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Guest Workers A Study of Overseas Pakistanis

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GUEST-WORKERS

A Study on the Overseas Pakistanis

This study has been prepared with the collaboration
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INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES
ISLAMABAD

PART I

OVERSEAS PAKISTANIS

INTRODUCTION

Approximately one hundred thousand Pakistanis have been leaving the country each year since 1973 to work in the Middle East. Although some of them have since returned to Pakistan, many have continued to stay and they, joined by the fresh arrivals, constitute a stock of approximately one and a half million Pakistanis in the oil rich countries of the Gulf and North Africa. Another approximately half a million Pakistanis work in different parts of the world.

Considering that this stock amounts to more than one in every ten households in Pakistan, the impact of overseas migration on the Pakistani society is both extensive and deeply felt.

Overseas migration of this magnitude affects the country at two levels: Firstly, the macro level or the level of the national economy, a concern of agencies such as the national planning agencies and the Finance Ministry; secondly, the micro level or the level of families and communities directly affected by the migration process, a major concern of agencies as the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation.

The present study deals with both aspects of international migration and offers recommendations concerning macro as well as micro level policies.

The Current State of Knowledge

Considering the immense importance of overseas migration for

Pakistan, it is natural that it should take the lead in both keenly and carefully studying the phenomenon of overseas migration. As such, several extensive studies on overseas migration have been carried out in the country. The lead was taken by a study produced at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE). This study was based on a nationally representative survey of approximately three hundred villages and towns.

The PIDE study focussed on the consequences of labour migration for the national economy. The task of looking more carefully at the social impact of the problems related to the economic as well as social readjustment of the returnee migrants had been left for a later study. This task was performed by the same group of researchers through a study conducted at the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion. The continuity in the direction of the two studies has given them a complementary character.

An earlier survey of migration and remittances was conducted by Shahid Perwaiz, under the sponsorship of USAID Pakistan. The author relied mainly on the secondary data obtained from the Ministry of Labour. The Ministry had issued several bulletins reporting the numbers and the skills of emigrating workers. However, it registered only those workers which left the country through official channels and the duly recognized recruiting agents. It did not report workers going through a so-called "private visa". Accordingly, it strongly underestimated the number of Pakistanis abroad. As subsequent research revealed, the Ministry figures reported barely one quarter of the cases until 1978 when there was a change in procedures. The study was, therefore, handicapped by gross underestimation of the volume of migration. On remittances, the same study relied on the figures provided by the Central Bank. It used a heuristic estimate for adding the remittances which entered the country through non-banking channels. Finally, the study had no systematically collected information on the pattern of use of remittances. It relied on intelligent guesses and newspaper stories. Despite these weaknesses, however, it was the first effort to put together the existing state of knowledge on the migration question.

The Pakistan Economist, a weekly specializing in economic affairs, arranged a national seminar on the remittances in 1978 and published its papers in its special number. The papers included statements by senior government officials

and carried both useful information and interpretation as well as their opinion. But, again the study was limited by the lack of primary information on the number of workers, volume of remittances, and the consumption pattern of remittances.

During this period the World Bank sponsored a study in the labour importing countries whose aim was to project the manpower requirements in the 1980s and to identify the possible sources of meeting these requirements. This study was subsequently published by Serageldin et al., (1983) and its accompanying volumes published by Birks and Sinclair made certain estimates about emigration from Pakistan, but were no more than intelligent guesses. Their estimates were subsequently shown to be incorrect.

Among the more recent studies, the following are noteworthy.

A study sponsored by the International Labour Organization with the collaboration of United Nations ARTEP and the Governemnt of Pakistan has been published in seven volumes in 1987. The data gathering for this study was done in 1984-85. The study explores all aspects of overseas labour migration from Pakistan, and while it repeat some of the issues already expolored, it has also produced certain fresh data. Moreover it makes important contribution by way of vigorously analyzing the data and presenting meaningful policy suggestions.

A recent study completed by Dr. Mohammad Fahim Khan focuses on Return Migration and analyzes returnee migrants on a success failure scale. It constructs a criteria for successful and failure returnees in terms of financial readjustment, and then measures a sample of approximately 500 returnees on this scale. The study comes up with the conclusion that most returnee migrants are keen to set up their personal business upon return. But, very few of them have the 'staying power' to weather out initial losses or problems in the business. The study argues, supported by its data, that success is largely determined by the presence of a minimum threshold of financial resources. Those who fall below this threshold end up wasting their resources in businesses which they can not run.

Another notable study on Return Migration has been conducted by Farooq Azam. Its field work was conducted in 1985-86 and the findings were published in 1987.

A recent trend in the field of research labour migration to the Gulf has been to produce cross-national case studies. Two books are notable in the regards: Gunatilleke (1986) and Atal (1986). Both the books contain important case studies on Pakistan.

Godfrey Gunatilleke (ed.) Migration of Asian Workers to the Arab World, The United Nations University, 1986

Mamol Abella and Yogesh Atal (ed.), Middle East Interlude: Asian Workers Abroad, UNESCO Bangkok, 1986.

COUNTRY PROFILE

Geography

Pakistan is located in South and West Asia and extends from the Arabian sea to the Hindo Kush mountain ranges. The total area is approximatly one million sq. km.

Pakistan shares its international boundaries with four neighbours: Iran, Afghanistan, China and India.

The country is divided into four provinces: Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan. Punjab is the most populous province accounting for nearly sixty percent of the total population.

Economy

Pakistan is predominantly an agricultural country. Agriculture accounts for 30 percent share in its GDP. It is one of the leading exporters of cotton and rice. Manufacturing sector accounts for 18 percent of GDP, while the service sector which comprises wholesale and retail trade, transport and communication, public administration and defence constitute 44 percent of GDP.

The per capita income of Pakistan amounted to Rupees 4176 in 1982-1983 (approximately \$ 320).

Income distribution is skewed with the poorest ten percent receiving only 5.5. percent, while the top ten percent receive approximatey 25 percent of total income.

Demographic Pattern

According to official sources the population estimates for Pakistan in 1983 are 88 million. Population growth has been around 3.0 percent per year. Life expectancy is currently estimated at 55 years.

A large portion of the population is in the younger age group, due to a fast growing population. According to the 1981 census, children below 15 years, constituted 45 percent of the total population.

During the past thirty years, Pakistan has witnessed sizeable urbanization. The urban population now comprises nearly 30 percent of total population, while it was only 18 percent thirty years ago.

The labour force (10 years age and above) is estimated at 26 million out of a total population of 88 million. The labour force participation rate is approximately 31 percent. It is lower compared to other countries in the region.

Official unemployment estimates are quite low. According to the latest labour force survey (1978-1979), the unemployment rate was estimated at 3.5 percent. The low rate is explained by factors such as emigrating labour force, low rate of female participation and underemployment in agriculture. It must, however, be mentioned that while open unemployment is low, underemployment is much higher. According to a recent survey, 30 percent of the households indicated unemployment or underemployment of at least one member (PIPO, 1984).

Migration History

In its brief history, Pakistan has experienced a wide variety of migratory movements, both national and international. The birth of the country was marked by an inflow of the Muslim population and outflow of non-Muslim population involving millions of people.

Voluntary migratory movements within the country and outside have been a significant phenomenon. As industrialization and development schemes progressed in the 1950s and 1960s, large number of workers moved from rural areas to the small towns and from smaller towns to the big cities. Urbanization had made a steady headway. and today nearly thirty percent of the population lives in the urban areas, compared to less than twenty percent in 1950. These migratory movements have fed not only the large metropolitan centres like Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi/Islamabad but also led to the emergence of a fairly large number of regional cities like Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Hyderabad, Multan, Wah Cantt. and Nowshera. According to the 1981 census, twenty five cities in the country have each a population of more than 100,000.

International migration is no less significant. According to our estimate, nearly every tenth household in the country has one or more members of the family working abroad. International migration began with emigration to the United Kingdom in later half of the 1950s. It continued at a fairly rapid pace until the end of the decade of the 1960s.

Precisely at that juncture migration to Middle East began.

Migration to the Middle East rapidly accelerated after the dramatic increase in the price of oil in 1973. According to estimates more than a hundred thousand Pakistanis have since left each year for work to go to the Middle East. Today, the number of Pakistanis working in the Middle East exceeds one million.

Estimates show that there are approximately two million Pakistanis working in more than thirty countries across the globe. The largest concentration is in the Middle East which accounts for two thirds of the total. Other centres include U.K., USA, Canada and a number of Northern European countries, particularly Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Federal Republic of Germany.

Pockets of Migration

While one can identify certain pockets of migration, it must be recognized that in Pakistan migration has been widespread in all regions of the country. Within the provinces, however, one finds that the raid-fed (barani) areas were the first ones to respond to foreign demand for labour and are more heavily represented. The cause is quite obvious: they were poorer, under-employed and had a long standing tradition of migration within the country or across borders to find work. The Gulf was simply a new and more attractive destination.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS

The typical migrants in the light of the various surveys conducted on the subject appear to be young males in their twenties and thirties, married but unaccompanied by their wives. They come from rural background and humble economic and social origins. They are only modestly educated and many of them are illiterate.

Occupational Background

Forty three percent of Pakistani migrant workers in the Middle East are unskilled, 41 percent are professionals and 12 percent are clerical, business, sales and other miscellaneous workers. Amongst skilled workers, the highest number comes from the construction sector (masons, carpenters, electricians, plumbers etc.) followed by workers from the manufacturing sector (machine operators, mechanics etc.) Amongst professionals, the overwhelming number (60 percent) is that of engineers.

