203</b>

**PARTY SHARE OF VOTES****PUNJAB***National Assembly Elections*

	<b>1988</b>		<b>1990</b>		<b>1993</b>		<b>1997</b>	
	% of Voters	No. of Seats						
PML(N) / IJI	37.70	45	49.41	92	45.35	52	58.95	107
PPP / PDA	39.80	53	38.63	14	38.67	47	22.12	0
IND / Others	22.3	17	11.96	9	15.98	13	18.92	7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>114</b>

**1997 Elections (Rural / Urban Comparison)**

	<b>Punjab Urban</b>		<b>Rural cum Urban</b>		<b>Rural</b>	
	% of Voters	No. of Seats	% of Voters	No. of Seats	% of Voters	No. of Seats
PML(N)	68%	20	58%	26	57%	61
PPP	21%	0	25%	0	21%	0
Others	6%	0	8%	0	8%	0
IND	5%	0	9%	2	13%	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>66</b>

PML (N) edge over its own is about 10% points higher in the Urban Punjab

- The classification has been borrowed from a similar analysis done by The Friday Times for the 1993 Elections. For each of the three categories, the NA seats are the ones included by TFT in its 1993 analysis on the subject.

**PARTY SHARE OF VOTES**  
**REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUNJAB**

*National Assembly Elections*

NA Seats → → →	BARANI		NEHRI		COLONY		SOUTHERN	
	35-46 / 80-84		57-65 / 71-79 85-131		47-56 / 66-70 132-140		141-150	
	% of Voters	No. of Seats	% of Voters	No. of Seats	% of Voters	No. of Seats	% of Voters	No. of Seats
<b>PPP 1997</b>	<b>27.37</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>22.72</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>15.57</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>24.70</b>	<b>0</b>
PPP 1993								
PDA 1990	41.14	2	39.80	5	33.88	5	37.73	2
PPP 1988	38.40	6	44.44	36	31.21	8	34.20	3
<b>PML(N) 1997</b>	<b>61.90</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>61.83</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>49.54</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>59.50</b>	<b>9</b>
PML(N) 1993								
IJI 1990	51.86	15	50.35	55	45.48	15	48.05	7
IJI 1988	38.24	9	40.8	25	30.66	5	36.21	6

The regional distribution within Punjab can be done in several ways. This particular distribution is not the best. But since we started with it in 1988, we continued it for the sake of time series data. 1993 data are missing.

**PARTY SHARE OF VOTES****SINDH***National Assembly Elections*

	<b>1988</b>		<b>1990</b>		<b>1993</b>		<b>1997</b>	
	% of Voters	No. of Seats						
PML(N) / IJI	12.80	0	8.82	3	30.40	10	18.56	9
PPP / PDA	46.54	31	41.81	24	51.68	33	32.08	18
MQM	25.50	13	27.09	15	Boycott		17.91	11
IND / Others	15.15	2	22.28	4	17.92	3	31.45	8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>46</b>

It is interesting to note that while PML (N) has improved its performance compared to 1988 and 1990, its share of vote is lower compared to what it scored in 1993, the year in which MQM boycotted the election. This is true for both Urban and Rural Sindh as can be seen from the next table.

**PARTY SHARE OF VOTES**  
**REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SINDH**

*National Assembly Elections*

NA Seats → → →	RURAL		URBAN	
	152-167 / 170-183		151, 168, 168, 184-196	
	% of Voters	No. of Seats	% of Voters	No. of Seats
<b>PPP</b> <b>1997</b>	<b>41.72</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13.45</b>	<b>2</b>
PPP      1993	56.82	25	41.11	10
PDA      1990	57.56	22	18.32	2
PPP      1988	67.61	28	17.90	3
<b>PML(N)</b> <b>1997</b>	<b>17.41</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>20.79</b>	<b>2</b>
PML(N)      1993	28.36	3	34.43	7
IJI      1990	9.11	3	8.40	0
IJI      1988	14.17	0	10.21	0
<b>MQM</b> <b>1997</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>47.82</b>	<b>11</b>
1993	Boycott			
1990	1.79	1	64.85	14
1988	2.97	0	56.07	13
<b>IND</b> <b>1997</b>	<b>19.36</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4.48</b>	<b>0</b>
1993	7.63	0	Missing	Missing
1990	1.79	1	64.85	14
1988	2.97	0	56.07	13

Please note that the data for 1993, Sindh Urban does not include NA 151 (Sukkur) whereas in the remaining years it does.

