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The Four R's of Afghanistan

A Study of Pak-Afghan Relations and Their
Impact on Foreign Policy Attitudes in
Pakistan

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THE FOUR 'R's OF AFGHANISTAN

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on Foreign Policy Attitudes in Pakistan

Ijaz S. Gilani

REFUGEES

RESISTANCE

REGIME

RUSSIA



PAKISTAN
INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION
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Ijaz S. Gilani

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
THE FOUR 'R's OF AFGHANISTAN	5
Refugees: Confounding a historically generated scenario	
Resistance: Terrorism or National Uprising	
Regime (Karmal): Rich in form, poor in substance	
Russia: Seeking equal penetration rights in Pakistan	
FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES IN PAKISTAN	17
Attitudes towards India	
Attitudes towards Global Powers	
CONCLUSIONS	27

INTRODUCTION

Pak-Afghan relations have been transformed so drastically in the last five years that it should appropriately be referred to as a very young field of study. One cannot deny the utility of consulting the existing literature concerning Pakistan and Afghan foreign policies or the internal processes of each society. But, we should also be weary of the phenomenon of 'misuse of history'. Pak-Afghan relations have changed on such a scale that we may be studying a phenomenon which if not new, is at least qualitatively different from what had passed under this name in the past.

Pak-Afghan relations today are no more the relations between two governments, nor even between two countries. There are at least four major segments which define Pak-Afghan relations in their elementary state-centric model, ignoring for a moment the broader context in which the contemporary theorists analyze international relations. The elementary Pak-Afghan relations today involve the following four segments:

- Refugees
- Resistance
- Regime (Karmal)
- Russia (more than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan)

Refugees number nearly twenty percent of Afghan population; Resistance claims to control vast territories inside Afghanistan; Regime reigns over the state apparatus; and Russia cannot deny to rule Afghanistan when more than a hundred thousand strong Soviet army mans the Afghan state apparatus.

In the face of such competing claimants to the person of Afghanistan, one is baffled to speak about Pak-Afghan relations. But such is the contemporary situation and we can only attempt to bring some order out of this complexity — in our understanding, if not in the reality we are studying.

The first requirement in our search for orderly understanding would be to look at Pak-Afghan relations as a phenomenon quite distinct from the past, surely influenced by it, but not in its continuation. It is a major *Discontinuity*.

Discontinuity

I emphasize the discontinuity aspect; because it is sometimes ignored by the rest of the world — although the major factors themselves: Pakistan and the four 'R's of Afghanistan I have mentioned earlier, do not ignore the discontinuity due to the simple reason that they are going through its first hand experience.

The discontinuity is so sharp that Pakistan, the government and the people alike, have drastically altered their perceptions of friends and foes in the region as well as globally. Their perspectives about India, America, Russia, and the Muslim world are pertinent cases in point.

The discontinuity has no less sharp implications for the internal dynamics of Pakistan. The Frontier province which was known at home and abroad for secessionist tendencies, demonstrates today more intense patriotism than any other part of the country. The 'Pash-toonistan' issue which in the last decade, as in the previous two, was the major thorn in Pak-Afghan relations has suddenly disappeared from the agenda. The former

proponents of 'Pashtoonistan' have become in a matter of a few years the 'nativist' opponents of the Afghan refugees, while the Islamic opponents of Pashtoonistan appear to be the major champions of Afghan inroads in the Pakistani territory.

It is in this perspective that we ought to understand the current state of the Refugees, Resistance, (Karmal) Regime and Russia (in Afghanistan). Pakistan is involved in a singularly herculian task of dealing with the four in one. This paper shall take up each of the four segments, explain what they are, and the way in which they relate to Pakistan. The paper will than go on to explain the transformation in foreign policy attitudes in Pakistan, especially concerning relations with India and the United States of America.

Wherever possible this paper relies on empirical information, drawn from surveys concerning the perceptions of Pakistani population about Afghan refugees, and the Afghan regime and about the relations of Pakistan with the United States and the Soviet Union.

THE FOUR 'R's OF AFGHANISTAN

Refugees, Resistance, Regime, Russia

Refugees

Confounding a 'historically generated Scenario'

There is considerable amount of speculation about the effects of three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It is undeniably an immense number. How and why has the local population tolerated such unparalleled influx of refugees and sustained it for several years? Indeed the potential of frictions between the refugees and the local population is often seen as a volcano on which the Pakistanis are sitting.