There are certain regional variations in skill composition. The majority of worker from the Frontier province (60 percent) are unskilled, whereas only one-third of workers (34 percent) from the Punjab and Sind are unskilled. Skill composition appears to have changed overtime. The data show that since 1973 the share of unskilled workers compared with skilled workers is constantly increasing.

Marital Status and Family Situation

A large majority (70 percent) of migrant workers are married, but only 4 percent are accompanied abroad by their families. The families of the remaining 66 percent stay behind, thus leaving approximately 3 million women and children separated from their husbands and fathers.

Age and Employment Status

The data show that 75 percent of the migrants are less than 30 years of age. Only 7 percent were reported as unemployed when they migrated. Another 10 percent were reported as students at the time of migration.

Income and Education

The overseas Pakistani by and large comes from a humble income and educational background. His average income before departure is reported as less than one thousand rupees and the total household income as less than 1,500 rupees. Only 4 percent are reported to have more than ten years of education.

However, since he went abroad to work, there have been many dramatic changes in his life. His income has increased several folds to an average of approximately five thousand rupees a month. He has also been exposed to many new experiences: air-travel, learning new languages, and meeting people of different nationalities. A large majority of the Overseas Pakistanis claim they have learnt enough Arabic to

understand and can make basic conversation in it. A smaller number claims to have learnt European languages like English, German, and French, because they were employed by companies where the managerial staff spoke these languages.

IMPACT OF MIGRATION

Large scale migration has several areas of impact, most notably its economic impact on the labour market, saving and consumption behaviour and income distribution. Besides its economic impact labour migration has important social consequences on the families and communities directly affected by it.

Impact on the Labour Market

The PIDE study data show that 83 percent of all migrant workers are production workers. Their loss to the economy has resulted in declining output.

In the long run, the shortages created by migrant workers can be overcome by providing training to the unskilled or less skilled workers. This study provides an estimate of what it would cost to replace migrant workers. The costs are not very high in terms of both monetary outlay and the training time, except for professional whose training requires substantial investment of money and time.

It also appears that output has declined not because the required workers are not available but because the quality of their work is below acceptable standards. There is some evidence in the data to show that as skilled workers

departed, their jobs were replaced by hurriedly trained unskilled workers. The shortage of suitably qualified workers is most pronounced in the manufacturing sector, followed by the construction sector.

The data show that the large scale emigration of both skilled and unskilled workers has resulted in a general increase of wages.

Impact on the Money Market

The period of migration from Pakistan coincides with the period of very high inflation rates, particularly the initial five years between 1973-1978. The coincidence of the two leads one to infer a causal relationship between the two. The common sense argument which contains an element of truth in it is straightforward and convincing: "Large sums of money are being pumped into the economy and it pushes the prices of commodities." This is particularly valid when the new money goes to the traditionally poor with high propensity to consume and seek urgently desired goods to meet the basic needs.

Argued in this fashion, inflation has been almost exclusively blamed on migration. Such exaggeration is not true and stands to be corrected for the following reasons.

Alongwith the increasing remittance money, the import bill of Pakistan has also been rising very sharply. This has meant that the increased purchasing power has been to that extent matched by increased number of goods. The

inflationary impact has been most notable in sectors where the increased demand could not be met by increased imports or increased production at home. This was particularly true of real estate. Real estate was the most favourite investment among remittance recipients and it is an item whose supply, particularly in the short run, is severely constrained.

The inflationary impact of migration has been felt through the rising prices of real estate and higher wage rates, the two areas on whom we have given more precise figures in the previous section. It would be wrong however to apportion the blame of inflation on migration. Inflation rates in other countries either not influenced or much less influenced per capita by emigration, such as India, are not drastically different. The structural character of a modern economy and world wide inflation during the period under study ought not to be ignored.

Saving and Consumption Behaviour

Almost two-thirds of the remittances go into consumption. The remaining one third is primarily accounted for by investment in real estate. This has caused the impression that remittances are responsible for higher consumption propensity, not only among migrants but through their demonstration effect on the rest of the population as well. Since there is a certain degree of truth, as observed in the data, the impression about a spendthrift migrant has become

deeply entrenched, to the complete neglect of many qualifications which must be added to this image of the migrant. Such corrective qualifications are the following.

Firstly, in judging the consumption behaviour of the migrant families, it is only logical to consider consumption as a proportion of their current income and not the past income. Calculated in this manner, the PIDE study, which compared consumption patterns of approximately 1,200 migrant and 600 non-migrant families, showed that within the same income groups the consumption ratio among migrant families was not higher than non-migrant families.

Since the migrant families coexist with the non-migrants in all communities and do not live in their own enclaves, it is difficult to expect them to vary very much in their consumption habits from others in equivalent income groups. They might, however, if they were wise enough to be particularly farsighted realise that the incomes of non-migrants were more stable and perhaps longer lasting in that state than their own, and hence pro-rated on a longer period the income of migrant families would drop. Thus conceived, the migrant family should be more inclined to save for harder times in the future.

Another aspect of migrant savings and consumption habits is the available investment options. It has been shown in the PIDE and PIPO studies that investment ratios are higher in irrigated areas where fruitful investment options are

available for the migrants. Given the volume of investment income, educational and business skills of the migrants, they are not likely to venture far beyond their own residential areas. Therefore, unless investment opportunities are available in close proximity, remittance will continue to be attracted towards the easiest and universally available option: real estate, which our studies show account for one quarter of remittance and two-thirds of all investment.

Income Distribution

Despite the fact that two-thirds of migrant workers originate from rural areas and approximately half of all migrants are unskilled labour, they still seem to come disproportionately from above average income groups.

As a result migration has made the income distribution in the country worse. Nevertheless, it appears that within the group of approximately one million migrant households income is more equally distributed, showing the relatively equitable distribution of the benefits of emigration. Furthermore, the increased income from remittances does have an egalitarian dimension, which is, that no other net inflow of resources to the public at large has historically been as equally distributed over the national population as remittances.

Social Consequences

Two aspects of social consequences of migration are of

special importance: its impact on the family, and on the immediate community of residence. Both of these subjects can only be partially probed through statistical survey. They relate to certain qualitative considerations and can best be understood through qualitative analysis techniques. There are, however, certain quantitative aspects which can be probed on a representative national scale and were included in social surveys. Their findings are given below.

The surveys on migrant population have revealed the interesting influence of extended family. More than 80 percent of the migrant families live in an extended family pattern. The wife and children therefore do not shift residence; they simply continue to live in their old environment. The duties of the husband and father are not taken over by the wife, but by another male member of the household. These duties relate to financial matters as well as education and other matters relating to children.

Perhaps the wife begins to feel more responsible mentally but the physical burden rests with a male member of the household. This is, however, different in cases where migration occurs from a nuclear family, in which case the wife assumes financial and other responsibilities.

Since in the majority of the cases the household pattern does not undergo a qualitative change, the impact of migration, on family patterns cannot be considered very significant.

As for the community, migration has proved to be a great social equalizer. The traditional social hierarchy in rural and, with a modest difference, in the urban Pakistan is based on a congruence between tradition based social prestige and economic resources. Migration provided an opportunity for the socio-economically underprivileged to enhance their economic position and through it revise the socio-economic hierarchy. The revised socio-economic hierarchy expresses itself most graphically, when the migrant family having improved its economic status, moves on to change its caste (Gilani et. al., 1981).

Profile of Social Change

The rural hierarchy in Pakistan gives very little status to manual workers, such as carpenters, tailors, black-smiths, etc. But their demand abroad suddenly placed them in a privileged position. Those from the so-called menial castes sent large amounts of money and goods to their families at home. With their newly acquired wealth, the family of the migrant avidly desires to change its traditional social status in the village. Psychologically, this is often a difficult experience for them as well as for those who were used to seeing them as inferiors.

Two profiles may help to illuminate the underlying conflict situation.

Our first profile is 72 year old Allah Dita. He comes from a family whose ancestral profession was carpentry. In the

village hierarchy, he was regarded as a menial worker. In his youth, Allah Dita joined the army as a carpenter and worked there until his retirement. Before he retired, he managed to save some some money and supported one of his sons to go abroad to work as a carpenter in Muscat in the Gulf. The son began to send home substantial amounts of money, with which Allah Dita built a new house outside the enclave of manual workers. He left his old profession and gradually acquired a new title 'Mughal'. This is an agriculturist caste and is considered more respectable than the carpenters. Obviously, most villagers knew his true lineage, but very few ever mentioned it to him. Instead, they all respected him and sought advice from him on various matters. The secret of his respectability? His son was constantly sending him various gifts which were physically or vicariously enjoyed by fellow villagers. Most enjoyable of all was a television set. In the evening, the villagers would sit around in the house of Allah Dita and watch his television. They all praised his son, the migrant worker abroad. For understandable reasons, they never hinted that Allah Dita Mughal was not a Mughal but a carpenter.

This profile tells a story where social mobility seems to have occurred rather painlessly. But it is not so in the case which follows.

