

GILANI RESEARCH FOUNDATION

Public Service Archiving Activity

Conflict or Convergence Global Perspectives on War, Peace, and International Order

Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani

Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies
Harvard University
USA

1997



Disclaimer: Gallup Pakistan is not related to Gallup Inc. headquartered in Washington D.C. USA. We require that our surveys be credited fully as Gallup Pakistan (not Gallup or Gallup Poll). We disclaim any responsibility for surveys pertaining to Pakistani public opinion except those carried out by Gallup Pakistan, the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International Association. For details on Gallup International Association see website: www.gallup-international.com

© 2009 All rights reserved

GILANI RESEARCH FOUNDATION



Public Service Archiving Activity

All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or
unauthorized distribution

For more information and queries

Conteact: Bilal Ijaz Gilani
info@gilanifoundation.com
www.gilanifoundation.com

Disclaimer: Gallup Pakistan is not related to Gallup Inc. headquartered in Washington D.C. USA. We require that our surveys be credited fully as Gallup Pakistan (not Gallup or Gallup Poll). We disclaim any responsibility for surveys pertaining to Pakistani public opinion except those carried out by Gallup Pakistan, the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International Association. For details on Gallup International Association see website: www.gallup-international.com

© 2009 All rights reserved

WEATHERHEAD CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

HARVARD ACADEMY FOR INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

BY

IJAZ SHAFI GILANI

PROJECT ON

CONFLICT OR CONVERGENCE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR,
PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

This paper was originally presented at the Harvard Academy conference on
"Conflict or Convergence: War, Peace and International Order,"
held in Cambridge, Massachusetts on November 13-15, 1997.

A complete list of working papers is located on the inside back cover.
To order other papers from this series, please contact:

The Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
1737 Cambridge St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-3671

WEATHERHEAD CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

HARVARD ACADEMY FOR INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

BY

IJAZ SHAFI GILANI

PROJECT ON

CONFLICT OR CONVERGENCE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR,
PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Ijaz Shafi Gilani is the Chairman of the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion.

Perspectives on War, Peace and Order

There is a remarkable turnabout in the intellectual perspectives in Pakistan, and possibly in other South and Central Asian Muslim Societies. The "conservatives" of yesterday have become today's radicals and the radicals of yesterday have become today's "conservatives" or "moderates".

It is a period of transition in which intellectual and political elites are shifting and realigning. A somewhat crude remark in Pakistan's last elections hinted at this change, when the head of the Jamaat-I-Islami was seen by a section of the press as "Bhutto with a beard." Bhutto, as would be recalled was a symbol of radicalism in his days, contrasted with the then head of the Jamaat-I-Islami who would often be defined as an arch conservative. The tables have now turned upside down. Benazir, the successor to her father, is increasingly seen as an exponent of the status quo while a successor to the founder leader of the Jamaat-I-Islami, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, has adopted a platform of protest against political and social problems of the country. The worldview about the international system has also undergone a major change. There was a time when it was easy to define perspectives as left, right and centre. In fact opinion survey questions, on occasions, asked respondents to classify themselves as to be of right left or centrist orientation. Any of these associations would represent a reasonably well defined perspective on imperialism, communist world, international capitalism, military build up, development strategies and even on various regional conflicts on which major world powers had taken a position. The intellectual and political perspectives today are undergoing major revisions. Thus it is no longer possible to write a paper such as this with three neat sections: a socialist world-view, a liberal worldview and, in the case of many Muslim societies such as Pakistan, an Islamic world-view. The splitting up of elites among radicals, conservatives and moderates, or fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists, Islamists and seculars would also be of limited value in classifying opinions.

Indeed it is a period in which events and evolving intellectual constructs are influencing the elites in ways which ought to be understood and interpreted. There is also the question of generations. There are elites whose worldview and positions had been shaped before, let us say, the breakup of the Soviet Union, those who were still in the process of maturing and those who came

later. It would be instructive to identify events and ideas that may have played a critical role in reshaping or the shaping of the perspectives of these different generations.