**PARTY SHARE OF VOTES****NWFP***National Assembly Elections*

	<b>1988</b>		<b>1990</b>		<b>1993</b>		<b>1997</b>	
	% of Voters	No. of Seats						
PML(N) / IJI	27.28	8	23.74	8	22.66	9	37.18	14
PPP / PDA	22.54	8	22.51	5	10.73	5	10.13	0
JUI(F)	8.85	3	20.57	4	0	0	7.99	0
ANP	18.40	2	15.00	6	14.19	3	19.12	9
IND / Others	22.93	3	18.18	3	52.42	9	25.58	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>24</b>

**PARTY SHARE OF VOTES**  
**REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NWFP**

*National Assembly Elections*

NA Seats → → →	BARANI		NEHRI		COLONY		SOUTHERN	
	1-8		11-17		21-26		9-10 / 18-20	
	% of Voters	No. of Seats						
<b>PPP 1997</b>	<b>17.26</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2.41</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>22.45</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1.34</b>	<b>0</b>
PPP 1993								
PDA 1990	25.43	0	8.22	0	30.67	3	24.20	2
PPP 1988	33.99	5	12.84	0	34.05	3	4.56	0
<b>PML(N) 1997</b>	<b>7.11</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>60.01</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>36.34</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>48.52</b>	<b>3</b>
PML(N) 1993								
IJI 1990	5.15	1	41.53	4	35.99	2	24.16	1
IJI 1988	18.82	0	30.53	4	32.77	2	32.51	2
<b>ANP 1997</b>	<b>52.52</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>13.44</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5.22</b>	<b>1</b>
1993								
1990	41.16	6	-	-	1.66	0	-	-
1988	38.47	2	0.85	0	17.38	0	6.07	0
<b>JUI(F) 1997</b>	<b>8.21</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4.84</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4.84</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13.69</b>	<b>0</b>
1993								
1990	23.84	1	9.02	2	14.73	0	33.11	1
1988	3.68	1	1.61	0	6.93	0	26.64	2

1993 data are missing

**PARTY SHARE OF VOTES****BALUCHISTAN***National Assembly Elections*

	<b>1988</b>		<b>1990</b>		<b>1993</b>		<b>1997</b>	
	% of Voters	No. of Seats						
PML(N) / IJI	21.01	2	12.00	2	7.47	0	7.69	0
PPP / PDA	7.19	1	15.00	2	18.23	1	15.42	3
JUI(F)	17.22	4	18.82	2	0	0	15.36	2
BNA / JWP	11.97	2	18.60	2	8.14	2	10.77	0
PKMAP / PMAI	7.46	0	10.08	1	10.29	3	18.26	3
IND / Others	35.15	2	25.50	2	55.87	5	32.50	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>11</b>

**Note:** In 1993 JUI (F) contested election under the banner of IJM (Islami Jamhoori Mahaz)

## PARTY SHARE OF VOTES

## REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF BALUCHISTAN

*National Assembly Elections*

NA Seats → → →		QUETTA		PASHTUN		BALUCHI/BRAHVI	
		197		198-200		201-207	
		% of Voters	No. of Seats	% of Voters	No. of Seats	% of Voters	No. of Seats
<b>PPP</b>	<b>1997</b>	15.99	0	7.91	0	5.33	0
PPP	1993						
PDA	1990	33.50	1	8.09	0	12.54	1
PPP	1988	10.70	0	9.51	1	5.12	0
<b>PML(N)</b>	<b>1997</b>	23.12	1	16.06	1	13.07	1
PML(N)	1993						
IJI	1990	1.34	0	14.11	1	14.07	1
IJI	1988	19.20	0	17.26	0	23.12	2
<b>BNA</b>	<b>1997</b>						
JWP	1993						
JWP	1990	9.50	0	6.14	0	26.11	2
BNA	1988	11.20	0	-	-	17.05	2
<b>JUI(F)</b>	<b>1997</b>	17.11	0	33.37	2	7.65	0
	1993						
	1990	30.14	0	35.43	1	9.80	1
	1988	20.52	1	34.64	2	9.22	1
<b>PKMAP</b>	<b>1997</b>	12.94	0	19.20	0	2.42	0
PKMAP	1993						
PMAI	1990	14.35	0	29.14	1	1.21	0
	1988	11.33	0	17.60	0	2.13	0
<b>PNP</b>	<b>1997</b>						
	1993						
	1990	-	-	1.08	0	21.73	2
	1988	10.31	0	0.76	0	14.73	0
<b>BNP</b>	<b>1997</b>					27.16	3
	1993						
	1990	3.88	0	-	-	11.28	0
	1988	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>BNM</b>	<b>1997</b>	0.82	0	0.45	0	17.63	0

The distribution of 11 seats of Baluchistan in 3 zones is a little tricky. Above table is not complete.

### Turn-out Rates: National Assembly Elections

	1985	1988	1990	1993	1997
<b>All Pakistan</b>	<b>53.60</b>	<b>43.07</b>	<b>45.46</b>	<b>40.28</b>	<b>35.06</b>
Punjab	60	47	50	47	39
Sindh	44	42	43	28	31
NWFP	41	34	36	35	29
Baluchistan	37	26	29	25	22

#### Notes:

1. Except for All Pakistan, figures have been rounded off to the nearest whole number.
2. In 1993 MQM boycotted the National Assembly Elections but participated in Provincial Assembly Elections. The turnout of Sindh in 1993 is 28% in National Assembly and 37% in Provincial Assembly Elections.
3. 1997 data excludes FATA in order to be comparable with earlier years.