Our second profile is Mohammad Ali, the shoe-maker. He was interviewed a few months before he died in a small village

of the Punjab. Mohammad Ali was very proud of his profession until one of his sons went abroad to work in the Gulf. The son began to send home large sums of money and asked his father to give up his profession, which was considered lowly in the village hierarchy. Mohammad Ali gave up his profession, but he was sad about it. He was also sad that none of his sons adopted their ancestral profession. Instead, they were constantly trying to change their caste and move to the higher caste of Malik. Unlike the previous case, they were not so successful. The villagers continued to treat them as people of low profession. The sad realisation dawned on the son when Mohammad Ali died. At the time of his death, the villagers treated him as a shoe-maker and contributed small gifts to the funeral, as was customary in a semi-barter economy for manual workers of the village. The son was furious. He refused the gifts and was very disappointed. He confided to our interviewer that he would prove to the villagers that money was the real caste. Now that he had money, he said, he would build a new house outside the village. There he would assume his new caste, Malik, if not Malik, then Awan (another higher caste).

Here is a case where remittances earned from abroad create a new situation of social tensions in the communities concerned.

On the one hand, this is a situation of conflict, on the other hand, one of the most peaceful mechanisms of breaking unjust hierarchies. Historically, such social hierarchies

were shattered either by a long process of industrialisation or by violent revolution. Since a parallel process of industrialisation not being in sight in Pakistan, foreign remittances may be relatively violence-free route to a socially more egalitarian society.

International labour migration from Pakistan has been one of the few resources whose allocation has not been strongly biased in favour of privileged classes. It has benefited the rural areas, and even within the rural it has benefited more the residents of areas of less fertile lands. It has benefited the unskilled and the semi-skilled more than the highly educated classes. And it has benefited the socially under-privileged manual workers more than the agriculturists holding relatively higher status. By its very nature, migration has proved welcome for those who were pushed out of their ancestral homes by desperate circumstances.

Whether the overseas workers will be able to sustain their new position in the socio-economic hierarchy is a moot question.

We know that the Middle Eastern countries do not intend to give citizenship or permanent residence to foreign workers. In fact, they are already acting upon the principle of rotation of foreign workers, that is, workers are required to leave after completing their contract periods and are replaced by fresh migrant workers. This means that after spending about five years (as estimated by our study), the

migrant worker is expected to return home.

Migrant workers may well slide back in the social hierarchy, particularly if they do not invest their savings in an economically productive fashion and, secondly, if their next generation is not so educated or trained that they overcome their traditional handicaps in their society.

On both accounts, that is, investment of savings in productive channels and education/training of children, the migrant workers are highly motivated. They have a very high preference for investing their savings in business and they want to give good education to their children. However, the social environment is not conducive for either. A major issue for public policy makers, therefore, is to design policies which may provide returning migrant workers the opportunity to make profitable investments of their savings and thus sustain their hard earned climb on the socio-economic ladder.

RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES AND POLICIES

Pakistan's emigration policy has gone through several phases and accordingly migration and recruitment procedures have also developed over the years.

The first phase of migration was caused by the partition of India. In order to regulate migration at a time when the administrative structure was still in a rudimentary stage, the government imposed very stringent measures against

movement across borders. These rules affected all categories of people and for all destinations. The principal focus of attention was migration between India and Pakistan. The rest of the world was treated as an exception, where the volume of movement was only marginal to the volume of people moving between India and Pakistan.

In the 1960s when substantial number of Pakistanis began to move as workers to various European and North American destinations, the government adopted selective attitude towards emigration; it was broadly neutral to the emigration of unskilled and skilled workers, but held negative attitude towards the emigration of professionals. It was a period when 'brain-drain' was a major worry. Although the government adopted certain measures to prevent the trend, brain-drain continued mainly through students who went to various western destinations for education and stayed back after completing higher studies.

A new situation arose in the 1970s when unparalleled opportunities for foreign labour opened up in the Gulf countries. This occurred at a time when Pakistan was passing through a major political crisis, resulting in the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country. There were severe concerns about the economic health of the remaining half of the country. In a situation of this nature, opportunities for foreign employment were seized by individual workers as well as the government. The talk about 'exporting manpower'

to earn foreign exchange and relieve local unemployment began early in the 1970s. The government relaxed the restrictions on foreign travel. Thus began a period of very rapid, and largely unregulated, emigration which continued for at least five years until the Emigration Ordinance of 1979 was promulgated.

The new Ordinance requires of all departing Pakistanis for employment abroad to obtain a clearance from the Bureau of Emigration, controlled by the Ministry of Labour and Manpower. The Bureau, in turn, seeks a clearance granted by the Protector of emigrants. It is the latter's task to verify that the foreign employment falls within the requirements of legal employment and minimum wages as well as other laid down conditions of work.

The law also requires that every departing worker should become member of the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation by paying a fee of rupees five hundred and fifty (approximately US \$ 100) to the agency.

It is not mandatory for a departing worker to go through a licensed retraining agent, of whom there are more than five hundred registered with the Ministry who are required to work within the framework laid down by the Emigration Ordinance. But those who do go through such an agency are required to pay fee of rupees 1,450 (around US \$ 100) to the agency.

The data from a survey (1983) show that in recent years almost half of the workers went through a recruiting agent. This figure has gone up from an earlier figure of only one quarter (25 percent) when a similar survey was carried out in 1980.


There has been severe criticism of the private recruiting agents. The charges against them relate to fraud and overcharging. The fraudulent practices involve the arrangement of illegal entry into host countries through forged papers, with or without the connivance of similar groups in the host countries. These practices also include false promises of sending their clients overseas or even boarding on boats in the ocean with unknown destinations or uninhabited islands. Severe public uproar was created when such practices led to the death of many unfortunate adventurers on the high seas.

In addition to outright fraud the recruiting agents have also been blamed for overcharging. The official fees of rupees 1,450 was fixed as a result of that charge.

The human misery caused by the malpractices of the recruiting agents has been immense. They have also become the new rich class of local communities, and many among them became millionaires overnight by arranging and selling hundreds of job visas at exorbitant prices.

Nevertheless recruiting agents were an important intermediary in the entire emigration process. Almost viciously thirsty for their profits, they sought jobs or other avenues for bringing manpower in the Gulf countries and they recruited people from the remote corners of Pakistan to board them on planes and herd them into the unknown territories in the Gulf. In doing so, they were not different from their predecessors on the Indian subcontinent in the 18th and 19th century who were called passage brokers and who managed to send millions of Indians to the British plantations in Africa, Carribean, and the Malacca straits. There was, however, one difference that the places of work in the Gulf turned out to be more lucrative than the British plantations and despite the miseries caused by emigration and the callousness of the intermediating agencies, the emigrant worker was able to win, barring exceptions, a reasonable degree of fortune for himself. Such was not the case for his predecessors, who remained paupers if they did not perish on the ships which promised to take them to their dreamlands.

The official structure of the emigration process looks as below:



In reflecting on the policies and procedures concerning migration to the Gulf one comes to the following conclusion.

The migration to the Gulf emerged as a very unexpected development. It was unexpected for the labour receiving as well as for the labour sending countries. They were unprepared to accept this development both psychologically and administratively. Psychologically, it was difficult to accept that the sending countries were unable to provide job, sustenance and opportunities to its citizens, millions of whom were looking abroad for work and opportunity. It was even interpreted as voting with feet. It was no less of a psychological dilemma for the labour importing countries, who were only confronted with the charge of impotence to do their job themselves and to have to rely on foreign labour

in a major way. Administratively, neither the sending nor the receiving countries were equipped to handle the registration or subsequent tracking down of hundreds of thousands of workers. Consequently, we find tremendous confusion in the sending and receiving countries on the question of migration during the first five years of large scale migration to the Gulf, that is 1973-1978. During the next five years, we observe that the psychological barriers are overcome by developing a coherent view on the issue and an administrative structure is constructed to regulate the workers movement. It is in this second half that researchers also responded to this dramatic development in international economic relations. We begin to be more informed on how many people are involved in migration, their profiles, and behaviour. We also begin to be more specific on the impact of migration on the economy and society of the involved countries. Despite this improvement in recognizing the issue, and becoming administratively equipped to handle it, there is yet very little by way of ongoing research on the migrant worker population, as there is on other sections of the population through census and other social surveys. But in countries where migration is either the predominant source of manpower (Gulf) or the provider of foreign exchange (sending countries), it is an issue which deserves to be regularly monitored by carefully designed periodic surveys.

Part II

RETURNEES

RETURNESS

Returnee migrants are perhaps the least known segment of the overseas Pakistanis community. It is also a group which evokes the greatest amount of concern among the population. One of the bleakest comment on overseas migration is quite frequently expressed saying: "What will happen when the migration boom ends and the workers come home?"

The concern about the dreaded fate of the returnee migrant was beautifully expressed to us by a man with great native wisdom quoting a Pashto proverb: "men sleeping on a borrowed cot, which they might have to leave in the middle of the night."

It appears that a deeper knowledge about the returnee may quell some of our exaggerated concern about the 'return of the overseas worker'. The return is in fact, our studies show, taking place since the last many years. And while the returnees face many problems, there is not much wisdom in imagining a doomsday scenario about them. A balanced understanding about the problems of the returnees may help in rationally and realistically planning about their welfare.

Three issues are of key importance in the study of returnee migrants: their profiles, their readjustment problems on return and the nature and impact of migration experience.

PROFILE

There are approximately one million returnee migrants in Pakistan. Approximately 80 percent of them have worked in the Middle East, the remaining elsewhere in the world, principally Europe and North America.