Let us first take a look at the agenda that attracts the attention of various elites. There is a significant shift in the agenda for discussion. The Islamists of yesterday have tilted from a heavily domestic agenda to a heavily international agenda, while the leftists of yesterday have tilted from a heavily international to a more domestic agenda. The shift in the agenda of the older generation has naturally influenced the affinities of later generations. In the older days the question of international trouble spots attracted the attention of the leftists. Thus Vietnam, Cuba, Angola and even Palestine were some of the issues which provided a rallying point for the left leaning socialist elites of the country. The right leaning and Islamist elites viewed these issues as distractions from a domestic agenda which attracted most of their attention; they would focus much more on national solidarity and reorientation of legal, economic, educational and political systems of the country. There is a major shift today. The international trouble spots have taken a different turn. Instead of the liberation struggles of yesterday, the limelight today is on Kashmir, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Palestine, Bosnia and other similar cases, all of which are looked upon as Islamic issues.

The focus of many of the former leftists has shifted to issues such as civil society, women's rights, child labour, environmental degradation, hazards of nuclear proliferation and similar issues. For many of them the problems in Bosnia and Chechnya, Tajikistan and Afghanistan appear to be irritants competing with more close to home issues on which real and tangible progress can be achieved by personal efforts and involvement.

The shift in agenda has also meant a shift in domestic and international alignments. The international alignments on global trouble spots are different from those which emphasize the agenda of civil society, human rights and other issues in that genre.

As an older and the middle generation grapple with the uncertainties of a changing world there is a new generation that is fascinated by the glamour of business and science. Their attention is consumed by the cooperation and conflict among multinational corporations, their mergers and demergers, new developments in the communications technology and the ebb and flow in global stock markets. Their exposure to world media keeps them aware, even opinionated about political trouble spots and a new social agenda, but their fascination lies elsewhere.

A pilot survey among a sample of socio-economic elite showed that 33% of the younger respondents (under 35 years of age) said their most favourite subject for conversation with friends was science and computers, while barely 5% of the older group (over 35 age group) gave this response. On the contrary politics was the most engaging subject for nearly 55% of the older compared with 40% for the younger group.

It is in this background of a changing agenda and shifting passions that we must read the views of intellectual and political elites in Pakistan and other Muslim countries in the region. It is difficult to begin by clustering them into groups at this point. But, perhaps new clusters may appear in due course of time.

In Pakistan and the surrounding region, the international system is often referred to as a unipolar world. There is a common view that America seeks hegemony in a world that it dominates militarily, and, although with greater difficulty, economically. American behaviour is seen generally as one of "failed expectations." The expectations are related to America's real or presumed claims about democracy, justice, compassion and fairplay. The disappointment originates in what is described as double standards in meeting its claims, whereby high principles are upheld to promote selfish interests and ignored when interests require a different behaviour.

The findings of a pilot survey among socio-economic elite show that 55% of the respondents were inclined to believe the world was unipolar (meaning the US was the only important influencer in world politics) while 45% regarded it as multipolar (meaning that powers other than US, such as European nations, Japan, Russia were also quite influential)

However a large majority believes that the world is moving towards multipolarity. When asked to project whether the world would be unipolar or multipolar in the year 2010, 85% believed it would be multipolar.

The industrialized countries of Europe are generally lumped together with the United States and described as "the West". There is slight ambivalence on how to treat Japan, but quite commonly it is also lumped with the West. Russia is seen as increasingly dependent on the West. Its

disappearance from the big league is seen with some remorse because it can no longer serve as a counterweight to the excesses of the Western block; but Russia is still distrusted and there is no particularly newly won affinity for it. In Pakistan there is considerable respect for China. It is seen as a friend which is not highly developed but which has remained steadfast in being friendly towards Pakistan. Pakistan's attitudes towards China may be partly influenced by relations with the common neighbour India. And thus the attitudes in other Muslim populations in the region about China would not necessarily be the same.