### THE DROP IN PERCENTAGE IN 1997

All Pakistan	5% points	that is 13% drop compared to 1993 turn out
Punjab	8% points	17% drop
Sindh	6% points	16% drop because of the boycott comparison has been made with 1990
NWFP	6% points	17% drop compared with 1993
Baluchistan	3% points	12% drop compared with 1993

Part III

Exit-poll Data  
Voters  
Behaviour

# INFLATION UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY TOP VOTER'S ADVICE TO THE NEW PM

## Voters Were Concerned About Incomplete Tenures

As voters were leaving the polling stations on February 3 the day on which they gave a landslide victory to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, they were asked by Gallup interviewers: "What is your advice to whoever becomes the nations next Prime Minister: What should be his or her first priority ?". The following responses were given by a cross section of over 5000 voters spread in more than 250 randomly selected polling stations covering a scientific sample of National Assembly seats in all the four provinces.

Economic issues received the attention of 52% of voters whereas accountability related issues received the attention of 26%. Sixteen percent (16%) gave miscellaneous advice, while 6% did not give any view. Interestingly there was hardly any difference in the priorities proposed by voters of PML (N) and PPP.

The new Prime Minister must however note with some concern public fears about incomplete tenures. When the voters were asked: "What is our view, will the new government complete its five years or end before the tenure is completed?" Only 40% were hopeful of a full tenure. 27% said it may end before its time and 31% did not give a view. This was before the election results instilled greater confidence in the new government. Or may be the fear was itself subconsciously responsible for a providing an undisputed majority to one party.

Table

## Voters Advice to the New Prime Minister

**Question:** What is your advice to whoever becomes the nations next Prime Minister; what should be his or her first priority?

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<b>Give top priority to :</b>	
Inflation	31%
Unemployment	15%
Welfare of the Poor	6%
Accountability	10%
Corruption	8%
Islamic Laws	8%
Other Miscellaneous advice	16%
No Response	6%

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**Source:** Gallup Exit Poll Survey, 1997

## MAJORITY OF VOTERS FAVOURED A QUIET ELECTION CAMPAIGN

73% of the voters told a Gallup Exit Poll Survey that they preferred a relatively quiet election campaign without posters, banners, flags and rallies. In 1997 elections the Election Commission had prohibited the use of these means of election campaign. Only 19% said they would have like to see a more loud campaign as in the past. There were differences in the views of voters of various parties. The voters of PML (N) were most favourable to a quiet campaign, whereas the voters of MQM (A) were least favourable. The voters of PPP and PTI lay in between. Thus only 16% of PML (N) opposed a quiet campaign, whereas 40% of MQM (A) voters, 27% of PTI voters and 24% of PPP voters gave unfavourable views about Election Commission restrictions which had resulted in a quiet election campaign.

Notwithstanding the absence of more glamorous aids of an election campaign the voters who turned up at the polling stations reported a rate of active participation in the election campaign which was not very different from previous elections. Thus nearly 30% of voters said that they not only voted, but have also canvassed other people in favour of their preferred candidate. Almost 50% said they had attended a small or large electoral gathering during the campaign. Nearly 20% said they had helped in organizing an election meeting and just a little less than 10% said they had even made a speech during the campaign. In each case, except for speech making, the figure was nearly 5% less than the participation rate measured by the Gallup Exit Poll Survey in the 1993 election. Thus the drop in the rate of participation in the election campaign is almost the same as in the turn out rate which also dropped by 5 percentage point compared to 1993. For the first time the 1997 Gallup Exit Poll Survey posed a question to find out if the voters had travelled to the polling station in a transport provided by the election candidate. Interestingly one third (34%) of the voters said they had used a transport provided by the candidate, while the remaining two third said they had made their own independent travelling arrangements.

## PML (N) WAS THE SECOND CHOICE OF 41% OF MQM VOTERS: Gallup Survey

The Gallup Exit Poll survey reveals that even though Imran Khan's PTI received less than 2% of the national vote, his party was the second choice of 19% of PML (N) voters, 16% of PPP voters and 14% of MQM voters. The survey also revealed interesting findings about the second choice of MQM voters: 41% of MQM voters indicated PML (N) as their second choice while only 1% of MQM voters indicated PPP as their second choice.

## THE ROLE OF CLAN OR BIRADARI IS SIGNIFICANT BUT DECLINING IN ELECTIONS

All except 20% of the national population easily identify themselves with a clan, zat or biradri in Pakistan. Those who identified with a biradri clan or zat were almost equally divided between those who said they collectively sat down among their biradri to decide on their voting decision in the recent elections (40%) and others who did not (40%). These findings have emerged from the Gallup Exit Poll Survey conducted with a sample of more than 5000 voters as they stepped out of the polling station. While 40% said they collectively sat down to decide about their voting decision, only 17% of the voters said that the legislator whom they were electing belonged to their own clan or biradri. But, only 3% said that a common biradri was their major attraction to the person for whom they were voting. The claimed role of biradri as a major cause for choosing a legislator has been declining over the years. In response to the Gallup Exit Poll in 1990, 7% mentioned biradri as the most important reason; it declined to 6% in the 1993 elections and to 3% in the recent most election of 1997.