In their profile they are not very different from the current group of migrants abroad. They come, largely, from low income backgrounds, and were earning an average of rupees six hundred before they went abroad. While abroad they earned approximately five thousand rupees a month. Upon returning their income once again dropped to an average of rupees 1,400 a month.

They had initially gone abroad with an intention to spend two or three years (an average of 2.7 years). As it turned out they ended up staying about five years (an average of 5.2 years).

Most of them did not return fully willingly, in the sense that half of them returned because their job tenures had been completed, or they were facing visa problems. Health problems (15 percent) and family problems (11 percent) also figured as prominent reasons to return.

Table

Difference between intended and actual period of stay abroad

	Intended stay	Actual stay
Total	2.82	5.50
Host country		
Saudi Arabia	2.66	2.88
U.A.E.	3.14	4.85
U.K.	2.00	19.06
Returned period		
Less than one year	2.87	4.71
1 - 2 years	3.08	6.34
2 - 3 years	2.69	5.96
More than 3 years	2.03	4.65

The detailed profile of the returnee migrants based on a survey in five districts is given below:

Income

The pre-migration income of the returnee migrants was an average of six hundred rupees per month. The total household income was approximately eleven hundred rupees. Those belonging to Gujrat and Larkana were relatively better off compared to those from other districts. Also those who went to Saudi Arabia were relatively better off. The level of premigration income also seems to be related with the length of stay abroad. It is understandable that those who left earlier had smaller amount of nominal income. While abroad the returnee was earning more than four thousand six hundred rupees per month.

Since has returned to Pakistan, the average income of a returnee is about one thousand four hundred rupees a month.

Table

Personal income of the returnee migrant
before and after migration

	Income in rupees per month		
	Before migration	During migration	Current
Total	613	4657	1395
Host Country			
Saudi Arabia	773	4720	1556
U.A.E.	474	3904	1256
U.K.	338	5407	1350
Return Period			
Less than one year	744	4743	726
1 - 2 years	574	5677	1665
2 - 3 years	695	4526	1398
More than 3 years	500	3489	1652

Skill

Forty four percent among the returning migrants are skilled workers, an equal number (44 percent) are unskilled workers, three percent are professionals and the remaining nine percent belong to the miscellaneous category. It is interesting to note that in their skill composition, the returnee migrants are not very different from the stock of migrants currently abroad.

Age

Average age of the returnee migrant is 38 years. There is some variation across districts. The returnees in the Punjab are relatively younger; their average age is 32 years. The average age of returns in Sind and Baluchistan is 43 years.

Marital Status

Eighty nine percent of the returnees are married. This varies from as low as 70 percent in some districts to as

high as 91 percent in others. The returnees from the UK are all married. Sixty percent of them were married before they went abroad. Another 25 percent married during their stay abroad and 4 percent of them married on return.

Table

Marital status of the returnee migrant

	Unmarried	Married before emigration	Married after emigration	Married after returning	Average age
Total	11	60	25	4	37.98
Host Country					
Saudi Arabia	13	65	19	2	36.99
U.A.E.	8	66	21	3	37.10
U.K.	-	63	38	-	50.91
Return Period					
Less than one year	20	53	24	3	34.38
1 - 2 years	5	72	20	1	40.32
2 - 3 years	10	52	33	4	36.78
More than 3 yrs	11	53	28	8	39.51

In case of Baluchistan, about one-half of returnees married after they went abroad. It seems that either they were too young when they went abroad or they needed money for their weddings which they could afford only after they had worked overseas.

Household Size and Family Structure

The household size is slightly smaller in case of returnees as compared to left behind families. This is because some returnees set up a nuclear household after returning from abroad.

The average household size among returnees is 8.15.

Table

Household size and household structure

	Average number of members per household	Nuclear	Extended
Total	8.15	29	56
Host Country			
Saudi Arabia	7.24	29	55
U.A.E.	9.22	26	57
U.K.	7.69	19	50
Return Period			
Less than one year	7.13	29	59
1 - 2 years	9.24	24	59
2 - 3 years	8.17	27	65
More than 3 years	7.89	38	53

There are more nuclear households among returnees as compared to those who are currently abroad. Almost 30 percent of the returnees live in nuclear families, compared to 10 percent among those left-behind.

Modernity Scale

To measure modernity, a scale of zero to six was used; zero showing the least and six the most modern attitudes.*

On an average, the returnees scored 3.9 points on this scale. This is substantially lower as compared to the left behind families, who scored an average of five points.

* The details of this scale are provided in Ijaz Gilani, Left Behind or Left Out: A Study of the left behind families of overseas Pakistanis, PIPO, Migration Report No. 1, 1983.

Table

Cumulative score on modernity scale

(Minimum = 0)	
(Maximum = 6)	
Total	3.9
Host country	
Saudi Arabia	3.6
U.A.E.	3.7
U.K.	4.6
Return Period	
Less than one year	3.9
1 - 2 years	3.7
2 - 3 years	4.0
More than 3 years	3.9

Contentment with Life

A statistical sample of returnee migrants were asked a set of questions concerning contentment with life. The responses from them were then compared with responses from a representative sample of the entire country. The comparison gives us some very interesting results.

Despite the high degree of unemployment among returnee migrants, they turn out to be a much happier group compared to the general population. 52 percent among them say that satisfaction with life on the whole is high. The equivalent figure for the general population is only 13 percent.

While there is a big difference among the returnees and general population on contentment with life on the whole, there is no difference in the evaluation given by two groups when we break down satisfaction by certain specific characteristics: income, social relations, health, profession, family relations, law and order.

Table

Contentment with life: Life in general

	Level of satisfaction				
	Very high	High	Modest	Low	Very low
All Returnees	24	28	33	8	4
Host Country					
Saudi Arabia	20	38	30	7	2
U.A.E.	23	28	33	5	8
U.K.	6	19	56	6	13
Return Period					
Less than 1 year	25	31	29	3	6
1 - 2 years	21	30	32	11	1
2 - 3 years	21	27	37	8	2
More than 3 years	30	21	36	9	4
General Population	4	9	30	34	5

Contentment of returnee migrants with their current income levels is lower than their contentment with life in general. Almost 20 percent say satisfaction with current income is low, while 37 percent say it is only modest. When asked about the desirable income level the returnee quoted over rupees seven thousand per month. This was at least four times higher than their current actual incomes.

The returnees were hopeful about the future of the next generation. When asked whether it was possible for a child

born in a poor family to become rich, more than 50 percent replied in the affirmative; only 22 percent thought that such chances were very low or none. Perhaps this was so because they themselves had experienced that it was possible to make a steep rise on the income ladder.

Rehabilitation of the Returnee Migrant

When the returnee comes home after having spent a number of years abroad, he is faced with two kinds of readjustment problems: economic and social. The economic readjustment is related to his gainful employment, whereas social readjustment concerns his re-entry into the family and community as well as his personal satisfaction. Considering this, we are looking into three issues: first, dealing with re-employment, the second dealing with the returnee's entry in his family and community, and the third dealing with personal satisfaction, particularly mental health of the migrant.

Only about half of the returnee migrants are able to find gainful employment immediately. Some find employment after a year or so, but a significant number of the returnees remain unemployed for much longer period of time. Almost 30 percent among them are unable to find employment even after two years of their having returned to Pakistan.

Table

Post-return employment			
	Re-employed immediately	Re-employed after some time	Unemployed
Total	47	24	29
Host Country			
Saudi Arabia	52	25	23
U.A.E.	43	30	27
U.K.	19	31	50
Return Period			
Less than one year	41	3	56
1 - 2 years	49	32	19
2 - 3 years	45	26	29
More than 3 years	59	34	7

Most of the unemployed returnees are willing to go out of town in search of a job. However, 20 percent among them are interested in finding a job only in their own vicinities.

It appears that more than half of those who remained temporarily unemployed did not actively seek a job during that period. The most frequent reasons given by them for remaining unemployed were: "Just did not feel like working" (45 percent) and "physical or mental illness" (30 percent).

The most frequently mentioned problems which the returnee migrant faces in seeking employment are: Short of capital to start self-employment business (15 percent), lack of capabilities and training to start a new business (11 percent), disorientation from work (8 percent), find it hard to make a living through halal means (8 percent), and

inflation (6 percent). Half of those who had remained unemployed (53 percent), however, said their unemployment was not related to any specific problems.

Those who are skilled unemployed mention shortage of capital (22 percent), lack of education (9 percent), ill health (12 percent) and being short of proper (Sifarish) references (4 percent). Again half of the respondents attribute their unemployment to lack of effort on their part or other miscellaneous reasons.

As the above statements show we tried to determine, through several questions, the problems faced by the unemployed returnee. Shortage of capital and ill health are mentioned as the principal problems. At the same time their responses do not indicate a situation of helplessness. Half of them feel they have not still made a genuine effort and do not blame anyone else for their present state. Nor do we trace a sense of cynicism shown by the fact that only four percent attribute their unemployment to their inability in having the proper sifarish or reference.

Those returnees who are employed, wish to continue with the present jobs, except a few (12 percent) who plan to change their economic activity over the next one year. This group is possibly a dynamic one which wants to improve its economic position by going into business or enlarging their current enterprises.

Even though the returnees were not very explicit in expressing their disappointment at the steep decline in their earnings after their returning from abroad, it is indeed true that they wish for much higher incomes than they are enjoying today. When asked to mention the desired income, they gave a figure which was at least four times their current incomes. This was almost the same as what they had earned when they were abroad. The returnee migrants are a group who are keen to change their current position.