Looking at this question empirically the most interesting aspect is the lack of congruence between theory and expectations on the one hand and reality on the other.

The expected scenario was as follows: A nativist pressure will soon build up against the inflow of hundreds of thousands of refugees. The refugees will compete with the local population for limited economic resources, including land, pastures, trade and business. Despite shared cultural traits, the two populations are not identical, hence cultural and tribal difference will provide the ground for mutual conflagration. It would be fuelled by the underlying economic conflict. The Soviets and the Afghan regime would be successful in heavily infiltrating the ranks of the refugees. They would be instrumental in igniting the potential conflict. Many refugees would flock to the cities, and become rootless and disorganised trouble makers. Crimes such as prostitution, drug abuse and street violence would flourish.

This scenario was projected fairly early after the refugee influx, and appeared, as it still does, perfectly plausible. Its validity had been demonstrated so clearly in other parts of the world, especially, Middle East and Indo-China.

The 'bias of history' among analysts is so strong that I am often baffled at Pakistani as well as foreign analysts discussing the Afghan refugee issue in the light of this historically generated scenario, as if it was a reality which scarcely needed to be checked with empirical information.

The scenario may turn out to be true, some expect in the long run. But, the fact of the matter is that it is not yet true, almost five years after the major influx began. Any sound analysis must therefore begin from an empirical verification of this scenario. We can then go on to identify the causes which are responsible for our scenario not coming true, and to see whether it is only a matter of time before it would.

Public Attitudes on the Refugees Question

In a nationally representative survey conducted in April 1980, 87 percent of the respondents said the government of Pakistan must help the Afghan refugees. A follow up question in the same survey educated the respondents on the possible cost of supporting the Afghan refugees. This was an attempt to see if they would revise their views in that light. Only 3 percent became reluctant to support the Afghan refugees when they were told that it could provoke Soviet hostility.

This public opinion survey was repeated in 1982, 1983 and 1984. There is a slight decline in the public support for the Afghan refugees, but it still remains overwhelming.

The public opinion survey also probed the willingness to give private help to the refugees: only 13 per cent disapproved that Pakistanis in their personal capacity should help the Afghan refugees.

It is significant to note that this high level of public support to the Afghan refugees is maintained despite realizing that the refugees are an economic burden, and the fear that they may be infiltrated by saboteurs. About two third of the respondents believed that the refugees were an economic burden and about half feared the infiltration by saboteurs.

The tranquil situation between the refugees and the local population seems to rest on widespread public support on the refugee question, which is not naive about the costs of supporting the refugees in terms of inviting Soviets hostilities, economic cost and threat to the local law and order situation.

Table 1

Table 2

It is also noteworthy that while the popular support for the Afghan refugees cuts across regional and political divisions, the support is less than unanimous among the elites. According to a survey of the national population, a majority of the supporters of all political parties support assistance to the refugees. This is, however, not true of the political and intellectual elites, which is shown by hostile political statements by PPP, NDP, PNP occasionally joined in by Tehrik Istiqlal and even JUP. This hostility towards the refugees is also expressed in newspaper articles published by a section of the intellectuals and former civil servants.¹ One finds a discrepancy between the views of political leaders and their

rank and file: 62 percent of National Democratic Party (NDP) and 61 percent of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) voters² approve that government and even they personally should help the refugees. But their leaderships take actively anti-refugee position.

Would the rank and file persuade their leaders to shift their position, or would the leaders sway their rank and file in favour of their own position may well be a crucial issue in the future. It must, however, be noted that there is a modest declining trend in public support for the Afghan refugees. This calls for caution by the Government which must not take step that would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The recent steps to curtail refugee movement in cities such as Peshawar can have more negative than positive influence on the harmony between the local population and the refugees.

RESISTANCE

Terrorism or National Uprising

The Afghan resistance is in many ways unique in its inability to project its strength in the world media. Most other contemporary resistance movements, for example, Algerian, Vietnamese and Palestinian, were able to make use of global communication networks and modern image making skills; they managed to project an image, some would accuse, larger than the actual size of their struggle.