## BEING PERSONALLY HELPFUL IS THE MOST LIKED QUALITY IN ELECTION CANDIDATE

Nearly 40% of respondents in the Gallup Exit Poll survey said that they were voting for the person whom they thought was most helpful to them in personal difficulties with various official dealings, courts or the police. The respondents had been provided with seven possible attributes of a good election candidate and asked to pick one which they thought was most important to them. The second most important attribute was the candidate's ability to be helpful in the neighbourhood's development such as roads, gas supply and electricity etc. 16% voted in favour of this attribute. 14% gave highest importance to the candidate's competence or ability to deal with important national matters.

The candidate's affiliation with the voter's favoured party was rated top most reason by only 10%. It goes to show that even though people have voted for the party ticket, the party is constrained to nominate people who would qualify well on being helpful in personal matters and being successful in bringing developmental activity to the neighbourhood. The importance of party has declined compared to previous years. It was most important reason to vote for 25% of the voters in 1990 elections and 22% of the voters in the 1993 elections. The candidate's personal piety and honesty appeared to be the top most reason to vote for 9% of the voters.

### *Table* Motivation to Vote MOST LIKED ATTRIBUTE IN THE CANDIDATE

**Question:** Would you tell us the most important reasons which led you to vote for the candidate for whom you have just vote? I will read out to you seven different reasons (show round card). Please think for a moment and tell us which was the most important reason for you?

Attribute	<i>Percent of Respondents</i>											
	<b>ALL</b>			<b>ML(N) / IJI</b>			<b>PPP / PDA</b>			<b>Others</b>		
	1997	1993	1990	1997	1993	1990	1997	1993	1990	1997	1993	1990
Party Candidate	10	23	25	25	23		28	32		12	20	
Religious and clean	9	17	17	14	22		12	9		26	20	
Helpful in personal needs	39	17	16	18	16		16	16		16	15	
Competent in national affairs	14	13	13	15	12		11	13		14	15	
Helpful in community development roads, electricity, etc.	16	13	9	13	10		13	10		12	6	
Biradri / clan's choice	3	6	7	5	7		7	8		7	8	
Better than this competitor	1	2	4	2	5		2	3		1	4	

**Source:** Gallup Exit Poll Survey, 1997

Table

## PROFILE OF VOTERS OF PML AND PPP

	Composition of PML(N) / IJI voters percentage			Composition of PPP / PDA voters percentage		
	1990	1993	1997	1990	1993	1997
<b>Age Composition</b>						
21-30 years	31	34	23	40	32	27
31-40 years	33	30	36	30	30	35
41-50 years	19	19	21	16	19	21
51-60 years	11	10	11	9	10	10
Over 60 years	4	5	6	4	7	3
<b>Education Composition</b>						
Illiterate	22	32	25	26	37	29
Primary	16	18	19	20	18	23
Middle / Matric	38	30	32	33	28	28
Above Matric	24	20	22	21	17	19
<b>Income Group Composition</b>						
Rs.1-1000	19	10	32	19	14	35
Rs.1001-2000	32	36		33	35	
Rs.2001-3000	23	17	26	23	19	25
Above Rs.3000	22	19	32	20	14	27
<b>Language Group Composition</b>						
Urdu	14	10	10	9	8	8
Punjabi / Saraiki	75	75	67	60	56	49
Pushto / Hindko	5	7	6	9	6	7
Sindhi	1	4	6	14	20	29
Baluchi / Others	4	4	?	8	10	?

**Note:** When the total of a segment does not add up to 100, the different is explained by No Response

**Source:** Gallup Exit Poll Survey, 1997

Table

**PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN**

	1997	1993
	%	%
Canvassing	29	35
Attending Rally	49	56
Organizing Rally	21	24
Making Speech in a Rally	9	9
You were canvassed	56	-
Candidate Provide Transport	34	-
Flag hoisting	48	-

**Source:** Gallup Exit Poll Survey, 1997

## VOTER'S SENSE OF EFFICACY

**Question:** You have just voted for the National Assembly election. In your view, will your vote made any contribution in improving national affairs?

	<i>Percent of Respondents</i>		
	1997	1993	1990
Effective	70	75	73
Ineffective	10	4	10
No opinion	20	21	17

**Source:** Gallup Exit Poll Survey, 1997

## FAITH IN POSITIVE ROLE OF CONTINUED ELECTIONS

**Question:** If elections continued to be held on a regular basis, will condition of the country, in your view, improve or remain unchanged?

	<i>Percent of Respondents</i>		
	1997	1993	1990
Positive	51	54	66
Negative	23	23	7
No Impact	14	7	12
No opinion	12	16	15

**Source:** Gallup Exit Poll Survey, 1997

# Part IV

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## Appendices:

- ✧ Pre Election Survey Reports 1997
- ✧ Accuracy of Gallup Poll, 1997
- ✧ Pre Election Survey Report, 1993
- ✧ Some tips for the sophisticated Election  
Watcher
- ✧ Gender and Election Results
- ✧ Questionnaire

## Polls related to 1997 Elections Ratings for the Interim Prime Minister

### **Caretaker Prime Minister Meraj Khalid**

#### *Receives High Rating as a person but relatively poor rating as a Prime Minister: Gallup Poll*

A nation-wide survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan on the near completion of the term of Mr. Meraj Khalid as interim prime minister shows that the public judged him quite highly as a person: 60% gave him good rating and only 8% gave him a poor rating. But, when it came to judging him as a Prime Minister, the story was a little different. The good rating dropped to only 30% and poor rating climbed to 26%.