Re-entry in Family and Community

We have not observed much of a dislocation due to overseas migration. The migrant left his wife and children with the extended family when he went abroad. Only 6 percent of the returnees reported that their families had to change residence as a result of their migration.

When the migrant was away, in most cases his parents acted as guardians of his family. In some cases, however, this responsibility fell on the older children who, in the absence of their fathers became the heads of their families.

In very few cases (4 percent) it was the left-behind wife who acted as head of the household.

Table

Guardianship during absence of the migrant

	Wife	child	Parent	Others
Total	4	11	51	9
Host Country				
Saudi Arabia	6	13	49	7
U.A.E.	2	13	49	10
U.K.	13	6	63	19
Return Period				
Less than one year	2	2	46	10
1 - 2 years	3	20	50	12
2 - 3 years	8	4	65	2
More than 3 years	2	13	42	9

We did not find any indication of family problems caused by indiscipline or delinquency among children or any problems with the behaviour of wife. The returnees did not give a negative rating on the set of questions concerning discipline among male and female children and on the question dealing with the norms and behaviour of their wives. Based on the experience of veterans returning home after many years, one could conceive that a problem among returnees would be that when they return the wives would have become used to acting as independent. They may be frustrated to find that these roles would be denied to them after the husband had returned.

In order to test the above mentioned hypothesis we included a number of questions dealing with the duties which the wife performed when the husband was abroad and after his return.

Table

Impact on decision-making role of wives							
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Total	2	2	3	1	1	1	3
Host Country							
Saudi Arabia	-	1	2	-	-	-	1
U.A.E.	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
U.K.	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Return Period							
Less than one year	2	-	-	2	-	-	-
1 - 2 years	-	-	1	-	-	-	3
2 = 3 years	4	4	8	2	4	4	4
More than 3 years	-	-	2	-	-	-	4
A: Banking	B: children's education						
C: Grocery shopping	D: Buying durables						
E Real Estate/house building	F: Match-making/weddings of children						
G: Taking care of agriculture/livestock							

It appeared that this issue had not been problematic, simply because, except in a very few cases, the wife had never assumed the traditional responsibilities of males. Only three percent of the returnee households reported that duties such as dealing with banks, children's education and buying durables or even groceries were performed by the wife.

Personal Satisfaction

In order to find out if the drastic decline in their earnings and widespread unemployment had any depressing

effects on the returnees, a set of questions were asked from the returnees dealing with their general as well as mental health. They were asked them whether compared to the previous years their health was better or worse during the last one year. Ten other items dealing with depression were also included.

About ten percent of the respondents said that their general health was worse than before. However, about the same number said that their health had been better than before, and another 33 percent said that their health had remained the same as before. On the mental health issues, twenty to thirty percent of the respondents showed some sign of depression.

The state of depression was measured by a set of questions: whether the respondents had suffered, over the last year, from sleeplessness, anxiety, suffocation, extraordinary heart beating, frequent nightmares, feeling of being victim of an evil spirit, feeling of being tired and eructation.

How do the returnees perceive their own problems? Two third among them did not interpret their problems of readjustment as serious or grave. Twenty five percent thought that they did face modest degree of problems, while seventeen percent thought that the nature of problems which they had faced was severe.

Table

General health status

	Percent of returnees feeling		
	Better than before	Worse than before	No difference
Total	33	29	33
Host Country			
Saudi Arabia	35	24	37
U.A.E.	36	16	43
U.K.	6	63	31
Return Period			
Less than one year	24	37	32
1 - 2 years	43	24	30
2 - 3 years	37	21	39
More than 3 years	32	36	30

Table

Perceived social adjustment problems for returnee migrants

	Percent perceiving the problems as		
	Severe	Modest	None
Total	7	25	65
District			
Gujrat	9	59	31
Mirpur	3	72	23
Kohat	7	50	34
Larkana	3	83	13
Turbat	17	66	17
Host Country			
Saudi Arabia	1	76	21
U.A.E.	15	61	12
U.K.	6	38	56
Return Period			
Less than one year	7	64	22
1 - 2 years	7	62	29
2 - 3 years	4	65	29
More than 3 years	13	70	17

Future Plans of the Returnee Migrant

The picture of the returnee migrant which emerges from our data is something like this: He is in his late thirties. He is neither highly educated nor highly skilled, but he is an experienced person. He has been abroad, has learnt one or more foreign languages, and has also learnt some skills during his stay abroad. During his years spent abroad he has earned considerable sums of money, with which he satisfies his basic needs, such as housing. He had to return home either because his job ended or there were some problems at home.

Since returning he is unemployed. He is keen to go into business or trading. This, he says, was one of the goals which took him abroad. But for a number of reasons including lack of skill and enough capital, he has not been successful in starting any business activity.

On the whole, he is an ambitious person. He is not satisfied with what he accomplished during his first opportunity to work overseas. He wants to earn much more than what he has earned at present. If possible, he also wants to go abroad once again. Given a second opportunity, he says he will do his best to make savings to start his own business.

The above picture shows the returnee migrant to be a person who is experienced; some of his basic needs have already been satisfied and he is keen to do business. But he is suspicious of working with others because he feels that he

will be cheated by them. These characteristics make the returnee migrants the most appropriate people to become the target group for self-employment schemes.

PART III
CONSEQUENCES OF
OVERSEAS MIGRATION

EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MIGRATION MOVEMENT

The consequences of labour migration for sending countries has been the subject of much debate. Some critics consider it to be extremely harmful, while others argue that large-scale labour migration can stimulate economic growth in both the sending and receiving countries. The debate is broadly focused on three major issues; labour markets, remittances, and social impact. Those who view migration as contributing to the welfare of the sending countries argue that labour migration reduces unemployment, brings much needed foreign exchange, and reduces income and social inequalities. On the other hand, others argue that labour migration causes skill shortages in the sending countries, fuels conspicuous consumption without leading to correspondingly higher levels of economic growth, and further exacerbates income inequalities. The South Asian experience suggests that the impact of a migration largely depends on the peculiar characteristics of the particular labour migration concerned. The first phase of South Asian migration involved enormous human costs and brought few rewards to either migrants or the labour exporting regions concerned. Second phase migration, though conducted on more favourable terms and often beneficial at an individual level, was too limited and too diffused to have a major impact on the labour sending countries as a whole. In contrast, labour emigration to the Middle East which has occurred during the past decade is having a dramatic impact in a number of regions

throughout South Asia. The positive and negative features of this impact will be discussed in the following paragraphs, with comments framed within the context of ten frequently asked questions regarding the consequences of labour migration. Though empirical evidence is insufficient to decisively resolve all the issues raised, the various studies across the subcontinent do provide for insight and understanding of broad trends.

Is Migration a Drain on the Skills of the Sending Countries?

Casual analysis from South Asia often suggests that migration to the Middle East drains the various countries involved of many of their most skilled and competent workers. "Brain drain" arguments from the 1960s are sometimes put forward, though in this case the concern more often focuses on skilled production workers - carpenters, foremen, welders, machine operators, and so forth. No doubt some bottlenecks have occurred in some skilled occupations. Nevertheless, it should be recognized from the outset that such a characterization cannot be applied to the movement of labour as a whole. First, migrant profiles noted earlier demonstrate that a substantial proportion of the migrants have little or no skills at all. Given the high rates of underemployment prevailing throughout the subcontinent, the loss of such workers does not adversely affect the manpower situation in the economies concerned. Second, the impact of a loss in skilled labour will vary depending on the

occupations involved. The supply of some skills exceeds demand in South Asia, and at least part of the migration has provided a "safety valve" for unemployed youth. Finally, skill shortages that do emerge can be overcome in time through the expansion of technical training programmes. Such an expansion in technical education has taken place in both the public and private sector throughout South Asia over the last ten years.

Does Emigration Mean a Loss in Public Funds Spent on Training Migrants or their Replacements?

The issue of costs involved in training workers is closely related to the issue of possible losses incurred through the departure of skilled labour to the Middle East. Some skills can be acquired with relatively little investment in terms of time and money while others require years of commitment and considerable capital expense. Data from Pakistan suggests that the cost of training workers to replace those that have left is quite low, with much of the costs borne by the private individual rather than by public funds. The Bangladesh study expresses greater concern over this issue but highlights the cost differential between training for different occupations, with professional degrees the costliest, non-technical training the least expensive, and technical education falling somewhere in between. Interestingly, the high remittance rates have meant that training a worker for migration provides higher financial returns than training a worker for employment in the

domestic economy. Finally, one must be careful to distinguish between shortages occurring because of the immediate loss of a worker to the Middle East and shortages occurring because of economic growth spurred in part by remittance spending. The construction sector is a case in point here. Despite the migration of large numbers of construction workers to the Middle East, it has consistently expanded, with growth partly attributable to construction demands made by emigrant families. As for policy considerations, financing programmes to alleviate manpower shortages that develop in an expanding economy is preferable to financing disguised unemployment in a labour-surplus economy that is stagnating.

Are Remittances a Major Benefit of International Migration?