There is tremendous admiration for the economic success of East Asian countries including Singapore and Malaysia. But, there is little interest or interaction with them beyond trading through somewhat impersonal channels. As for the countries of the Gulf and the Arab World, it is believed that they could not make wise use of their oil wealth and are now subservient to Western interests. Africa is neglected and there is tremendous ignorance about Central and South America. Last but not the least is the controversial position of India. In Pakistan it is seen as a vile enemy which connives with other world powers to undermine Pakistani and Muslim interests. The view about India in the surrounding Muslim populations is however not hostile. Despite India's pro soviet behaviour during the Afghan crisis, the Afghans do not fully empathize with Pakistani views about India and despite India's growing tilt towards the Western countries, Iran finds it quite comfortable to work with India in international diplomacy and economic exchange.

The international structure is essentially seen in this region as hierarchical, in which military and economic strength, combined with control of scientific technology and global media determine the supremacy of the United States. The United States, together with its junior Western partners, is seen to be dominating an increasingly acquiescing world.

Beyond this commonly held view about international structure of power, there are differences on details and more importantly, differences in perceptions about the future evolution of the international structure of power and how to deal with it.

A pilot survey among Pakistani elite shows that 91% of the respondents considered the international system to be unfair and only 9% considered it to be fair, that is a world in which the powerful nations treated the weak with fairness.

As for the future, a majority (44%) believed that fairness and justice in international affairs will be higher in 2010 than it is today. As for the prospects for the removal of economic inequities on the international scene, views were split: 38% believed the inequities would be higher, 37% believed they would be lower, 29% believed there would be no difference.

There are three broad tendencies on a continuum of confrontation to acquiescence. The confrontationists, the acquiescents and the negotiators.

The **confrontationists** believe that the present international structure is as hollow as the collapsed power of the former Soviet Union. It will, not in the distant future, collapse under its own weight. There is no vision about what might replace it. But, there are vague expectations about a fairer world order in which the Islamic countries will have a more important, if not a central role. There is also a vague notion about a world order governed through law and morality rather than political interests and military muscle.

The confrontationists believe that Muslim countries should hold steadfast against the unjust demands and hypocritical morality of the current leaders of the international system.

The **acquiescents** believe that the preponderant power of the present leaders of the international system is firmly rooted in their economic, technological and military superiority. They are awed by it, and wish they were coopted into the system. They are on occasion critical of it, but that does not detract them from the desire to be accepted as partners.

The negotiators share the acquiescent's evaluation of the present international structure, but they do not believe they would be accepted as partners. They are also more native and local in orientation. Thus, without harbouring the expectation to become a notable factor in the dominant system, they wish to negotiate the best possible bargain in the short run. They do not entertain great concern about the long run.

A pilot survey among the Pakistani elite shows that nearly 30% favour defiance, 64% favour negotiations and bargaining while 6% support a policy of accepting leadership of major powers as a junior partner.

There is a general impression that the imbalance between the power of America and other important nations, notably China and Germany will be reduced over the next ten to fifteen years. China, Germany, India and the Muslim World (as a general category) are perceived to be nations whose influence is likely to rise from their present level over the next ten to fifteen years, while the influence of the USA, Russia and Britain is seen to be sliding down from their present level.

Of course these are simplified ideal types of three tendencies. It would be difficult to attribute them to specific political groups or intellectuals. In fact most political groups would harbour a combination of these tendencies. But, it may be worthwhile to probe and check the hypothesis that the **Islamist** parties in Pakistan are more inclined towards a confrontations tendency, Benazir's **People Party** to an acquiescent tendency and Nawaz Sharif's **Muslim League** to a negotiation tendency.

The intellectual community has an added dimension to its tendencies regarding the evaluation of the present international structure of power. They can be classified as **strategists** approach, **businessmen-economists** approach and **social theorists** approach. The **strategists** focus not just on the harmony in the current Western leadership of the international structure, the unipolar world, but also in its discords. They look at the different approaches of the Americans and the Europeans to international system, the conflicting economic interests of major European countries and different viewpoints within each power. They believe that weaker members of the world community will find room to manoeuvre when these differences begin to mature and express themselves more than at present. They look at this possibility through the prism of the past cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union and project a similar future, except that the competitors in the game might be different. They also do not reject the possibility of a resurgence of Russia to join this game of power. There is a proliferating class of retired military officers and other international relations specialists, besides defence journalists who take up this view.