It is significant that despite his weaker grounding in the Pakistani Society, Mr. Moeen Qureshi had received a higher public rating as an interim Prime Minister. The week before he completed his term in 1993, 50% of the respondents in a Gallup Pakistan Poll had judged his performance as good and 16% had rated it poorly. A separate question on Moeen Qureshi as a person had not been posed in the survey at that time.

It is interesting to note that despite his rhetoric against Benazir and her tenure in government, views about Meraj Khalid are not very negative among prospective PPP voters: 25% of those intending to vote for PPP give Meraj Khalid good rating as a PM and 50% of them regard him as a good person. This is not a great departure from the national average. Apparently Meraj Khalid has not invited much bitterness from the rank and file of the PPP voters. The liking for Meraj Khalid as a person is significantly higher among the youth: 65% of the under 30 as against 51% of the over 50 appreciated Meraj Khalid as a person. Whether or not it says much about Meraj Khalid, it does reflect a desire among the youth to hear the frank and humane touch in Meraj Khalid's discourses.

The survey was conducted among a representative sample, scientifically chosen from the rural and urban areas of all the four provinces. It included more than two thousand respondents belonging to a cross section of different age, income and educational backgrounds. The survey was conducted by Gallup Pakistan, the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International.

**Question:** How would you rate the performance of interim Prime Minister Meraj Khalid (a) as a person and (b) as a Prime Minister?

### PERFORMANCE RATING OF Interim Prime Minister Meraj Khalid



Conducted by Gallup Pakistan, the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International: Gallup Poll

A nation-wide Gallup Poll conducted according to internationally recognized scientific principles throws an interesting light on the current pre-elections political thinking. The survey shows that voter attitudes are not entirely unambiguous, as one would expect them to be a fortnight before the elections. Instead the voters are split between electing their favourite parties and a strong desire for accountability, almost unaware of its modalities and implications. The recent focus on corruption has given rise to a large category of suspecting votes who are untruthful of even those whom they are likely to vote for. The following are the major highlights of the Gallup Poll conducted on January 19-22. The poll was conducted in the rural and urban areas of the four provinces with a sample size of more than 2000 voters.

A cross section of voters of different age, income and educational backgrounds was included in the sample.

Its findings will be provided for publication in four parts along with an analysis by Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani, a Social Scientist and Chairman Gallup Pakistan. The first part is reported today.

The Gallup Poll held on January 19-22, two weeks prior to the election day shows that Nawaz Sharif has a distinct edge over Benazir Bhutto. On a nation-wide basis nearly 40 percent voters say they will vote for Nawaz Sharif. Compared to this less than twenty percent are committed at this point of time to vote for Benazir Bhutto. However, applying a suitable adjustment factor it is expected that five to ten percent PPP voters, who are currently reluctant to commit themselves to their party may return to its fold by the election day. This estimate is based on the behaviour pattern of PPP voters observed by Gallup Poll in the last three elections of 1988, 1990 and 1993. PPP voters have undergone a process of disillusionment for nearly a decade, poised and threatening to desert the party. But, they have often returned to the party fold shortly before the polling day. Thus in all three elections, PPP ratings initially

remained depressed but then surged just about the election eve. If the pattern remains unchanged, PPP will add five to ten percentage points to its current ratings. That surge, however, is not sufficient to bridge the Muslim League (N) lead. Despite the adjustment factor, PPP is estimated at this point not to receive more than 25% of the national vote against ML (N)'s 40%. Elections can take unusual turns at the very ends, which leaves a certain room for uncertainty.

While the personal popularity of Imran Khan stands at around 10%, his candidates contesting more than half of all National Assembly seats, may not add up to more than 5% of the national vote. Thus, in the current electoral lay out, Imran Khan is unlikely to make much impact. The leading parties had feared that he would assume a balancing role. Survey results do not validate this thesis.

Gallup Poll has picked up a very dramatic change in the political mood of Rural Sindh. Ghinwa Bhutto's personal popularity is higher than Benazir Bhutto's. A Gallup Poll in November sensed this mood, but took it as an aberration or a passing phenomenon. Oddly enough, the latest poll shows the same pattern. It appears that the political climate in Rural Sindh is taking a new turn. The Sindhi speaking voter, who previously stood solidly behind Benazir Bhutto, is now split three ways, Ghinwa, Benazir and, to the surprise of many, Nawaz Sharif. If things remain as they were two weeks prior to the elections, ML (N) is heading for giving a surprise in Rural Sindh, by performing considerably better than in the past.

The picture in Urban Sindh, particularly Karachi may remain unchanged for all practical purposes. MQM continues to be the single largest vote winner. While each of ML (N) and PPP may receive a respectable vote, their supporters are not sufficiently concentrated in any part of the city to beat MQM in its traditional strongholds.