Remittances income is usually put forward as the most obvious benefit resulting from an international labour migration. Wages in the Middle East have been substantial enough to permit high savings rates and these savings have for the most part been remitted to the countries of origin. Pakistan in particular has become critically dependent on remittance earnings as a source of foreign exchange, while such earnings also constitute an important part of the balance of payments accounts in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. This scenario should, however, be qualified by at least three factors. First, increasing remittances while increasing foreign exchange reserves, also increase consumer demand for imported goods. This demand may be further

stimulated by a "demonstration effect" in which others imitate emigrant consumption patterns, further increasing the strain on balance of payments accounts. Second, while the central bank captures the foreign exchange returned through official channels, it does not determine the actual spending pattern of the rupees exchanged. These rupees represent a claim on real resources and will not necessarily lead to increased investment. Finally, dependence on remittances compromises security in that continued flows depend on political and economic developments in the host countries concerned. Remittances have increased consistently during the past ten years, but their continued flow will always remain problematic.

**Are Remittances Being Overwhelmingly
"Wasted" on Consumption Items?**

Anecdotal evidence, primarily gathered from airport customs counters, often refers to the conspicuous consumption patterns allegedly adopted by migrant households. This consumption is frequently described as "wasteful". Though a large proportion of remittance spending does in fact go toward consumption, the question is far more complex than the context in which it is often framed. First, it should be noted that the amount spent on the most visible consumer durables - television sets, radios, tea sets, and so forth - represents only a fraction of remittance spending; a much larger part is directed toward recurring consumption items, primarily food. Second, increasing the consumption levels of

certain groups in a society may be a very legitimate public policy goal, particularly if these groups have been deprived of adequate food, shelter, medical care, and education in the past. Such "wasteful" consumption increase the value of human capital and can have a substantial and positive economic impact over a long period of time. Furthermore, it should be remembered that some forms of consumption lead to the kinds of investment necessary to sustain demand-led economic growth. Consumer demands that are met locally can have a beneficial impact at a micro level. A large part of emigrant spending - more diversified diets, for example, or much of the construction programmes - falls into this category. Such consumption may be less valuable than other alternative forms of investment, but its utility need not be completely ignored.

Is There a Substantial Leakage in Remittances Because They are Remitted Illegally or Saved in the Host Country?

Official remittance figures detail only that part of the remittances which are returned through official channels. Other foreign earnings are exchanged through the black market for reasons of convenience (bank drafts often take weeks to arrive) or financial gain (the black market premium in some instances may be quite high). In other cases, migrants maintain overseas bank accounts, depriving the labour exporting country of some of the foreign exchange it might ordinarily have expected to receive. Empirical evidence from the Pakistan case study indicates that fears

over both black market remittances and unremitted savings are exaggerated. About 80 percent of all remittances were found to be returned through official channels, with the 20 percent remaining sent through non-banking institutions. This uncaptured 20 percent is largely confined to the Northwest Frontier Province. In addition, the bulk of the overseas workers were found to return all their savings over the course of their stay in the Middle East. The only exception here has been the professional employees, who account for 4 percent of the emigrant population and about 17 percent of the earned income. They withheld approximately one-third of their savings. Initial evidence from Bangladesh suggested that migrants were remitting below capacity, but a later analysis disputes this and finds "little support for the complaint often made that remittances from the Middle East have been feeding a rapidly-expanding black currency market." On the contrary, this study concluded that "only about 15 percent of remittable funds were either diverted to the black currency market or held back by the migrants themselves."

Has Emigration Led to Increased Wages?

An insufficient data base means comments on the impact of labour migration on labour markets in South Asia must be largely speculative. It can, however, be argued that migration should lead to increased wages for two reasons. First, wages for skilled workers would be expected to rise if these workers are departing for the Middle East in

especially high numbers. Second, wages for unskilled wage labour may increase because of increases in the "reservation wage". This wage represents the level below which an underemployed and unemployed person will not work, preferring instead to draw on resources provided by the extended family. It appears that remittance inflows have increased the incomes of a large number of extended families in South Asia, a development that would be expected to increase the reservation wage as well. In fact, limited evidence from both Pakistan and Kerala lends support to this view. In both cases, wages have increased across the board for both skilled and unskilled labour.

Does Emigration Lead to Higher Inflation?

Inflation in labour exporting countries is often indiscriminately ascribed to emigration, though a direct relationship is in most instances difficult to establish. Remittance income has clearly increased consumption demands throughout South Asia. Inflationary tendencies as a result of this demand would depend on the supply elasticities of the commodities in question. Inflationary rates for those items whose supply can readily be met by local production or by imports would be less than those whose supply is relatively fixed. Such inflation is usually manageable insofar as the supply response does not lag too far behind the demand. Real estate is perhaps the best example of a commodity whose supply is fixed. Evidence from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh all highlight the fact that land is

an important target for remittance spending. Not surprisingly, prices have increased dramatically over the last decade. Real estate aside, it is interesting to note that the overall inflation rate in India's high-migration state of Kerala is not significantly higher than the inflation rate elsewhere in the country.

Does International Emigration Reduce Unemployment and Serve as a Safety Valve Against What might have been Disturbingly High Levels of Unemployment?

The unemployment question, related very much to concerns over a loss in skilled manpower noted earlier, may be viewed from two perspectives. Migration may provide a mechanism allowing the unemployed to find work abroad, or it may occur among the already employed. Empirical evidence from South Asia suggests the latter view is more valid. International migration primarily attracts the better skilled and more enterprising workers and these workers are by and large already employed. Moreover, migration requires an initial financial outlay to finance the job search and travel expenses, funds which may be unavailable to the chronically unemployed even within the context of an extended family network. Nevertheless, international migration would tend to ease a tight job market insofar as the formerly unemployed fill positions by those leaving for the Middle East.

Does Emigration Lead to Stifled Production and the Loss of Output at Home?

The question of a loss in output cannot be adequately

answered with the data presently in hand. In the case of Pakistan in particular, fears have been expressed that migration has drained the domestic economy of many of its most skilled and experienced managers and technicians. The loss of competent foreman and skilled manual workers could also adversely affect the construction and manufacturing sectors - at precisely the time when, given increasing remittances and increased demand for housing and consumer goods, these sectors should be expected to rapidly expand. As a matter of speculation, it may be stated that such losses, though probably in the short-term, can be overcome through proper technical and apprenticeship programmes. Furthermore, the long-range impact of migration on production may be positive insofar as it stimulates increased demands for goods and services that can best be met locally.

Does International Migration Lead to Increased Income Disparities and the Emergence of a 'New Rich' Class?

This common sense notion regarding the distributional impact of emigration to the Middle East is reflected in special terms coined to describe migrant workers such as the phrase "Dubai Wala" in use in Pakistan. There is, however, little empirical work analyzing the distributional impact of migration at the micro level. The Pakistan case study does attempt to determine the socio-economic background of the migrant population as a whole. It shows that the migrant households prior to migration had an income that was

slightly higher than the national average. Thus, they came from the lowest but not very bottom part of the income ladder. This characterization could be applied to Bangladesh as well. In the case of the Indian state of Kerala, one description states that "the majority of the migrants come from poor families, living in rural areas and engaged in low production activities such as fishing, agricultural labour, household industry, and service sector jobs such as helpers in the country tea shops and salesmen in groceries". Remittance income from the Middle East immediately moves migrant households into higher income brackets. Overall income distribution patterns may worsen as a result, with non-migrant households sharing a smaller portion of the total national income. Nevertheless, it is clear that migration has allowed some formerly marginal groups to enhance their income and consumption patterns dramatically. Furthermore, it is significant that these households are very well represented in rural areas across South Asia. Indeed, it would seem that labour migration has been more effective than in other economic development during the last 35 years in increasing incomes for a substantial number of rural households.

Quite aside from the question of empirical evidence, the Pakistan can also highlights an interesting aspect of the discussion process as it relates to labour migration to the Gulf region. For understandable reasons, this discussion is carried out almost exclusively by academics, government

officials, journalists and intellectuals. None of these groups have benefitted for emigration. On the contrary, they have also been serious losers. The manpower requirements in the Middle East did not call for Pakistani bureaucrats or academics or journalists; they called instead for carpenters, masons, technicians, pipe fitters, and unskilled manual labourers. As a result, the relative economic position of the intellectual groups was seriously weakened. Their social position has also been undermined insofar as social status is measured in terms of the ability to live in substantial houses and indulge in conspicuous consumption. A social hierarchy that previously held manual labour in low esteem has also been seriously disturbed. One should thus be wary of inherent biases which may emerge in outside critiques assessing the impact of the large-scale movement of South Asian labour to the Middle East.

PART IV
COMPARATIVE BEHAVIOUR
OF
OVERSEAS PAKISTANI HOUSEHOLDS
AND
THE REST OF THE POPULATION

COMPARATIVE BEHAVIOUR OF OVERSEAS PAKISTANI HOUSEHOLDS AND THE REST OF THE POPULATION

This chapter is based on a survey conducted in 1987 to compare the behaviour of Overseas Pakistani households with that of the rest of the population. The details of the research methodology are provided in an appendix to the study.

While many previous studies had looked into the behaviour and attitudes of Overseas Pakistanis, none had conducted a systematic comparison between them and the rest of the population. The present study is quite unique in that respect. The survey was designed to elicit certain attitudinal and behavioral characteristics of the Overseas Pakistani households such as their profile characteristics, attitudes towards social and political issues, exposure to the mass media, and to compare them on the same dimensions with the rest of the population.

Below are the findings from the survey:

COMPARATIVE PROFILE

INCOME

The Overseas Pakistani households are more than twice as likely as the rest of the population to be in the above average income group in the country.