The scale of the Afghan resistance and its untiring continuity is often beclouded by news about its factionalism and internal bickering. Its military activities are, however, one of the most remarkable in recent history. The reality of its potency is validated by the fact that the Soviet estimates about pacification of Afghanistan are being continuously stretched further.

The resistance is active in almost all provinces and all the major urban centres. It is not a guerilla movement which commits sporadic acts of terrorism in order to keep itself in world attention and to keep its issue alive. Instead the Afghan resistance is closer to a sustained national uprising. It is engaged in an active war with the Soviet-Karmal forces. Unlike several other liberation struggles where the problem was to provoke and mobilize the population through profound acts of courage and sacrifice, the Afghan resistance rides over an already mobilized population. Its problem is a gigan-

tic enemy and not mobilizing its own people. The geographical scope and the scale of the resistance activities can be judged from a monthly monitoring of the combat situations and losses incurred by the Soviet-Karmal forces. Following is a consolidated picture for the past six months of 1984.³

Table 3

Relationship with the Government and the People of Pakistan

The resistance has enjoyed fairly good relations with the Government of Pakistan. Except for a few instances in recent months when the Government asked the resistance leaders to shift their headquarters out of Peshawar on grounds of security and crowding, there has rarely been any public expression of differences. The Government of Pakistan takes the position that it should play a passive role with regard to the internal dynamics and factionalism of the resistance. This policy has, however, led some to speculate that the Government of Pakistan prefers to deal with a fragmented resistance rather than a unified front which would enjoy international stature and greater obedience from the refugee population, and which might constrain the freedom of action enjoyed by the Pakistani authorities.⁴

The relationship of the resistance with the non-governmental groups in Pakistan have been fairly cordial with the exception of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Frontier. The NDP has accused the resistance to play a partisan role in favour of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan. There are signs, however, in recent weeks that the NDP leadership may, for fear of losing its Pushtoon constituency which is its only power base, rethink its attitude towards the Afghan refugees and resistance.

REGIME

Rich in Form, Poor in Substance

The foremost demand of the Kabul regime from Pakistan is recognition. It is by all accounts a regime installed and controlled by the Soviet forces. Yet, it maintains a facade of independence and an increasingly elaborate state structure. Its success in establishing an independent state structure is, however, more in form than reality. The government, party, armed forces, professional and functional groups do exist, but without much substance and authority to them. The French government was successful in establishing the subservient nature of the Kabul regime by putting pressure on the Soviet Union and not Kabul to release the French Journalist Jacques Abouchar.

Despite the subservient status of the Kabul regime, the Moscow-Kabul circles have been successful in convincing an important section of the Pakistani political and intellectual leadership that the Karmal regime should be recognized. The PPP leadership has publically supported the recognition of the Karmal regime, as have the National Democratic Party (NDP), Pakistan National Party (PNP), Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP) and Tehrik Istiqlal leaderships.

While the elite is divided on this question, the common public opinion seems to go along with the government's position that the Karmal regime is not sufficiently independent of Soviet control; moreover since the Is-

lamic Conference had taken a decision not to recognize the Kabul government, Pakistan must follow that policy.

Table 4

The Afghan regime maintains an indirect contact with Pakistan at the Geneva 'proximity' talks. But the Pakistan government and the outside world consider it as a forum of peace bargaining with the Soviet Union rather than the Karmal regime.

The Government of Pakistan is also the victim of a very hostile propaganda by the Karmal regime, which actively promotes and supports whoever seems to challenge Zia. It supported the left wing movement for the Restoration of Democracy and the Islamic students during different phases of the past one year, depending on their judgement of who posed a potent threat to the Pakistani authorities. According to a content analysis of Kabul radio broadcasts, the following picture emerges:

Table 5

RUSSIA

Seeking Equal 'Penetration Rights' in Pakistan

Like many other former colonies, Pakistan can be viewed as a highly penetrated country by Western political and social influences. It inherits a state apparatus established by the British empire. Its civil service and the military have retained their colonial structure and socialization practices, and they still heavily depend upon Western training and finances. Its education system is subservient to Western models through language of instruction (English), information media and Western dominated higher learning and research. Its economy is heavily dependent on Western debts. Thus with a highly penetrated bureaucracy, military, economy and education, Pakistan is still passing through a neo-colonial phase. Unfortunately the Soviet Union is increasingly threatening Pakistan to allow it to enjoy the same neo-colonial rights which it believes are enjoyed by Western powers. The equal right of penetration is the principal Soviet theme in recent months. It seeks such rights in terms of education, economy, strategic capabilities etc.