The **businessmen-economist approach** focuses on the new power of international trade, investments and multinational corporations. They do not look upon these new actors as subservient to their governments or their military strategic aims. Instead they believe that the new global economic actors have their own autonomous role to play. This approach advises political leadership to negotiate a better deal for themselves through harnessing the new instruments of international power. A new class of business managers, professional business analysts and some social scientists seem to hold this position.

The social theorists take into account the new agenda in international discourse and seek to take an activist role in promoting or criticizing this agenda. They focus upon global economic measures of international financial institutions, structural readjustment, human rights issues, environmental regulations issues and issues such as women rights and child labour. There are different variants in the social theorist approach; some are highly critical of the new agenda of international diplomacy; while others look upon it as a source of great relief to them in their own domestic struggle against these very social problems. There are still others who appreciate the basic principles and do not object to an international pressure on these matters; however they are critical of self serving motives of the international sponsors of social reform.

Considering that they are somewhat removed from the centre stage of the current international system, there is not much thought or concern in the South Asia region about its stability. Nevertheless, there is a growing appreciation about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, world wide terrorism, environmental hazards and socio-economic disparities. But, the region is far too concerned about its internal and immediate problems. It is the breakdown of the internal order which provides it a vantage point from where to occasionally look at the international system. Internally the region is faced with enhanced access to weapons among domestic political dissidents and criminal groups, the subversive role of the drug trade, the criminalization of banking and business transactions, and the general breakdown of traditional institutions of governance.

There is a strong concern about the phenomenon of "failed states". The horrors of Somalia and Rwanda were viewed with great apprehension in Pakistan and the region. The alarmists are quick to point out that if the structures of governance were allowed to deteriorate even further, this

region may face the same fate. The majority of analysts however did not agree with such alarmist projections.

There are fears about regional hegemony. The dominant impression, however, is that the regional balance largely hinges on national deterrence and not on legal legitimacy or international sanctions. The threat is therefore perceived to emanate from a shift in military or economic balance of forces. Pakistan and Bangladesh fear Indian hegemony while Central Asian states fear Russian hegemony. There is considerable ambivalence about the conditions under which the international system should or should not intervene through the use of force. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been active members of international peace keeping forces, which is indicative of their support for the basic concept of such forces. In neither of the two countries there was popular opposition to such participation, although some groups did oppose sending troops to Somalia and during the Gulf War. But, on the whole there is a basic acceptance, even support for an internationally enforceable law. In Pakistan this is rooted in the feeling that India is keeping Kashmir unlawfully under its control, because the United Nations is unwilling to take an active role. The opinion in Pakistan was, on the whole in favour of using international force to check Serbian aggression against Bosnian Muslims. Views were however divided in the case of Gulf War. The sentiments in Pakistan were against Saddam Hussain, and in favour of restoring Kuwait's sovereignty until the Gulf War began to appear an American war against Iraq rather than an international intervention to safeguard the integrity of a small country aggressed by a larger neighbour.

62% said Iraq was wrong in occupying Kuwait. However when the allied forces started to strike Iraq, a large majority supported Saddam Hussain.

Recent domestic developments concerning a row between the executive and the judiciary in Pakistan suggests that there is strong public support for judicial autonomy and legal activism *.* This sentiment, to a degree, transcends to international questions as well. Thus there is a substantial support for international sanctions on the issue of drugs and terrorism. There are however a number of reservations about the conditions in which such interventions become unfair. This paper will probe into the arguments which underlie those reservations. The first reservation is on grounds of **selective application**. There is a widespread feeling that not all violations of commonly agreed ground rules are treated equally, and that selective application is governed by political and power considerations. The second reservation concerns **unequal participation** in framing common ground rules; the third reservation concerns the composition of **enforcement mechanism** which is believed to be tilted in favour of certain powerful interests. The fourth reservation concern the **choice of subjects** which call for intervention, which is once again accused to be determined by narrow interests.

There have been a number of instances in recent years where international intervention became a prominent issue in Pakistan and the region. In the case of Pakistan, such interventions or sanctions have been mostly of a bilateral nature. The most prominent sanction is on the issue of its nuclear programme. Other interventions concerned the issue of drug trafficking, the issue of harbouring international terrorism, the issue of discriminating against religious minorities and the issue of child labour.