INCOME GROUP

<u>Percent of Households among</u>	
Overseas	Rest of the
Pakistanis	Population
(OPs)	(Rest)

-----	-----
-------	-------

Households with Monthly Income Group

Rupees 1-500	4.0	15.2
Rupees 500-1000	21.4	32.5
Rupees 1000-2000	22.1	25.7
Rupees 2000 +	44.6	17.4

Thus while only 4.0 percent of the OP households report monthly income of less than Rupees 500, this figure is 15.2 for the rest of the population. On the other end of the spectrum, while 44.6 percent of OP households report monthly income of more than Rupees 2000, the comparable figure for the rest of the population is only 15.2 percent.

OWNERSHIP OF DURABLES

There is a wide difference between the two groups on the ownership of various households durables. The following table shows the details.

TABLE
OWNERSHIP OF DURABLES
Percent who own among

	<u>OPs</u> ---	<u>Rest</u> ----
MEDIA -----		
TV (black and white)	15	12
TV (coloured)	26	6
Radio	64	41
Cassette (Tape) Recorder	60	28
VCR	12	2
TRANSPORT -----		
Motor Cycle	25	10
Car	9	2
HOME APPLIANCES -----		
Washing Machine	27	12
Refrigerator	32	9
Air Conditioner	4	1

The table is divided into three broad groups: Media, Transport and Home Appliance. On items relating to the mass media, the Overseas Pakistanis are more likely to own a TV set as the rest of the population. 15 percent among them own a black and white TV set, while the comparable figure for the rest of the population is 12 percent. The gap is even wider when it comes to colour TV sets. 26 percent of Overseas Pakistani households own a colour TV set compared with 6 percent among the rest of the population. On Radio sets the gap is less glaring, but still quite wide: 64 percent of Overseas Pakistani households own a Radio set compared with 41 percent among the rest of the population. On cassette recorders, the Overseas Pakistani households are twice as likely to own them as the rest of the population: 60 percent among the Overseas Pakistani households and 28 percent among the rest of the population. The Overseas Pakistani households are especially privileged when it comes to ownership of VCRs: 12 percent of Overseas Pakistani households own VCRs compared with 2 percent among the rest of the population.

The second group of households durables relates to transport items. The ownership of transport vehicles is important not only as a convenience, but also as a possible contribution towards enhancement of income. 25 percent of Overseas Pakistani households own a motorcycle compared with 10 percent among the rest of the population. 9 percent among Overseas Pakistani households own a car compared with 2 percent among the rest of the population.

The third group of households durables comprises of home appliances: Washing machines, Refrigerators and Air conditioners. These items, it should be pointed out, are important determinants of life style. The Overseas Pakistani households fare much better than the rest of the population. 27 percent among the Overseas Pakistani households own a washing machine compared with 12 percent among the rest of the population. 32 percent among the Overseas Pakistani households own a refrigerator compared with 9 percent among the rest of the population. Air conditioner ownership is 4 percent among Overseas Pakistani and 1 percent among the rest of the population.

URBANIZATION

The Overseas Pakistani households tend to either originate from urban localities, or have moved from rural to urban locations after they acquired their new prosperity. This trend has become more apparent only in the latest survey, and was not empirically evident in previous studies.

According to the survey 59 percent of the Overseas Pakistani households currently live in the rural areas, while 41 percent of them live in the urban areas. The figures for the rest of the population are: 73 percent rural and 27 percent urban.

TABLE

PLACE OF RESIDENCE

	OPs ---	OTHERS -----
Rural	59	73
Urban	41	27

**EXPOSURE TO THE
MASS MEDIA**

TELEVISION

The Overseas Pakistani households are much more exposed to TV compared with the rest of the population. 62 percent of them, as opposed to 47 among the rest of the population claim regular or occasional viewing. The difference is sharper in case of regular viewing: 30 percent of Overseas Pakistani households are regular viewers compared with only 18 percent among the rest of the population.

MEDIA HABITS

TABLE

Question: How frequently do you watch TV?

	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>	
	<u>OPs</u>	<u>Others</u>
<u>Viewers</u>	50	36
Daily	23	13
Occasionally	27	23
<u>Non-Viewers</u>	46	62

RADIO

The differences in radio listening among Overseas Pakistani households and the rest of the population are less sharp. 56 percent among the Overseas Pakistani households are radio listeners while the comparable figure for the rest of the population is 46 percent. In fact among regular listeners, the OP households are only 5 percentage points a head of the rest of the population. 25 percent against 20 percent. The absence of sharp differences in radio listening among Overseas Pakistani households and the rest of the population can perhaps be explained by ownership of radio sets which is quite common among the entire population, and hence the Overseas Pakistani households do not enjoy a particular edge.

TABLE

Question: How frequently do you listen to the Radio?

	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>	
	OPs	Others
	---	-----
<u>Listeners</u>	56	46
	--	--
Daily	25	20
Occasionally	31	26
<u>Non-Listeners</u>	40	52
	--	--

NEWSPAPER READERSHIP

The Overseas Pakistani households are considerably ahead of the rest of the population in terms of newspaper readership. 62 percent among the Overseas Pakistani households claim newspaper readership as opposed to 41 percent among the rest. It must however be pointed out that claims about newspaper readership should not be interpreted literally. Surveys have shown that many among those who claim to be newspaper readers are illiterates and are mere listeners to newspapers being read to them. Others have a vague acquaintance with alphabet but they are interested in the visual material in the newspapers; they also claim to be newspaper readers. Thus the claimed newspaper readership figures become quite inflated.

The above qualifications notwithstanding, 30 percent of Overseas Pakistani households claim to be regular newspaper readers as opposed to 16 percent of households among the rest of the population. 32 percent of Overseas Pakistani households claim occasional readership as against 25 percent among the rest of the population.

TABLE

Question: How frequently do you read the newspapers

	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>	
	<u>OPs</u>	<u>Others</u>
<u>Readers</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>-----</u>
	62	41
	--	--
Daily	30	16
Occasionally	32	25
<u>Non-Readers</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>59</u>
<u>-----</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>

CINEMA GOING HABITS

Surprisingly there is no significant difference in the cinema-going habits of the Overseas Pakistani households and the rest of the population. This is possibly so because cinema-going is neither very expensive nor does it require the ownership of a personal gadget, as opposed to TV viewing or VCR viewing.

TABLE

Question: How frequently do you go to the Cinema

	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>	
	<u>OPs</u>	<u>Others</u>
	---	-----
Cinema-goers	22	22
-----	--	--
At least once a month	7	8
Less frequently	15	14
Non-goers	78	78
-----	--	--

SOCIAL ATTITUDES

The findings from our survey show that the Overseas Pakistani households are, on the average, more concerned about social issues compared with the rest of the population. This difference could probably be explained by their greater exposure to the outside world and higher access to the mass media.

By way of example the study focused on two issues: Narcotics and Health care. The purpose was to examine whether the attitude and behaviour of Overseas Pakistani households was any different on these issues from that of the rest of the population.

According to our survey the Overseas Pakistani are generally more aware of the narcotics problem and have greater concern on the issue compared with the rest of the population. They are more likely to believe that Pakistani territory has been used for trafficking drugs. They are also more inclined to believe that Pakistanis are themselves consuming narcotics and that producer countries should burden the principal responsibilities to combat the drug problem.

Knowledge About Narcotics:

41percent among the Overseas Pakistani households say they have recently heard a good deal of narcotics compared with 27 percent among the rest of the population.

TABLE

Question: How much have you recently heard or read about
heroin and opium?

Percent of Respondents

	<u>OPs</u> ---	<u>Others</u> -----
Much	41	27
Some	27	25
Not much	14	16
None	15	30
No Response	3	2

Trafficking through Pakistan:

25 percent among the Overseas Pakistani households believe that very large quantity of narcotics are trafficked through Pakistan. The comparable figure for the rest of the population is 16 percent.

TABLE

Question: According to what you have heard how much of the heroin and opium produced in other countries is trafficked through Pakistan?

	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>	
	<u>OPs</u> ---	<u>Others</u> -----
Very large quantity	25	16
A large quantity	27	27
Not very large quantity	19	17
Not at all	14	19
No Response	15	21

Seriousness of Narcotics Problem:

79 percent of the Overseas Pakistani households consider narcotics to be a very serious problem for Pakistanis. The comparable figure for the rest of the population is 65 percent. A large number among the OP households tends to believe that Pakistanis and not foreigners are the principle users of heroin and opium.

TABLE

Question: According to your information is the problem of heroin and opium a very serious problem for Pakistanis, somewhat serious or not serious at all?

Percent of respondents

	OPs ---	Others -----
Very serious problem	79	65
Serious problem	19	24
Not at problem at all	2	7
No Response	-	4

TABLE

Question: Some people say that foreigners are the principal users of heroin and opium. Others say that the users of heroin and opium are principally Pakistanis. In your view who are the principal users: Pakistanis or Foreigners?

Percent of Respondents

	OPs ---	Others -----
Pakistanis	48	39
Foreigners	49	51
No Response	3	10

Burden to Fight Narcotics:

Compared with the rest of the population, the Overseas Pakistani households are slightly more inclined to believe that the producer countries should bear the principal burden to fight narcotics.

TABLE

Question: Some people say that the problem of heroin and opium should be solved by countries where the users live. Others say that the problem should be solved by countries where heroin and opium are produced. What is your view?

	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>	
	<u>OPs</u> ---	<u>Others</u> -----
User countries	18	21
Producer countries	79	72
No Response	3	7

ATTITUDES TOWARDS HEALTH CARE

The issue of child care, especially the issue of diarrhea among children was chosen to compare the level of awareness on health issues among the Overseas Pakistani households and the rest of the population.