Punjab is solidly behind Nawaz Sharif: 50% of the Punjab voters were inclined to vote for Nawaz Sharif in the latest Gallup Poll. His party had polled, it would be recalled, 45% of the votes in the 1993 elections in this province. But, a 45% vote earned him only 52 seats in that election. Contrast this with 1988 elections when a 49% vote for IJI had won Nawaz Sharif 92 seats. Past electoral data clearly demonstrate that when the margin between PML and PPP crosses an 8% limit in Punjab, there is a massive swing of seats. The end January Gallup Poll shows that the margin is well ahead of that magic number. PPP barely stands at 25% in Punjab, after taking into account the election eve surge in its vote.

For the first time the contest in the NWFP has changed its character. Of its traditional five strong contestants, PPP, PM (M), ANP, JUI and JI, the JI has boycotted the elections while the Tehrik Insaf, lead by Imran Khan, has made its debut. Imran Khan performance in NWFP is likely to be better than in the rest of the country. But, even here he stands at barely a 10% mark. In contrast the ML (N) and ANP together score around 40%; matching the number they polled in 1993. The PPP's standing is well short of the 11% vote it received in the 1993 elections. Thus the threat to a ML (N), ANP supremacy is less from PPP and TI and more from a strong intention in the province, not to vote. The disinclination to vote in NWFP is twice as high as the national average.

The turn out ratio is still one of the uncertain phenomena of the 1997 elections. On a national level, Gallup Poll show that intention to vote, two weeks prior to elections, is around 80% of what it was in comparable polls in 1993. This inclination may take a different turn, in either direction, as the elections approach nearer. But if it stays the same, the turn out ratio will be between 30 and 35 percent of the registered voters. The lowest turn out is likely to be in NWFP. Voter disillusionment with the quality of contestants, a restricted election campaign and inclement weather are factors which depress turn out

ratio. However the holding of National and Provincial assembly elections on the same day may push up the turnout because many more electoral contestants would now be interested in ensuring that voters reach the polling stations. The effect of these conflicting pressures on the final turn out ratio remains an uncertainty greater than the unpredictability of who is likely to be the winner in these elections.

## Accuracy of Gallup Poll: Comparison of Pre Election Gallup Poll and Actual Results of Elections

S.No.	National Vote Poll	Actual
1.	PML(N) = 40%	46%
	PPP = (15-25%)	22%
2.	Punjab solidly Behind PML(N)	As it is
3.	PML(N)'s gains in Rural Sindh many surprise many	Correct
4.	The situation of Karachi will remain nearly the same. PML (N) will get respectable votes. But seats are unlikely	Correct, with minor Exception for Karachi Seats PP = 48%    ML = 22% PP = 11%    ANP = 9%
5.	In NWFP, PML(N) and ANP are definite to have supremacy	As it is
6.	Turn out will be 30-35% It will be lower than national average in NWFP	35% Punjab = 40% NWFP = 30%
7.	Imran Khan will get too few votes to be a balance less than 5% His vote will be better in NWFP than rest of the country	Around 2% More than Twice as high in NWFP as in rest of country

## Study Findings: 1993 Elections

The study does not confirm the survey findings released by various weeklies. **The popular vote according to this research is a near tie**, as was the case in 1990 when both PDA and IJI scored 37% of the vote. The share of two parties in parliamentary seats is, however, another matter.

PML (N) has a clear edge over PPP in **Urban Punjab** whereas PPP has clear edge over PML (N) in Rural Sindh. In **Rural Punjab**, Nawaz Sharif still enjoys a slight edge over PPP. The exact nature of this edge is the greatest source of uncertainty in the 1993 campaign.

**Viewed with a broad brush, it is estimated that, in a hung parliament, Nawaz Sharif may emerge with a parliamentary strength slightly in excess of PPP.** The peculiarities of the list of candidates in various constituencies, and what is not to be ignored, sheer luck or chance factor, can play a decisive role in such situation. In the first-past-the post electoral system, a few percentage point lead in Rural Punjab can earn any number of seats for Nawaz Sharif, ranging from an edge of a few sets over PPP to a comfortable majority. In turn, this would determine the fate of the two parties at the national scene. Punjab, it must be recalled, accounts for 116 seats in a house of 200 directly elected seats. Moreover there is no possibility of a significant shift in the 1990 position in the other three provinces.

When popular vote is evenly split, any prediction about seats is almost impossible and the prediction by various political pundits is nothing more than guess-work influenced by their personal pre-dispositions.

One element of uncertainty in prediction is the personal popularity of PIF leader **Qazi Hussain Ahmad** and the acceptability of his election themes among a wide cross-section of voters. Views are split on whether the appeal of his themes would be translated into votes.

On the issue of **boycott by MQM in Urban Sindh**, the study suggests that the majority of MQM vote has an anti-PPP tendency. In the absence of MQM candidates, those who ignore the boycott call are likely to choose one of PML (N) and PIF. These two parties would be the major beneficiaries of the boycott.

As in 1990, the **NWFP seems to be the most competitive battle-field**. Five political parties: **PPP, PIF, PML, ANP and JUI** are all equally poised to present a strong contest, although each one has its own strong-holds and weak spots in various regions of the province. Compared to the 1990 elections, there is some change indicating additional vote for PIF and diminished vote for ANP. One reason for the diminished vote for ANP is that contrary to the position of its leadership, many of its former voters find themselves tilted in favour of PPP candidates.