In pursuing the theme of equal neo-colonial rights the Soviet Union presents both the stick and the carrot. It has made vague offers of large scale economic and technical assistance as a carrot; and it has shown its muscle through air raids across the Pak-Afghan borders, and through openly associating itself with internal dissidents in Pakistan.

According to informed observers the Russians are presently training several thousand Pakistani youth who were carefully recruited and covertly sent to Soviet educational institutions (Estimates range between two to five thousands). They may be used by the Soviet Union as an instrument to challenge Pakistani authorities in the future. According to certain other observers, however, these Pakistani youth may be used by the Soviets as their loyal colonial service in Afghanistan, parallel to the Indian colonial officers in the British Empire.

The Pakistan government appears to play very cautious in dealing with the Soviet Union. It has strived to maintain cordial bilateral relations, while demonstrating its determination to resist various Soviet pressures. There is, nevertheless, the loss of nerve and exhaustion among certain important segments of the elites, who advise making greater accommodation with the Soviet demands and look for the so called 'Neutralization' and 'Finlandization' solutions.

Pakistan's dilemma is that the Soviet policies are pushing it towards greater reliance on the West. It would wish to be more independent and self reliant than it is today. But it seems unlikely that it would make any progress towards liberating itself from foreign dependence by acquiescing to the demands of one more giant.

FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDE IN PAKISTAN:

Transformed by the new Pak-Afghan Relations

FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDE IN PAKISTAN

Attitudes Towards India

Pakistan is perhaps best recognized in international circles for its hostility towards India. It is a country, the informed audience of the world media know, which carved itself out of the Indian Union. It fought several wars with India: In 1948, 1965 and 1971. It sought Western help in its confrontation with India, and some believed that while it assumed an anti-communist posture, it was in fact strengthening itself militarily against India; the anti-communism, they said, was only a smoke-screen. Pakistan's relationship with India was recognized to be the basis of its relations with the rest of the world. In short, it could be argued that the government and the public alike, were obsessed with India. This obsession was the result of similar obsession by India, or, as others might say, it provoked similar response from India.

We shall explain in this section that while this portrait of Pakistan might have been true in the past, it is not valid any more. That is a significant discontinuity aspect of the post-Afghan crisis Pakistan. The Indian threat has been overtaken by the more imminent danger from the Soviet Union.

The Pakistan of today is a markedly different Pakistan. A majority of the Pakistanis today would like their government to sign a no war pact with India. Approximately 50 percent of the respondents in a nationality

representative survey support a no war pact with India as against only 20 percent who oppose such a pact, and the remaining 30 percent find themselves unable to answer this question. These figures have remained within a small margin of fluctuation over the last four years since such surveys were conducted (1981–1984).

The four year survey data reported in this paper demonstrates that there is a strong basis for the changed attitudes towards India and that several negative developments were unable to shake this new attitude. For example, the fear of war with India sharply increased in 1984. But it did not revive anti-India feelings in Pakistan. While the people became more concerned about a possible war with India, they still retained their support for a no war pact.

Those who feared that there was a very strong possibility of war with India rose from 12 percent (1983) to 21 percent (1984). But the percentage of those supporting no war pact with India declined by only 3 percent during the same period (55 percent to 52 percent).

Table 6

Table 7

Similarly widely reported communal riots between Hindus and Muslims caused only modest and temporary change in the attitudes of Pakistani population. In October 1980 communal riots in Muradabad (India) were being widely reported in the Pakistani press during the survey period. But the support for no war pact declined by only 7 percent as compared to the previous survey, which was carried out in more normal situation (see Table 6).