Any discussion about international or world order evokes widespread interest among the elites in Pakistan and the surrounding areas. In fact the subject arouses keen interest even among the poor and illiterate masses in the country side. Public opinion surveys show a high level of interest in world affairs among all sections of the population. As explained earlier, there is strong support

*A row developed between the supreme Court Chief Justice and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1997. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accused the Chief Justice of conspiring with a part of the establishment in a move to destabilize his government. During this highly publicized confrontation, views of the general public remained rather divided. Despite his otherwise overwhelming political support and control over official media, Nawaz Sharif trailed behind the Chief Justice on this issue: 29% supported the position of the Chief Justice, 27% supported the position of Nawaz Sharif while the rest remained neutral or did not answer. However, at one point in the confrontation, the Chief Justice began to appear extremely partisan. Thereafter the views switched remarkably in favour of the Prime Minister (47% in favour, 20% opposed, 3% neutral or did not answer). These observations are based on public opinion surveys conducted by Gallup Pakistan.

in Pakistan for the concept of international organisations such as the United Nations. As a Muslim society, there is a deep seated belief about the importance of law in social organisation. Thus the view that all relations, including those which cut across national boundaries should be regulated by law is first greeted with support. But, it gives birth to an expectation about equality and justice in treating everyone bound by that law on equal footing. Now this may not be the common practice in its society, but it is held strongly as a norm. Thus the major criticism of prevailing international organisations is on grounds of discrimination in favour of the privileged, often expressed as "double standards" maintained by major actors in the international system.

The respondents in a pilot survey of socio-economic elite in Pakistan were asked a set of questions to know their views on the complex issue of the legitimacy of international intervention on various issues to control civil wars:

Only 30% considered American and European intervention in the case of Somalia and Rwanda to be justified, 70% considered it unjustified.

In the case of Bosnia, 45% considered the American/European intervention to be justified, 55% considered it unjustified. However when the respondents were further pressed to know how they evaluated the practical outcome of US intervention in Bosnia, it was evaluated by 10% as good, by 44% as reasonable and by 45% as bad.

The second concern about any international community building is the concern among Muslim societies that they should not be obliged to forgo any behaviour which they are obliged to uphold as part of Islamic Sharia. A particular variety of pluralism is therefore required in cultural matters. Muslims are increasingly realizing that if they ask for such rights for themselves, they will also be obliged to reciprocate in the same spirit for others. These issues are coming under sharp focus as Muslims from all over the world, including those from South Asia, find themselves living in Western societies among people of other faiths.

Aside from these basic normative considerations, the Muslim societies of Pakistan, Bangladesh in South Asia and the Muslims in Central Asia are keen to engage in international organisations because they wish to seek international protection from their overpowering region

neighbours: India in South Asia and Russia in the case of Central Asia. Thus, there is an underlying support for relinquishing a certain degree of sovereignty in return, on various functional issues.

A pilot survey among the Pakistani elite showed that views regarding American position (used here as a surrogate for global interventionist approach) on various issues such as arms control, human rights violations, control of terrorism, free trade and environmental protection evoked different responses. While 56% of the respondents endorsed the (presumably) American view that international sanctions are required for environmental protection, only 13% agreed with the American stance regarding arms control. A majority believed that the American position on arms control was hypocritical because it preached what it did not practice.

	Views on (Presumably) American Positions concerning considered by respondents to be		
	Correct	Wrong	Hypocritical*
Arms Control	14	6	80
Human Rights	35	20	45
International Terrorism	38	37	25
Free Trade	42	37	21
Environmental Protection	56	12	32

*explained as "to preach what one does not practice"

QUESTIONNAIRE

Question 1: Some people believe that world politics is unipolar and only the United States is really influential. Others believe that countries of Europe, Japan and Russia are also quite powerful. In your view is the world unipolar (only America is really influential) or multipolar (other countries are influential).

- | | |
|------------|--------------------------|
| Unipolar | ☐ |
| Multipolar | ☐ |

Question 2: And what would the situation be like in the next ten to fifteen years, let us say in 2010?