The respondents were asked whether they had ever heard the name of Oral Rehydration Salt, which is also known in Pakistan by its brand name 'Nimkol'. The survey showed that 73 percent among the Overseas Pakistani households had about Nimkol. The comparable figure for the rest of the population was 66 percent. The level of awareness about Oral Rehydration Salt, a slightly more abstract name, was 56 percent among the Overseas Pakistani households and 42 percent among the rest of the population.

TABLE

Question: Are you aware of (have you ever heard the name of)

a: Nimkol b: ORS

	<u>Percent of respondents</u>	
	<u>OPs</u> ---	<u>Others</u> -----
Nimkol	73	66
ORS	56	42

ATTITUDES TOWARDS EDUCATION

The Overseas Pakistanis are very keen to move up on the social scale. They wish to send their children to English medium schools, which are generally regarded as a vehicle for upward mobility. In response to a question which asked: "What kind of schools would you like your children to be educated in", 52 percent of Overseas Pakistani households wished their children to go to English medium schools. The comparable figure for the rest of the population is 30 percent. These differences could also result from the fact that English medium schools are more expensive. While many Overseas Pakistani households could afford to send their children to these schools, the less to do in the rest of the population would not expect to send their children to English medium schools because of financial constraints.

TABLE

Question: In what language schools would you like your children to be educated: English or Urdu?

	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>	
	<u>OPs</u> ---	<u>Others</u> -----
English language schools	52	30
Urdu language schools	40	53
No Response	8	17

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

PERSONAL AND PUBLIC CONCERNS

Compared with the general population Overseas' Pakistani households give greater importance to political issues. But, they also place considerable emphasis on personal security. On the other hand they are less concerned than the rest of the population with inflation. The issue of unemployment, however, irritates both the groups almost equally.

TABLE

Question: In your view what is the most important problem being faced by the country"

Percent of respondents

	OPs ---	Others -----
Unemployment	37	36
Inflation	16	26
Bomb blasts	20	14
Theft, dacoities	6	7
Political Issues	5	4
Others	14	11
No Response	2	2

TABLE

Question: What is the most important problem being faced by
you personally these days?

TABLE

Percent of respondents

	OPs ---	Others -----
Financial/Business	47	56
Family	11	9
Insecurity of life and property	20	15
Others	6	4
No opinion	16	16

POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

The Overseas Pakistani households do not differ from the rest of the population in terms of their political affiliations. But they are slightly more in favour of a politicized environment, and support elections with political parties by a few percentage points more than the rest of the population.

TABLE

Question: If all political parties nominated their candidates in the next elections for the national parliament, who would you vote for?

Percent of respondents

	<u>OPS</u> ---	<u>Others</u> -----
Muslim League	38	41
Peoples Party	22	20
Jamaat-e-Islami	8	6
All other parties	16	18
No opinion	16	15

TABLE

Question: Would you say that elections should be held on
party basis or non party basis?

Percent of respondents

	<u>OPS</u> ---	<u>Others</u> -----
<u>LOCAL BODY ELECTIONS</u>		
Party	58	53
Non Party	24	25
No opinion	18	22
<u>NATIONAL ELECTIONS</u>		
Party	61	59
Non party	18	18
No opinion	21	23

FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES

In general the Overseas Pakistanis, like the rest of the population, express strongly patriotic attitudes. But compared with the rest of the population, they are more opinionated on relations with India and the United States. They are more likely than the rest of the population to oppose a no war pact with India, and to approve intimate aid relations with the United States. Meanwhile, they are more forceful than the rest of the population to reject aid with strings.

TABLE

Question: Under the present circumstances should Pakistan sign a no war pact with India or not?

Percent of respondents

	OPS ---	Others -----
Favour of no war pact	57	57
Oppose	28	17
No opinion	15	26

TABLE

Question: How great would you say is the chance of war with
India?

Percent of respondents

	<u>OPS</u> ---	<u>Others</u> -----
Very high	19	19
Little	42	33
None	14	15
No Response	25	33

TABLE

Question: In your view should Pakistan sign an agreement
for economic and military aid with America?

Percent of respondents

	OPS ---	Others -----
Support	52	42
Oppose	28	25
No opinion	20	30

TABLE

Question: If America were to impose the condition that Pakistan would get aid only if it gives the assurance that it would not make a nuclear bomb, what should Pakistan do?

Percent of respondents

	<u>OPS</u> ---	<u>Others</u> -----
Refuse aid	70	60
Accept condition	8	10
No opinion	22	33

Appendix

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The data in this study are based on three different surveys: Part I - III rely on an International Migration survey conducted at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in 1979-80, and a survey conducted at the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion in 1982-83. Part IV relies on a recent survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan in 1987. The research procedures adopted in each one of the studies are given below:

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION SURVEY

The study bases itself on primary data generated by five different surveys during which 15000 migrants and their households were interviewed. The migrants were interviewed at three international airports of Pakistan and a sub-sample of their families was traced to approximately 250 villages and 50 towns and cities. The five surveys were carefully designed as part of an elaborate sampling plan: Two surveys were conducted directly with the migrant, one with permanently returned migrants, one with left behind household members of the migrant worker, and the last with households from where no one had migrated abroad which served as a control group for purposes of comparison between the behaviour of migrant and non-migrant households.

The information collected by the five surveys was supplemented by in-depth observations and data from secondary sources.

PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

The objective of the survey was to provide information which would be necessary to plan welfare activities for the benefit of the Overseas Pakistanis community.

In the light of the objective, the first issue was to give an operational definition to the Overseas Pakistanis community. This was done by categorizing the Overseas Pakistanis into three distinct groups: Overseas Pakistani Workers, the left behind families of the Overseas Pakistanis and the returnee migrants.

Having identified the above mentioned three distinct groups for the study, it was necessary to design an appropriate sample and a research instrument to obtain the desired information from each group.

It was decided that the left behind families and the returnee migrants would be interviewed in their households, while the Overseas Pakistani workers would be interviewed at the international airports in Karachi and Islamabad. Keeping in view the objective of the study that is, providing an

information base to organize the welfare activities of the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, it was decided to conduct the study in five high migration districts, one in each of the four provinces and the fifth in Azad Kashmir. Based on this decision the research design for the study provided for conducting representative sample surveys of all households in each district. A given number of migrant households and returnee households were selected for interviewing through a random search process from randomly selected villages and towns in each district.

Regarding interviews with the Overseas Pakistani workers a period of two weeks with normal air-traffic was selected. Interviewers were posted inside the departing lounge, where they interviewed a given number of departing passengers waiting to board their planes after having spent their vacations in Pakistan.

In addition to the structured interviews conducted with the above mentioned three groups, unstructured interviews were conducted in five selected villages, one in each of the districts included in this study. The purpose of the unstructured interviews was defined as 'quasi participant observation'. Research Assistants were posted in the selected villages for approximately one month. They were

provided with written guidelines in the light of which they prepared their observations about the impact of international migration on the village under their observation.

The researchers assigned to work in the five villages also prepared a detailed profile of their respective village, which included information on the physical characteristics, economic resources, social customs, village hierarchy and a brief history of both the village and the migratory flow from it. A few days each were also spent in the five villages by the study Director and two other researchers of the research team for this project.

The purpose of introducing the notion of 'quasi participant observation' was to draw on the merits of the anthropological method, while still remaining within the financial resources of the project and its time schedule.

The primary information collected through the surveys was supplemented by the published census information on the five selected districts. Detailed statistical profiles of each of the five districts were prepared which gave their population, area, geography and the various public services presently available in the district.

GALLUP SURVEY

The survey was designed so as to select two statistically representative sets of households: One representing the Overseas Pakistanis and the other representing the rest of the population. The purpose was to compare these two sets of people on a number of criteria, such as their socio-economic profile, attitudes on social and political issues and exposure to the mass media.

In order to achieve these objectives, a nationally random set of households was statistically selected, following the procedure of two stage area probability sampling. The following steps were taken:

Step # 1 : All villages in the country numbering approximately 45,000 were listed. Similarly all urban localities were divided into blocks of approximately 1000 persons, and listed. These amounted to approximately 30,000 units. The approximately 75,000 units achieved in this fashion were arranged according to the districts in the country.

Step # 2 : From the above listing, a random selection of 100 villages and 75 urban blocks was made. The selection was made in proportion to district populations, but such that almost all districts would be represented by at least one sampling point.

point.

Step # 3 : All households falling in the 175 statistically selected locations were listed, alongwith the name of the head of the household.

Step # 4 : For each sampling location a random starting point was selected. This name and address was provided to the interviewers to use as their first respondent. Thereafter the interviewers were required to interview 10 households in rural points and 20 households in urban points. They were required to interview every third household following certain specified guidelines.

Thus 1002 rural households and 1485 urban households were interviewed, totalling upto a total of 2487 households.

The respondents were then categorized by way of their migration status. Of the 2487 interviewed households 331 were identified as Overseas Pakistani households and 2156 were categorized as the rest of the population.

A similar set of questions dealing with the socio-economic profile, social and political attitudes and exposure to the mass media were administered to both sets of population.

The entire data was computer processed.

A weight adjustment was applied in order to correct the rural urban composition of the sample. The wights were applied so that the sample would approximate the national rural urban ratios. The weighted results were used for the analysis in this report.