There appears to be an enduring change in the public mind concerning India. It is the contention of this paper that this change is caused by the Afghan crisis and the strong apprehension that Pakistan can become a victim of Soviet expansionism. The fear of India is today felt more as a surrogate for Soviet expansionism than on its own merit. Pakistanis are willing to come to an agreement with India about common cause against the possible Soviet Threat. Thus when the Government of Pakistan pursues a no war pact with India, it does so in the wake of deeply felt public support on this issue.

We would, however, be misreading the situation if we believed that Pakistanis would be willing to dilute their separate identity vis-a-vis India. Corresponding with the willingness to make peace with India is a strong feeling of self awareness and separate nationhood. The Independence Day Celebrations marking the creation of Pakistan as a separate homeland have been marked in recent years by unparalleled enthusiasm. It should be seen as a spontaneous response of the population in the wake of imminent threat to their survival and independence. Pakistanis are willing to make peace with India in order to preserve their independence, which should not be wrongly read as their willingness to give up their political identity. A slightest hint of political confederation with India, even in limited quarters, raises many eyebrows. The strategic cooperation does not appear to be acceptable in return for sacrificing separate political identity. After all, that is precisely what Pakistanis are trying to preserve, and it is for that purpose that they are willing to change their conception of friends and foes on the world scene.

Attitudes Towards Global Powers

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan evoked signi-

ficant influence in the minds of the Pakistani public. *Firstly*, it convinced many Pakistanis that the Soviet Union was a stronger power than the United States. The subsequent inability of the Soviet Union to consolidate its power, however, led them to change their view. *Secondly*, the Afghan situation created willingness among Pakistanis to seek military and economic assistance from the United States. *Thirdly*, it reinforced a feeling of unfriendliness towards the Soviet Union and *Fourthly*, it strengthened Pakistani attitudes of fraternity with the Muslim World and increasing identification with the non-aligned movement.

We shall give a brief treatment to each of the above subjects.

Perception of Soviet and American Power

In October 1979, 34 percent of the Pakistanis believed that the United States was a stronger power than the Soviet Union. This was a considerably higher number compared to those who believed the Soviet Union was stronger: Only 21 percent. Six months later, the situation had completely reversed. In a survey in April 1980, 31 percent thought the Soviet Union was stronger as opposed to only 26 percent who believed the Americans were stronger. The event during this interlude, which seems to be responsible for the change in attitudes, was the intervention of Soviet army in Afghanistan.

In subsequent years the prestige of the American might does not seem to have recovered in the minds of the Pakistani public. But, the Soviets did lose their enhanced prestige. While the perception of American power has remained steady over the four years since 1980, the Soviet prestige has dipped to an even lower

level than where it stood immediately before its intervention in Afghanistan.

Table 8

Attitudes Towards American Assistance

The American military and economic aid agreement has enjoyed a fairly high degree of public support among all segments of the population: 60 percent give their support and less than 10 percent oppose it.

Table 9

It is difficult to conceive the high level of support in a population which highly values its nuclear programme (82 percent of the respondents in a national survey fully agree that Pakistan should make a bomb) and regarded the Camp David peace harmful for the interest of the Muslim world. (47 percent thought Egyptian rapprochement with Israel was against the interest of Muslims, and only 11 percent thought it was not). The high level of support is also maintained despite the feeling that American friendship is not credible and that Americans may not actually come to help Pakistan in time of need. The Pakistanis also feel let down because they feel that Russia gives more dependable support to India.

It appears that despite these several reservations, the Pakistani public is willing to go ahead and establish a major aid relationship with America for the simple reason that it feels strongly threatened by the Afghan situation.

It is interesting to note that the voters of the religious parties extend a high degree of support to American

aid programme, despite their strong opposition to the American culture and Western influence. The voters of Muslim League and the three leading religious parties demonstrate a higher than the average level of support for accepting American assistance.

Table 10

The intense opposition of the religious circles to America's society and cultural influence on Pakistan, and its support for economic and military collaboration with it shows that unlike Iran, Islamic 'fundamentalism' in Pakistan is pragmatic on foreign policy. Its support for military and economic collaboration with the United States is a direct outcome of its close identification with the Afghan resistance.

The Unfriendly Image of Russia

The image of Soviet Union among Pakistanis seems to have suffered a further setback as a result of its intervention in Afghanistan. In response to a question: "If you were to choose between the Soviet Union and the United States as a friend, who would you opt for", only 6 percent opted for the Soviet Union.