- | | |
|------------|--------------------------|
| Unipolar | ☐ |
| Multipolar | ☐ |

Question 3: In your view, is there justice or injustice in world affairs, that is, do the powerful countries of the world treat the less powerful fairly or unfairly?

- | | |
|-----------|--------------------------|
| Justice | ☐ |
| Injustice | ☐ |

Question 4: Please give your view on American position on the following issues: whether it is correct, wrong or hypocritical (that is, to preach what one does not practice)

- | | | | | |
|----|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. | Position on control of deadly weapons. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| b. | Position on liberal international trade
(that is removing restrictions and taxes
on free flow of goods and services). | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| c. | International pressure for protecting human rights
within nations. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| d. | International intervention/pressure to control
terrorism (for example demand for handing over
serious criminals to international bodies). | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| e. | International regulations against environmental
pollution. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

Question 5: When Iraq invaded Kuwait and occupied it, what, in your view, should have been done by the United Nations? (Give **one** of the following responses)

- Sending UN forces ☐
- Requesting USA/Europe to send troops ☐
- Working through political negotiations ☐

Question 6: In recent years American and European troops have participated in missions in Africa especially Somalia and Rwanda. They believe their missions were justified because the troops had been sent to control civil wars. However, those who objected to their presence, believed the American and European troops were unjustified because their motive was domination and international control. In your view were they justified or unjustified.

- Justified ☐
- Unjustified ☐

Question 7: Would you consider the role of American and European troops during the fighting between Bosnian Muslims and Serbs as justified or unjustified?

- Justified ☐
- Unjustified ☐

Question 8: How would you rate interference/performance of Americans on the Bosnian Issue?

- Very good ☐
- Good ☐
- Average ☐
- Bad ☐
- Very Bad ☐

Question 9: How do you project the future: Will the American influence in world affairs in ten to fifteen years (approximately 2010) be more or less than today. The same question may be repeated for the following countries: Russia, China, Britain, Germany, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Muslim World as a whole?

	Increase	Decrease	No difference	Absolutely None
USA	☐	☐	☐	☐
Russia	☐	☐	☐	☐
China	☐	☐	☐	☐
Britain	☐	☐	☐	☐
Germany	☐	☐	☐	☐
India	☐	☐	☐	☐
South Korea	☐	☐	☐	☐
Malaysia	☐	☐	☐	☐
Islamic World as whole	☐	☐	☐	☐

Question 10: Would you say the level of justice and fairness in world affairs will be higher or lower than it is today by the year 2010?

Higher	☐
Lower	☐
No Change	☐

Question 11: Would you say the disparity in international economic power will be higher or lower in the year 2010 than it is today?

Higher	☐
Lower	☐
No Change	☐

Question 12: In your view, which will be a stronger entity in world affairs in the year 2010:

The American government or multinational companies?

American government ☐

Multinational companies ☐

Question 13: How should weak countries such as Pakistan deal with big powers in the world, such as the United States:

Adopt a defiant attitude ☐

Seek fairness through negotiations ☐

Seek friendship as a junior partner ☐

Question 14: How much trust do you have in a) the governments of the following countries b) in the people of the following countries?

	High	Low	None
America	☐	☐	☐
China	☐	☐	☐
Russia	☐	☐	☐
Britain	☐	☐	☐
India	☐	☐	☐
Saudi Arabia	☐	☐	☐
Iran	☐	☐	☐
Pakistan	☐	☐	☐

Question 15: In conversations with friends what is your most favourite subject? (give one answer)

Politics ☐

Business ☐

Science/Computers ☐

Sample Profile of the Pilot Survey Respondents

A total of 85 respondents were interviewed in the top three cities of the country distributed among academics (15), civil servants (16), armed forces (15), media/intellectuals (12), businessmen (8) and educated housewives (14). The respondents were chosen randomly in most cases from a listing of affluent Pakistanis maintained by Gallup Pakistan. The age breakdown was as under: Age upto 35 (15), Age 35-50 (35), Age above 50 (35). The findings of the survey should be read with caution: it was a pilot survey and the sample size was accordingly small. However the survey findings provide a reasonable indication of the broad trend of attitudes among the sampled population.