Outside Baluchistan which has developed a set of small local parties, there is a tendency for diminished vote of independents or smaller, mostly religious or maslak base parties, in the rest of the country. But an interesting feature of recent political developments is that while their voters would vote for their own local candidates, Qazi Hussain Ahmad has emerged as the leader of religious party voters at the national level. The 1993 election has reduced the number of national political leaders to three.

The study shows no decline in voter intentions to vote as compared to the last elections. It expects the turn-out not to be any smaller than in 1990.

On **the role of Army** in political affairs, the study has discovered an interesting mix of popular attitudes. Ninety (90%) support the role of Army in conducting the election, but only 30% of the population is willing to accept army rule as a substitute for rule by politicians, even if they were known to be feuding and corrupt.

While the policies of the caretaker government regarding loan defaulters and tax dodgers is popular, the acceptability of **Mr. Moeen Qureshi as a future Prime Minister of Pakistan** is quite insignificant, when compared with the popularity of the two top contenders for the same job.

## SOME TIPS FOR THE SOPHISTICATED ELECTION WATCHER

by Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani  
Chairman Gallup Pakistan

Pakistan is on the eve of its fourth national election in less than a decade: 1988, 1990, and 1993 and now the 1997 election. Ironically all four were mid term elections, and each one of them was called because the National Assembly was prematurely dismissed by the President. Never in Pakistan's history has power been transferred from one Prime Minister to another in normal circumstances. Thus election watching does not come at predictable times for analysts and scholars to gear up for it well advance in time. The current election for example became definite less than a week prior to the polling day, when the Supreme Court finally gave its verdict to uphold President Leghari's decision of the Pakistani elections, here are a few tips for those who are keen to watch the election with sophistication and in detail.

The sophisticated election watcher would want to compare present results with past elections and analyse what has changed. But, change has several dimensions: The **Shift in popular mood** is not measurable by shifts in the number of seats won or lost by a party. Instead it is measurable by shifts in percentages of votes. This is so because a party can win or lose large number of seats without any shift in the overall percentage of votes which it wins at the national or provincial level. This type of change occurs not because of shifts in popular mood but simply through better alliances, relative position of the principal opponent or, in some cases, simple good luck. The non-sophisticated watcher sometimes attributes a victory or loss to change of popular moods, when in fact there is none. Similarly the non-sophisticated watcher is much at a loss to recognise why a party has lost or won large number of seats when its national voting average has remained unchanged. But, in fact it is not uncommon to find that a party wins higher number of votes and yet obtains fewer seats in the Assembly. The percentage of votes won at the national level and the seats obtained are two different phenomenon and may be watched accordingly.

Another concern for sophisticated election watching is the distinction between what happens at the aggregate national level and at the provincial or even sub-provincial level. In some cases this is quite clear, for example the distinction between the Rural and Urban Sindh. In other cases, the relevant segmentation is not obvious or easily identified. In the 1993 elections, much was hypothesized on the argument that Nawaz Sharif had lost Southern Punjab. Some attributed this to his urban bias which turned off the farmers of the Southern Punjab. A careful analysis of electoral data in the relevant grouping of districts, however, showed that he had lost less than 3% of the popular vote but more than 20 seats because of the damaging effect of desertion by former political allies. There was no evidence of notable change of popular mood. Again many arguments rested on the success of Nawaz Sharif in the North of Punjab. How would, the questions arise, one classify different region of Punjab for meaningful interpretation of the election results. A similar question arises about the NWFP, which may conveniently be divided between the Hazara area, the Peshawar valley, the Southern Frontier and the Dir, Malakand, Swat, Chitral belt. As for Balochistan, a certain distinction may be made between the heavily Pashtun and non-Pashtun areas. The sophisticated election watcher is clearly interested in analysis the election results in terms of both votes and seats at each of the above groupings separately. Once results are available in this fashion, a comparison with past elections can disclose interesting facts about whether voter attitudes and party positions have changed.

The number of votes won by a party conceals certain realities about the profile of people who have voted for it. It is conceivable that a party has lost its poor voters and instead gained an equal number of middle class voters, thus keeping its total unchanged. As a result a significant change may remain hidden from the analysts' eyes.

The information on the voting pattern of the poor, the middle class and the rich, or the educated and the illiterate is not provided by the data released by the Election Commission. Instead, it is gathered by researchers through what have come to be known as "Exit Poll Surveys". In Pakistan these surveys have been conducted by Gallup Pakistan at the time of all elections since 1985. Thus valuable data are available on the voting pattern of various economic and social classes. The data throw interesting light on the changing loyalties of the youth vote, the voting pattern of various religious orientations, as well as, the voting pattern of salaried people as distinct from the voting pattern of traders and the self employed.

This year Gallup will conduct its Exit Poll on the election day with a representative sample of more than 5000 voters spread in more than 250 polling stations randomly spread all over the country.

Elections not only help elect a leadership for the country, they also provide a valuable picture of public attitudes, opinions and orientations, and how they change from one election to another. Let this picture be viewed with care and sophistication for it not to be distorted.