This was in comparison to 42 percent who opted for the United States, and 25 percent who preferred to stay neutral (see Table 11). The Soviet Union is seen in Pakistan as a close ally of India, and it is feared that if Indians were ever to attack Pakistan, it would be with Soviet assistance. Sixty six percent expressed this view in a national survey (see Table 12).

Table 11

Table 12

Pakistan Looks Towards the Muslim World and the Non-Aligned Movement

Pakistan's religious and cultural affinity with the Muslim World and the declining prestige of both the United States and the Soviet Union seems to increasingly drift the Pakistanis towards the Muslim world and the non-aligned movement. These trends have been strongly reinforced by the Afghan crisis.

Despite many reservations in the intellectual circles, several surveys show that Saudi Arabia turns out to be most favourite country among Pakistanis, and an increasing number of Pakistanis prefer to stay neutral if they were to choose between the Soviet Union and the United States as a friend.

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to demonstrate the fundamental transformation in Pak-Afghan relations since December 1979. Pakistan is today dealing with a highly fractured Afghanistan consisting of at least four major segments: Refugees, Resistance, Regime and Russia. Pakistan's pursuit of a successful Afghan policy depends on its prudent handling of these four interrelated segments as a whole and not in isolation of each other.

The Afghan refugees have managed to establish remarkably peaceful and harmonious relationship with the local population. But, it is not a situation which can continue indefinitely. The peaceful absorption of 3 million refugees over the last five years is an exceptional event. It should be handled with utmost caution and foresight; neither being complacent about the possibilities of increasing conflict between the native and the refugee population, nor causing self-fulfilling prophecies to come true by overzealous action to prevent conflict.

The Afghan resistance is engaged in an ongoing war of national liberation. It appears that the effective continuation of this resistance is the primary cause for bringing around Soviet-Karmal representatives to the Geneva negotiations seeking, inter alia, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Moreover, the continuing resistance inside Afghanistan alone has prevented (or postponed) foreclosing options other than fait accompli and acquiescence to Soviet occupation of Afghanis-

tan. The linkage between the Afghan resistance and the prospects of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan through the UN-sponsored Geneva talks or any subsequent negotiating process deserves due appreciation.

The Afghan regime is perhaps the least relevant of the four segments of Afghanistan today. Installed by the Soviets and rejected by its own people, it has lost its identity and enjoys little legitimacy. Despite Soviet insistence to recognize the Kabul regime, Pakistan does not find any wisdom in dealing with an entity which is entirely subservient to the Soviet Union. Its recognition would only legitimize Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Russia is undeniably the last among the colonial powers. Through its actions over the previous decade, it has bestowed fresh legitimacy to the use of overt military force in international diplomacy, a trend which other powers have been quick to emulate. As a result of Soviet advances Pakistan finds itself sandwiched between the undesirable legacy of its colonial past and an encroaching power, seeking what appears in effect new colonial privileges.

In the face of these many challenges, Pakistan has acted courageously and pragmatically. It has withstood Soviet pressures often orchestrated with similar pressures from India. It has also been pragmatic in seeking assistance from the United States and working in coordination with the West on the Afghan issue at a time when it is facing tremendous internal and external impulses for relieving itself from its past political and economic penetration by the West. Pakistan has also acted rationally in reversing its stance towards India by adopting a more friendly position towards her.

But, will Pakistan be able to sustain Soviet harassment, economic burden of the refugees and internal doubts about its ability to escape being sandwiched between the penetration impulses of the two super powers? Most Pakistanis, including this author, have the faith that it would.

Table 1
Public Support for the Afghan Refugees

	Percent of Respondents					
	Agree		Don't agree		Don't know	
	1983	1984	1983	1984	1983	1984
Afghan refugees must be supported by the Pakistan government	84	76	9	11	7	13
Afghan refugees must be supported by every Pakistani	80	75	11	13	9	12

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National Surveys.

Table 2
Public Apprehension About the Afghan Refugees

	Percent of Respondents					
	Agree		Don't agree		Don't know	
	1983	1984	1983	1984	1983	1984
Afghan refugees are an economic burden on Pakistan's economy	66	67	26	21	8	12
Afghan refugees are heavily infiltrated by saboteurs	43	47	47	37	11	6

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National Surveys.