## Gender and Election Results

Data suggest that Benazir Bhutto has a slight disadvantage among Women Voters

### 1990 Elections

Total Polling Stations = 24,827

Stations/disaggregated by Gender = 6,444 (Approx. 3200 each) in  
in all four provinces

### Results

Gender	IJI	PDA	Both	M/F Ratio
Male	40%	40%	1,946,963	59%
Female	972,639	974,327	1,348,464	41%
	42%	40%		
	692,364	656,100	3,295,427	

Female vote is approximate 0.69 of Male vote.

Thus when total vote is 40% Female vote is likely to be 41% of the total or **16%** while Male would be likely to be 59% or **24%**. Thus the Male turn out would be ? while Female turn out would be ?

## Exit Poll 1997 QUESTIONNAIRE

Q 1) In your opinion, what is the first thing that the Government formed after the elections should do?

Q 2) In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing the country today?

Q 3) What newspaper do you usually read?

Q 4) How often do you watch television?

- a. Daily
- b. Sometimes
- c. Don't watch television

Q 5) In the present elections campaigns:

- |   | Yes                      | No                       |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Did you get the chance to campaign for any candidate?                            | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. Did you get the chance to participate in any election rally or Addresses/speech? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. Did you participate in the arrangement of any election rally?                    | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. Did you address any election rally?  | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. Did anyone ask for you vote?   | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| f. Was transport arranged by the candidate for reaching this place?                 | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Q 6) Who did you vote for in today's national assembly election?

- a. Candidate Name:
- b. Election Symbol:
- c. Party:
  - i) PPP
  - ii) Muslim League Nawaz Sharif
  - iii) Tehrik-e-Insaf (Imran Khan)
  - iv) Others

Q 7) If for some reason, representative from this party could not participate in the elections then who would have you voted for?

- a. PPP
- b. Muslim League Nawaz Sharif
- c. Tehrik-e-Insaf (Imran Khan)
- d. Others

Q 8) And who did you vote for in the Provincial Assembly Elections?

- a. Candidate Name:
- b. Election Symbol:

Q 9) Is the candidate, you voted in favour of for Provincial Assembly, from your Biradari or does he belong to some other Biradari?

- a. Our Biradari\_\_\_\_\_

- 
- b. Some other Biradari
  - c. We don't have any biradri
  - d. Other
- Q 10) Did your biradri decide on voting together?
- a. Yes
  - b. No
  - c. Don't Know
  - d. Did not answer
- Q 11) Why did you vote for this particular candidate in the National Assembly Elections? I will put forward seven reasons, choose the most relevant:  
Please tell us what is the most important reason? What is the second most reason? What is the third most important reason?
- a. Helps people (Police Stations, Courts etc)
  - b. Helps in provision of utility services like gas, electricity etc
  - c. Has the capability to comprehend matters of national significance.
  - d. Is a pious and religious individual
  - e. Is a candidate of our most favourite party
  - f. Our Biradari decided in his favour
  - g. To ensure that the other candidate loses
  - h. Other
  - i. Don't Know
- Q 12) Did you cast your vote in 1993 elections?
- a. Yes
  - b. No
- Q 13) (If yes then) what party did you vote for?
- a. PPP
  - b. PML-N
  - c. MQM
  - d. Other Party (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
  - e. Independent candidate
  - f. Don't know/don't remember
- Q 14) Who is your favourite leader among the following?
- a. Nawaz Sharif
  - b. Benazir Bhutto
  - c. Qazi Hussain Ahmed
  - d. Imran Khan
  - e. Altaf Hussain
- Q 15) In your opinion, will your vote help in improving country's situation?
- a. Yes
  - b. No
  - c. Don't Know

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- Q 16) In your opinion, if elections are held regularly would that improve the country's situation, worsen it or make no difference?
- Improve
  - Will make no difference
  - Worsen
  - Don't Know
- Q 17) In your opinion, after the formation of new government who should be responsible for accountability?
- Army
  - Judiciary
  - New Government
  - No need for accountability
  - Don't Know
- Q 18) This time there was a restriction on use of posters, flags and rallies in election campaigns. Do you like this quiet or more happening election campaigns?
- Quiet
  - More Happening
  - Don't Know
- Q 19) What is your view, should the new government (formed as a result of this election) should or should not increase trade with India?
- Should
  - Should not
  - No opinion
- Q 20) Should the new government try to get more loans from America or ask the people to bear some hardship?
- Seek more loans
  - Call to bear hardship
  - No opinion
- Q 21) Should the new government work on the nuclear programme or wait until financial conditions improve?
- Work
  - Wait
  - No opinion
- Q 22) Should the new government provide military and financial assistance to Kashmiris or only moral support?
- Military / financial
  - Moral only
  - No opinion

Q 23) Should the new government try to increase or reduce foreign companies and foreign investment in Pakistan?

- a. Increase
- b. Decrease
- c. Keep at present level
- d. No opinion

Q 24) Do you think the new government will complete its tenure or end before time?

- a. Will complete five year tenure
- b. Will end
- c. No opinion