**SCALE OF THE AFGHAN WAR OF RESISTANCE:
Selected Indicators**

	Total mil'y ops (Muj & S-K): Muj sources	S-K ops: Kabul-Moscow sources	Human Losses: Mujahideen sources					* "Counter-revolutionaries" (Muj & civilian) losses: Kabul-Moscow sources	Soviet-Karmal Material Losses: Mujahideen sources	Mujahideen Material Losses: Kabul-Moscow sources	Economic Destruction By Soviet-Karmal forces: Mujahideen sources	By Mujahideen: Kabul-Moscow sources
			Soviet	Karmal	Soviet-Karmal (speculative loss)	Mujahideen	Afghan civilians					
Apr*	123 (23)	87 (21)	211	327	439	210	est. 2000	est. 1000-1500	4 tanks; 3 HLs; 96 tanks/APCs; 31 HMVs; 6 oil tankers; 6 jeeps			
May	172 (22)	107 (21)	est. 400	291	est. 500	est. 400	est. 1000	est. 1000	8 aircraft; 24 HLs; 117 tanks; 46 APCs; 60 HMVs/trucks; 4 munition depots; 3 oil storages; 2 radar units.	13 munition dumps (incl. anti-tank mines, mortar shells & rockets); 4 food depots; 107 lt & hvy arms; anti-aircraft units; 2 wireless transmission sets; 4 motor cycles.	4 villages; 1450 houses; 1 flour mill; 1 mosque	
Jun	168 (26)	78 (19)	250	342	818	245	est. 2000	est. 1000-2000	11 aircraft; 8 HLs; 83 tanks; 28 APCs; 43 HMVs; 48 oil tankers; 28 trucks; 5 munition dumps; 222 Kalashnikov rifles.	51 munition dumps; 130 lt & hvy arms; several food depots; 400 pairs footwear; 1 medical storeroom; 5 telephone units; 1 typewriter; 11 motorcycles	35 houses; 3 villages; 5 mosques; large number houses; hundreds cattle.	
Jul	258 (23)	144 (25)	319	300	2000	196	1500	est. 1500-2000	13 aircraft; 22 HLs; 78 tanks; 31 APCs; 63 HMVs; 150 tanks/APCs/trucks; 29 oil tankers; large quantity munition	100 anti-tank mines; 20 crates hand-grenades; 38 munition dumps; 100 lt & hvy arms.	13 villages, 113 wheat stocks; 3 huge lots livestock.	
Aug	267 (26)	178 (25)	236	423	est. 1500	271	est. 1100	est. 1000	13 aircraft; 22 HLs; 108 tanks; 38 APCs; 60 tanks/APCs; 89 MVs; 44 trucks; 14 oil tankers; large quantity lt & hvy arms.	55 dumps munition; large variety arms	800 houses, 1000 cattle; 180 wheat stocks.	
Sep	157 (27)	87 (22)	75	320	est. 1000	402	est. 1000	est. 1500	13 aircraft; over 1 doz. HLs; 88 tanks; 141 tanks/APCs; 47 HMVs; 114 trucks; 17 oil tankers; 150 lt & hvy arms; 2 munition dumps; 2 communication centres.	10 munition dumps (incl. anti-tank mines; anti-personnel mines, hand-grenades); 140 lt & hvy arms (incl. rocket launchers, mortar units); 18 tons wheat; several food & medical depots; 4 motor-cycles; 1 vehicle.	430 houses; 4 villages; large quantity cattle; 8 mosques; 3 agricultural stocks.	

* Figures under Mujahideen sources exclude losses in Panjshir Valley.

** Babrak Karmal told PDPA meeting on September 22 that 23,000 anti-government guerrillas had been killed since spring 1984 (BBC: September 23, 1984).

*** The figure in parenthesis indicates the number of provinces (out of a total of 29) where combat took place.

Source: Raja Ehsan Aziz et. al. *Afghanistan Report*, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 1984 (Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).

* According to daily *Servis Kaba Yogan*, loss so far sustained by Afghanistan due to "undeclared war" amounted to half the capital invested in 20 years preceding the April 1978 Revolution (Radio Kabul: May 2, 1984).
 ** "Counter-revolutionaries" had destroyed 1820 schools, 20 hospitals and 100 polyclinics (Radio Moscow: May 2, 1984).
 *** Karmal's Foreign Minister Stan Muhammad Don told the 29th US General Assembly session that "counter-revolutionaries" had damaged property worth \$350 million. It included destruction of hundreds of schools, highways and public buildings. (BBC/VOA: September 28, 1984).

Table 4

Should Pakistan Recognize the Present
Government in Afghanistan

	Percent of Respondents	
	1983	1984
Yes	10	11
No	58	56
Don't know	32	33

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National Surveys.

Table 5

Frequency of Kabul Radio Broadcasts Highlighting
(July – September, 1984)

	July	August	September
Pakistan is a lackey of the United States	16	8	33
Encouraging hatred against the military and ridiculing President Zia-ul-Haq	19	6	26
Promoting regional/separatist feelings in Pakistan and inciting trouble in tribal areas	26	9	21

*The milder tone in August is perhaps explained by the Geneva proximity talks on Afghanistan.

Source: Figures prepared by Raja Ehsan Aziz for the Afghanistan Project at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.

Table 6

Should Pakistan Sign a No War Pact with India

	Percent of Respondents					
	1980		1981	1982	1983	1984
	April	October				
Yes	53	46	54	57	55	52
No	30	31	18	16	16	19
Don't know	18	23	28	28	29	29

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National Surveys.

Table 7

What do you Think are the Chances of War
Between India and Pakistan

	Percent of Respondents			
	1981	1982	1983	1984
Very high	19	17	12	21
Some chances	29	32	25	21
No chances	16	14	19	15
Don't know	37	36	44	43

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National Surveys.

Table 8

Who do you think is a stronger Power:
America or Russia?

	1979	1980	1981	1984
America	34	26	26	25
Russia	21	31	26	19
Equal Match	18	23	20	25
Don't know	26	20	28	31

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National Surveys.

Table 9

Do you support or oppose Pakistan's
Economic and Military aid agreement
with America

	Percent of Respondents			
	1981	1982	1983	1984
Support	60	59	60	60
Oppose	7	6	5	9
Don't know	33	35	35	31

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National Surveys.

Table 10

Do you support or oppose Pakistan's military
and economic aid agreement with America

	Percent of Respondents		
	Support	Oppose	Don't know
All Pakistan	60	9	31
Muslim League Voters	78	12	10
Jamaat-i-Islami Voters	81	6	13
Jamiat Ulema Pakistan Voters	74	11	15
Jamiat Ulema Islam Voters	80	5	15
Pakistan's Peoples Party Voters	49	17	34

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion National Surveys.

Table 11

If Pakistan had to choose between the two,
should it make friends with America or Russia

	Percent of Respondents			
	1981	1982	1983	1984
America	42	32	28	29
Russia	6	7	5	8
None	17	14	17	14
Both	8	20	19	20
Don't know	28	27	31	30

Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National
Surveys.

Table 12

If a war breaks out between India and Pakistan,
who do you think would be supported by Russia


Percent of Respondents

India	66
Pakistan	4
Russia will stand neutral	4
Don't know	27


Source: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, National
Surveys.

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1. Two among them received prominence: Sajjad Haider, a former Ambassador and Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali, a former Air Force Chief.
 2. Those who intend to vote for NDP or PPP if there were elections.
 3. For details see Raja Ehsan Aziz et. al, *Afghanistan Report*, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 1984. The Report uses Kabul/Moscow and Mujahideen Sources to make its estimates.
 4. Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1984.
- * The survey data reported in this paper are provided by the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion and were gathered under the supervision of this author. These are nationally representative surveys conducted through in-person interviews with a sample of approximately 1700 scientifically selected households located in 175 localities across the country. These localities include 100 villages and 75 urban blocs and they were selected through a two stage probability sampling technique. For results based on samples of this size, one can say with 95 percent confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects could be 3 percentage points in either direction.



Incidents reported in all 29 provinces except:
 Mujahideen sources: Samangan, Bamiyan and Ghur.
 Radio Kabul: Nimruz, Badghis, Bamiyan and Uruzgan.



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